Incentive Fees and Mutual Funds

This paper examines the effect of incentive fees on the behavior of mutual fund managers. Funds with incentive fees exhibit positive stock selection ability, but a beta less than one results in funds not earning positive fees. From an investor's perspective, positive alphas plus lower expense ratios make incentive-fee funds attractive. However, incentive-fee funds take on more risk than non-incentive-fee funds, and they increase risk after a period of poor performance. Incentive fees are useful marketing tools, since more new cash flows go into incentive-fee funds than into non-incentive-fee funds, ceteris paribus.     

The ethics of creative accounting some Spanish evidence

Creative accounting involves accountants in making accounting policy choices or manipulating transactions in such a way as to convey a preferred and deliberately chosen impression in the accounts. Although it is regarded as unethical by most observers, a defense of creative accounting can be based on the assumption that users of accounts can identify bias in accounting policy choices and make appropriate adjustments. In this paper we take the example of the Barcelona Football Club where the club management made three key accounting policy choices that resulted in the presentation of a favourable position, and a supporters club presented an alternative report choosing three alternative accounting policies that presented an unfavourable position. We presented each of these financial reports to one of two groups of Spanish bank loan officers: we found that the more favourable set of accounts was significantly more likely to attract a positive response to a loan request. This result undermines the validity of defending creative accounting based on the argument that accounts users can identify manipulation.     

Spend More Today Safely: Using Behavioral Economics to Improve Retirement Expenditure Decisions With SPEEDOMETER Plans

This article examines how behavioral economics can be used to improve the spending decisions of retirees, using a SPEEDOMETER (or Spending Optimally Throughout Retirement) retirement expenditure plan that employs defaults within a choice architecture. The plan involves just four key behavioral nudges: (1) first, make a plan—ideally by being auto‐enrolled into one or with the help of a financial adviser; (2) automatic phasing of annuitization, which is designed to tackle the aversion to large irreversible transactions and losing control of assets, and so allows the greatest possible degree of flexibility in managing the rundown of retirement assets; (3) capital protection in the form of “money‐back” annuities that deals with loss aversion, that is, the fear of losing your money if you die early; and (4) the slogan “spend more today safely” that utilizes hyperbolic discounting to satisfy the human trait of wanting jam today, and to reinforce the idea that “buying an annuity is a smart thing to do.”     

Commuting Costs and Geographic Sorting in the Housing Market

The demand for housing is heavily influenced by access to employment opportunities. The cost of gasoline determines, in part, the cost of such access and therefore the relative demand across markets with varying commuting needs. Locally exogenous gasoline price movements demonstrate the causal impact of higher fuel costs on housing markets: a shift of market demand toward real estate markets with less costly commutes. Higher fuel prices increase the value of real estate with shorter commutes and easier access to driving alternatives relative to more driving dependent homes. Every incremental $1 per gallon of gasoline reduces home values by 0.143% for every additional mile relative to counterfactual markets, or $5,200 for the average home and commute. This translates into a discount rate of 6.4%, comparable to mortgage rates for the period.     

Mutual Fund Performance: Evidence from the UK

This paper uses a large sample containing the complete return histories of 2300 UK open-ended mutual funds over a 23-year period to measure fund performance. We find some evidence of underperformance on a risk-adjusted basis by the average fund manager, persistence of performance and the existence of a substantial survivor bias. Similar findings have been reported for US equity mutual funds. New findings not previously documented for other markets include evidence that mutual fund performance varies substantially across different asset categories, especially foreign asset categories. We also identify some new patterns in performance related to the funds' distance from their inception and termination dates: underperformance intensifies as the fund termination date approaches, while, in contrast, there is some evidence that funds (weakly) outperform during their first year of existence.     

A Classification System for Economic Consequences Issues in Accounting Regulation

This paper offers a classification system for economic consequences issues based on dividing perceived economic consequences issues into those that arise from decision making by users of accounts and those that arise from the mechanistic application of regulation or contracts. In order to test the system, twenty examples of economic consequence issues were selected (all of them relating to the UK or the Republic of Ireland) and subjected to three tests. The paper argues that the system proposed meets the tests. In addition implications for the definition of economic consequences are identified.     

Discontinuous innovation and supply relationships: strategic dalliances

The authors address the need for supply relationships to generate, support, and respond to discontinuous innovation (DI), noting that established ways of working appear insufficient. The peculiarities of DI are explained and contrasted with well-known concepts within innovation. The need for customer firms to be both closely collaborative with suppliers while also exploring potential, unpredictable DI elsewhere is proposed, by means of strategic dalliances . A model is presented for understanding and exploring this emerging management challenge.     

The new ecological paradigm and responses to climate change in China

The purpose of this study was to develop and evaluate a Chinese-Mandarin version of the revised new ecological paradigm (NEP-R) scale. In a sample of 515 Mandarin-speaking Chinese nationals, we first assessed the factor structure and internal consistency of the NEP-R and assessed its validity by examining associations with global warming risk perceptions and mitigation behavior. Respondents completed the NEP-R scale, together with measures of risk perception and mitigation behavior. Exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses indicated that a two-factor solution, reflecting ecocentric and anthropocentric worldviews, best fit the data. Multi-group path analysis revealed that respondents with stronger ecocentric and weaker anthropocentric worldviews perceived more risks associated with global warming. In turn, respondents who perceived more risks reported engaging in more global warming mitigation behaviors. But importantly, the path between risk perceptions and behavior was significantly stronger for highly educated respondents than for less educated respondents, suggesting that education may represent an important strategy for bridging the gap between perceived risks about global warming and action.     

Regulator performance,regulatory environment and outcomes: An examination of insurance regulator career incentives on state insurance markets

In this paper we test whether the past or future labor market choices of insurance commissioners provide incentives for regulators in states with price regulation to either favor or oppose the industry by allowing prices that differ significantly from what would otherwise be the competitive market outcome. Using biographical data on insurance regulators, economic and state specific market structure and regulatory variables, and state premium and loss data on the personal automobile insurance market, we find no evidence consumers in prior approval states paid significantly different “unit prices” for insurance than consumers in states that allow competitive market forces to determine equilibrium prices during the time period 1985–2002. We do, however, find evidence regulators who obtained the position of insurance commissioner by popular election and those who seek higher elective office following their tenure as insurance commissioner allow higher overall “unit prices” relative to competitive market states. The “unit price” of insurance in regulated states is not statistically different from the competitive market outcome for regulators that make lateral moves back into state government and it is mildly higher for regulators who enter the insurance industry following their tenure. Finally, we find some evidence regulators who describe themselves as consumer advocates are successful reducing the price of insurance in favor of consumers in regulated markets. Overall the results are consistent with the existence of asymmetric information in the regulatory process that agents use to enhance their career aspirations.