More evidence that university administrators are utility maximizing bureaucrats

Coates and Humphreys (2000) found evidence that administrators affect enrollment supply and faculty demand using a panel of eleven public colleges and universities in Maryland, implying that institutions have enough market power to permit the preferences of administrators to influence these variables. We extend this framework to include political constraints on administrators behavior and add data from public higher education in Virginia. The results from these extensions are consistent with the earlier findings. However, we find that political considerations and differences in the governance of higher education in the two states have relatively little influence on enrollment supply and faculty demand decisions of university administrators.JEL Classification: I21, I28Paper prepared for the Research Conference Its Better to Rely on Well-designed Institutions Than on Well-behaved People held at UCLA, May 18/19, 2001. We thank Bob Lowry for comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Nicole Myers and Ryan Mutter for able research assistance.     

Do Economists Recognize an Opportunity Cost When They See One? A Dismal Performance or an Arbitrary Concept?

2005 asked 199 professional economists a multiple‐choice question about opportunity cost. Given that only 21.6% answered “correctly,” they conclude that professional understanding of the concept is “dismal.” We challenge this critique of the profession. Specifically, we allow for alternative opportunity cost accounting methodologies—one of which is derived from the term's definition as found in Ferraro and Taylor— and rely on the conventional relationship between willingness to pay and substitute goods to demonstrate that every answer to the multiple‐choice question is defensible. The Ferraro and Taylor survey question suggests difficulties in framing an opportunity cost accounting question, as well as a lack of coordination in opportunity cost accounting methodology. In scope and logic, we conclude that the survey question does not, however, succeed in measuring professional understanding of opportunity cost. A discussion follows as to the concept's appropriate role in the classroom.     

控制外包的情报搜集——放养蝴蝶和咨询师

通常来说，不论规模大小，各个行业的公司都把搜集和生产初始一手来源竞争性信息的工作外包出去。（本文将间接的二手调研界定为对已公开出版的，通常是基于网络渠道获取的信息进行调研。）初始的一手调研是指通过直接找到能给出问题答案的相关人员并对他们询问来完成调研的信息搜集工作。     

Constructing a legitimate history: crisis,legitimacy, and the atlantic schools of Business Conferences

The Atlantic Schools of Business (ASB) conference is one of the longest running academic business conferences in Canada. It continued without the structure of an organizing committee for 34 years. In its 35^th year, however, a formal structure was adopted. The adoption of formal structure provides an opportunity to look critically at the change process from various perspectives. This paper takes three interrelated approaches: reviews of archival material to provide context; surveys of ASB membership to ascertain individual perceptions of the organization's purpose; and interviews with key individuals involved in the change process to examine the decision to formalize. Our analysis shows that perceived organizational crisis and a search for enhanced legitimacy can precipitate isomorphism and exclude alternative avenues for change. Copyright © 2008 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

All That Glitters: The Effect of Attention and News on the Buying Behavior of Individual and Institutional Investors

We test and confirm the hypothesis that individual investorsare net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, e.g., stocks inthe news, stocks experiencing high abnormal trading volume,and stocks with extreme one-day returns. Attention-driven buyingresults from the difficulty that investors have searching thethousands of stocks they can potentially buy. Individual investorsdo not face the same search problem when selling because theytend to sell only stocks they already own. We hypothesize thatmany investors consider purchasing only stocks that have firstcaught their attention. Thus, preferences determine choicesafter attention has determined the choice set.     

Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors

Individual investors who hold common stocks directly pay a tremendous performance penalty for active trading. Of 66,465 households with accounts at a large discount broker during 1991 to 1996, those that trade most earn an annual return of 11.4 percent, while the market returns 17.9 percent. The average household earns an annual return of 16.4 percent, tilts its common stock investment toward high-beta, small, value stocks, and turns over 75 percent of its portfolio annually. Overconfidence can explain high trading levels and the resulting poor performance of individual investors. Our central message is that trading is hazardous to your wealth.     

An empirical analysis of continuing improvements following the implementation of a performance-based compensation plan

Performance improvements subsequent to the implementation of a pay-for-performance plan can result because more productive employees self-select into the firm (selection effect) and because employees allocate effort to become more effective (effort effect). We analyze individual performance data for 3,776 sales employees of a retail firm to evaluate these alternative sources of continuing performance improvement. The incentive plan helps the firm attract and retain more productive sales employees, and motivates these employees to further improve their productivity. In contrast, the less productive sales employees’ performance declines before they leave the firm.     

认识金融危机的真相

所有与新兴市场国家及其债务打交道的人都应该阅读一下由Nouriel Roubini和Brad Setser撰写的这本书。对于过去十年中发生的金融危机，作者力图从理论和政策两个视角为我们讲述。通过详细阐述从各个危机的起源到官方对这些危机的政策反应的所有情况，他们帮助我们从中汲取教训。他们谨慎地揭穿那些虚构的说法，并将相关的差别（尤其是七国集团内部）揭示出来。