Regulatory Disequilibrium and Inefficiency: The Case of Interstate Trucking

Economic regulation is characterized as (1) an effort by special interests to influence the allocation of property rights, in (2) a continuous path-dependent spontaneous evolution (as apposed to a static equilibrium), driven by (3) market, political, and bureaucratic entrepreneurship in an ongoing discovery process. The implications of the model are illustrated by an examination of the evolution of regulation in interstate trucking. The model is also used to explain that the Chicago School's political-regulatory efficiency conclusions are incorrect, and that the inefficiencies arising from rent seeking are even greater than the Public Choice approach implies.     

Codes of ethics

Partly as a result of much recent evidence of business and government crime, a large proportion of major corporations have adopted codes of ethics; government service is also making more use of them. The electrical manufacturing anti-trust conspiracy and 1973–1976 investigation of foreign and domestic bribery were immediate prods. There are also government codes of which the ASPA code is most widely distributed. Corporate codes discuss relations to employees, interemployee relationships, whistle blowing, effect on environment, commercial bribery, insider information, other conflicts of interest, anti-trust, accounting, consumer relations, and political activities. A discussion of use of codes shows partly favorable results. A number of corporation decisions have not yet become a subject of code provisions. Codes will be more useful if the reasons behind each order are stated and team work is encouraged. George C. S. Benson is Professor of Government and President Emeritus of Claremont McKenna College. He is a member of the Ethics Committee of the American Society of Public Administration and was a writer of the Guidelines to ASPA's Code of Ethics. He teaches business and government ethics and has had management experience in business, government, military and academic work.     

Do Socially Responsible Fund Managers Really Invest Differently?

To date, research into socially responsible investment (SRI), and in particular the socially responsible investment funds industry, has focused on whether investing in SRI assets has any differential impact on investor returns. Prior findings generally suggest that, on a risk-adjusted basis, there is no difference in performance between SRI and conventional funds. This result has led to questions about whether SRI funds are really any different from conventional funds. This paper examines whether the portfolio allocation across industry sectors and the stock-picking ability of SRI managers are different when compared to conventional fund managers. The study finds that SRI funds exhibit different industry betas consistent with different portfolio positions, but that these differences vary from year to year. It is also found that there is little difference in stock-picking ability between the two groups of fund managers.