Demand and supply functions for money in Canada: Some further evidence

The demand and supply functions for money in Canada are estimated in a simultaneous-equation model format in which the supply of money is considered endogenous. The results indicate that the important determinants of the demand for money are income, short-term interest rate and lagged real cash balance variables. Wealth is an unimportant explanatory variable in money demand thus rejecting the hypothesis that an increase in outside wealth increases the demand for money. The monetary base and cash reserve ratio are important explanatory variables in the money supply function and play a direct role in monetary control.     

Frequent-user patients: reducing costs while making appropriate discharges

Homeless patients who lack access to the health resources they need to maintain their health on their own pose a challenge for hospitals: Premature discharge of such patients can result in their being readmitted to the hospital in a short time, leading to higher costs for the hospital. Hospitals can address this problem by developing clear, effective homeless discharge policies and by developing ongoing relationships with appropriate medical respite care providers. A hospital also can benefit from spearheading an initiative to develop a medical respite program, enlisting the assistance of other community stakeholders.     

Spend More Today Safely: Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Retirement Expenditure Decisions With SPEEDOMETER Plans

This article examines how behavioral economics can be used to improve the spending decisions of retirees, using a SPEEDOMETER (or Spending Optimally Throughout Retirement) retirement expenditure plan that employs defaults within a choice architecture. The plan involves just four key behavioral nudges: (1) first, make a plan—ideally by being auto‐enrolled into one or with the help of a financial adviser; (2) automatic phasing of annuitization, which is designed to tackle the aversion to large irreversible transactions and losing control of assets, and so allows the greatest possible degree of flexibility in managing the rundown of retirement assets; (3) capital protection in the form of “money‐back” annuities that deals with loss aversion, that is, the fear of losing your money if you die early; and (4) the slogan “spend more today safely” that utilizes hyperbolic discounting to satisfy the human trait of wanting jam today, and to reinforce the idea that “buying an annuity is a smart thing to do.”     

Utilizing a Value of Information Framework to Improve Ore Collection and Classification Procedures

This case study utilizes a value of information decision framework to provide mine managers guidance regarding the purchase of ore grade scanners. LKAB's Kiruna mine produces three types of iron ore to meet long-term contractual agreements on a monthly basis. There is a priori uncertainty regarding the ore type in any given mineable section of the orebody. In addition, there is extracted ore type uncertainty that is introduced by the mining process. These uncertainties are better understood by obtaining more precise (real-time) information. In addition, a better understanding of the uncertainties can improve the quality of operational decisions and increase the overall profitability of the mine. This case study provides a framework for measuring the economic impact of information purchases in a mining context and discusses the implications of those findings.     

Backtesting Stochastic Mortality Models

Abstract

This study sets out a backtesting framework applicable to the multiperiod-ahead forecasts from stochastic mortality models and uses it to evaluate the forecasting performance of six different stochastic mortality models applied to English & Welsh male mortality data. The models considered are the following: Lee-Carter’s 1992 one-factor model; a version of Renshaw-Haberman’s 2006 extension of the Lee-Carter model to allow for a cohort effect; the age-period-cohort model, which is a simplified version of Renshaw-Haberman; Cairns, Blake, and Dowd’s 2006 two-factor model; and two generalized versions of the last named with an added cohort effect. For the data set used herein, the results from applying this methodology suggest that the models perform adequately by most backtests and that prediction intervals that incorporate parameter uncertainty are wider than those that do not. We also find little difference between the performances of five of the models, but the remaining model shows considerable forecast instability.     

Discontinuous innovation and supply relationships: strategic dalliances

The authors address the need for supply relationships to generate, support, and respond to discontinuous innovation (DI), noting that established ways of working appear insufficient. The peculiarities of DI are explained and contrasted with well-known concepts within innovation. The need for customer firms to be both closely collaborative with suppliers while also exploring potential, unpredictable DI elsewhere is proposed, by means of strategic dalliances . A model is presented for understanding and exploring this emerging management challenge.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.