Debt Relief for Low Income Countries: Is it Effective and Efficient?

Although a great deal of attention has been paid to IMF conditionality and to the effects of IMF programmes, relatively little attention has been paid to their completion rate. However, the record is that the clear majority of Fund programmes are uncompleted. Is this a cause for concern and why is it that the completion rate is low? In principle, a number of factors could be at work. Gaining a better understanding of what these are should allow policy reform at the IMF to improve performance. While there are things that we do not know and need to know about programme completion, we know enough to delineate the broad direction that policy should take.     

Once Bitten: The Effect of IMF Programs on Subsequent Reserve Behavior

Traditional models have encountered problems in explaining the accumulation of international reserves, particularly in Asia, in the period since the late 1990s. One suggestion has been that countries have sought to self‐insure against future crises, either because of a perceived increase in the cost of crises or because of the perceived conditionality costs of using IMF credits. This paper offers an empirical investigation of these ideas, disaggregating across regions and across IMF facilities. We find that IMF programs have had a significant positive effect on subsequent reserve accumulation, allowing for other determinants, and that this effect endures over time. We also find that the effect differs between Latin America and Asia, and that it is not simply a phenomenon that is associated with the Asian crisis of 1997/98. The paper goes on to discuss the implications for the design of policy and for the reform of the IMF.     

The uses of moral talk: Why do managers talk ethics?

When managers use moral expressions in their communications, they do so for several, sometimes contradictory reasons. Based upon analyses of interviews with managers, this article examines seven distinctive uses of moral talk, sub-divided into three groupings: (1) managers use moral talk functionally to clarify issues, to propose and criticize moral justifications, and to cite relevant norms; (2) managers also use moral talk functionally to praise and to blame as well as to defend and criticize structures of authority; finally (3) managers use moral talk dysfunctionally to rationalize morally ambiguous behavior and to express frustrations. The article concludes with several practical recommendations.Frederick Bird teaches Comparative Ethics at Concordia University, where he is an associate professor. He has recently written a text on the comparative sociological study of moral systems as well as a number of articles on business ethics and contemporary religious movements.Frances Westley is an Assistant Professor of Policy at McGill University in Montreal. She publishes in the area of visionary leadership, organizational culture and change, and strategic communications. James A. Waters was Dean, Graduate School of Management at Boston College. His research interests concerned the process of strategy formation in complex organizations, organizational change and development, and ethics in organizations. His work has been published in such journals as Organizational Dynamics, Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, Strategic Management Journal, California Management Review, Business Horizons, Journal of Applied Psychology, Business and Society, Canadian Journal of Administrative Science, Advanced Management Journal, Journal of Business Ethics, Organizational Behavior Teaching Review, and numerous anthologies. He died January 4, 1989.     

Group incentive compatibility in a market with indivisible goods

In a market where each trader has one unit of an indivisible good, there are procedures for exchanging goods which result in competitive allocations. One of these procedures, the top trading cycle, has the property that it is in each trader's best interest to report his true preferences over the set of goods. This note shows that no subset of traders can misrepresent their preferences and improve the allocation for all members of the subset. Additionally, if there are no indifferences in the preferences, then some traders in a subset that misrepresents preferences do worse.