Learning by doing,spillovers and shakeouts

This paper studies industry evolution driven by non strategic learning by doing and spillovers. We characterize a dynamic process of cost and output changes and its effect on welfare and industry profits. The paper gives conditions for shakeouts to occur and analyzes the key factors affecting these conditions. Since shakeouts could lead to a long-run social loss due to higher market concentration, there is a role for a government to play in limiting unnecessary shakeouts. The most effective way to do so is to enhance spillovers.JEL Classification: L11, L13, O31Correspondence to: Michael TroegeWe would like to thank Hans Mewis, Christophe Moussu and an anonymous referee for valuable comments and suggestions. We also benefited from comments of seminar participants at WZB, Humboldt University, Northwestern University and the EEA/ESEM 1999 meetings. Part of the research was carried out while Michael Tröge was visiting Northwestern University. Financial support by the German Research Council (DFG) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Why Punish? Social reciprocity and the enforcement of prosocial norms

Recently economists have become interested in why people who face social dilemmas in the experimental lab use the seemingly incredible threat of punishment to deter free riding. Three theories with evolutionary microfoundations have been developed to explain punishment. We survey these theories and use behavioral data from surveys and experiments to show that the theory called social reciprocity in which people punish norm violators indiscriminately explains punishment best.JEL Classification: C91, C92, D64, H41 Correspondence to: Jeffrey P. CarpenterWe thank Carolyn Craven, Corinna Noelke and two referees for comments, and Middlebury College for financial assistance. In addition, Carpenter acknowledges the support of the National Science Foundation (SES-CAREER 0092953).     

Determinants of bank’s interest margin in the aftermath of the crisis: the effect of interest rates and the yield curve slope

Empirical Economics - This paper analyses the determinants of net interest margin, focusing on the impact of interest rates and the slope of the yield curve, using a broad panel of data from 32...     

Which Firms are More Sensitive to Public Disclosure Schemes for Pollution Control? Evidence from Indonesia’s PROPER Program

This paper analyzes differences in firms’ responsiveness to PROPER, Indonesia’s public disclosure program for industrial pollution control. The overall effectiveness of this program at achieving emissions reductions and its low regulatory costs have earned it a good reputation around the world. PROPER had no deterrents or incentives other than those that arose indirectly from publicly disclosing information about the environmental performances of firms. We analyzed plant-level data to relate short- and longer-term environmental responses to facility characteristics. The results revealed that foreign-owned firms were consistently more likely to respond to the environmental rating scheme, compared to private domestic firms. This is a clear and important insight with consequences for a number of issues, such as understanding the pollution haven debate. Also, firms located in densely populated regions, particularly in Java, responded more positively to the public disclosure of PROPER ratings. The main observed effect was however given by the initial level of environmental performance of firms. Those firms that had bad environmental performance records felt pressure to improve, but if the initial abatement steps had already been taken, the incentives to improve further appeared to diminish.     

Minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups

We study minimum cost spanning tree problems with groups. We assume that agents are located in different villages, cities, etc. The groups are the agents of the same village. We introduce a rule for dividing the cost of connecting all agents to the source among the agents taking into account the group structure. We characterize this rule with several desirable properties. We prove that this rule coincides with the Owen value of the TU game associated with the irreducible matrix.     

Essential equilibria of large generalized games

We characterize the essential stability of games with a continuum of players, where strategy profiles may affect objective functions and admissible strategies. Taking into account the perturbations defined by a continuous mapping from a complete metric space of parameters to the space of continuous games, we prove that essential stability is a generic property and every game has a stable subset of equilibria. These results are extended to discontinuous large generalized games assuming that only payoff functions are subject to perturbations. We apply our results in an electoral game with a continuum of Cournot-Nash equilibria, where the unique essential equilibrium is that only politically engaged players participate in the electoral process. In addition, employing our results for discontinuous games, we determine the stability properties of competitive prices in large economies.     

Cycles of Aggregate Behavior in Theory and Experiment

We test in the laboratory the potential of evolutionary dynamics as predictor of actual behavior. To this end, we propose an asymmetric game (which we interpret as a borrower–lender relation), we study its evolutionary dynamics in a random matching setup, and we test its predictions. The theoretical model provides conditions for changes in qualitative aggregate behavior in response to variations in structural parameters. While it turns out that Nash equilibrium is not a reliable predictor of average aggregate behavior, the experiment seems to confirm the qualitative predictions of the evolutionary model under structural changes. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C7, C9, E3.     

A Nonlinear Relationship: Unemployment and Economic Growth (Construction Sector) in Spain, 1995.1–2012.2

A quadratic version of the first-difference Okun’s Law model was estimated for Spain (1995.Q1-2012.Q2). An accelerationist version of Okun’s Law was obtained, which allowed us to calculate variable Okun coefficients as well as critical points in the relationship between construction sector growth and the variation in overall unemployment. The optimal economic growth rate was determined to be 7.38 %. By applying principal components, it is demonstrated that this sector led the economic process after 1995.     

Returns from social capital in open source software networks

Open Source Software projects base their operation on a collaborative structure for knowledge exchange in the form of provision or reception of information, expertise and feedback on the creation of source code. Here, we address the direction of these knowledge flows among projects throughout social networks and their impact on project success. We identify the roles of membership or contribution that individuals play within projects. We found that connections through contributors who bring their knowledge to the project, improve project success, and that connection through members, who transfer their knowledge towards other projects, enhance project success. Finally, we found that ties through shared membership and contributions hamper project success. The analysis of knowledge flows and their impact on project success imply a translation of returns from investment in social capital, where investment takes the shape of knowledge flows and the returns mean the projects’ diffusion over the network.

A Stochastic Model with Penalized Coefficients for Spatial Price Comparisons: An Application to Regional Price Indexes in Italy

This paper focuses on a new strand of research that uses stochastic approach for making spatial price comparisons. We propose a novel method to account for the presence of spatial dependencies in consumer prices and consequently in price indexes by imposing penalization conditions on the estimation of traditional CPD models leading to the spatially-penalized country-product-dummy (SP-CPD) model. The paper proposes an appropriate estimation strategy, which enables us to simultaneously estimate all the parameters in the model, including the smoothing parameter of the penalization term instead of determining it externally. In order to estimate spatial price indexes for areas lacking in price data, we suggest applying the kriging methodology to the price indexes obtained from the SP-CPD model. This new approach is applied to official Italian CPI data for constructing regional spatial price indexes for 2014. The results show that price levels are higher in the Northern-Central regions than in the South.