Accessing other people’s technology for non–profit research

As patents and other forms of intellectual property become more pervasive in the next generation of biotechnologies, designing policies and practices to ensure sufficient freedom to operate (i.e., the ability to practice or use an innovation) will be crucial for non–profit research agencies, especially those intent on developing technologies destined for commercial release. Are non–profit organisations exempt from intellectual property claims? What constitutes infringement of a patent? How does a non–profit establish its freedom to operate? We address these issues in this paper and evaluate various options for accessing other people’s technologies. Options include cross–licensing agreements, research–only or cost–free licences, market segmentation strategies, mergers or joint ventures, and patent pooling or clearinghouse mechanisms. Responding creatively to the new intellectual property environment will have far reaching consequences for the future of non–profit research.     

Design and Implementation of Return on Capital Employed Performance Indicators Within a Trading Regime: The Case of Executive Agencies

The financial regime under which trading executive agencies operate implies that return on capital employed (ROCE) is used to indicate that revenues meet but do not exceed costs, including the cost of capital; that is, that there is neither cross-subsidisation nor hidden taxation. This paper develops a model for measuring ROCE derived from this objective. It argues that users of ROCE indicators are likely to lack financial sophistication and to want to compare performance between entities, so that indicators should be clear, readily understandable and comparable. The range of measurement and presentation methods used in practice undermines clarity and comparability and some methods are inconsistent with the model. Performance is sometimes characterised as meeting the target when this is problematic. The paper also examines outturn performance and finds some very substantial excess returns, implying hidden taxation.     

Strategic reward systems: a contingency model of pay system design

A limited number of studies have addressed the idea of ‘strategic’ reward systems—the matching of compensation systems to a firm's strategy. Prior research on this topic has been confined to U.S. firms, however, and a number of key questions remain unanswered. Using a sample of 917 employees from two large Swiss financial institutions, we found that pay systems are linked with divisional strategic orientation, but in a different form than prior studies. Additionally, we identify hierarchical position as an important variable in the tailoring of reward systems. Hierarchy has a significant main effect on pay plan design, and an interactive effect with strategic orientation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Training Strategies In Small Service Sector Firms: Employer and Employee Perspectives

Brian Abbott, who is a Research Assistant in the Small Business Research Centre at Kingston University, examines both employer and employee views towards the level and character of training provision in small service sector firms. He challenges the widely held belief that small firms universally offer inferior levels of training and demonstrates that the level and character of training are largely dependent on the industrial sector in which the firm is located. He goes on to examine the implications of employers’ views on the newly established Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs).     

When will boards influence strategy? inclination × power = strategic change

While boards of directors are usually recognized as having the potential to affect strategic change in organizations, there is considerable debate as to whether such potential is typically realized. We seek to reconcile the debate on whether boards are typically passive vs. active players in the strategy realm by developing a model that specifies when boards are likely to influence organizational strategy and whether such an influence is likely to impel vs. impede change. Specifically, we develop arguments as to when certain demographic and processual features of boards imply a greater inclination for strategic change, when these features imply a greater preference for the status quo, and how differences in such inclinations will influence strategic change. We then also propose that a board's inclination for strategic change interacts with a board's power to affect change, generating a multiplicative effect on strategic change. These ideas are tested using survey and archival data from a national sample of over 3000 hospitals. The supportive findings suggest that strategic change is significantly affected by board demography and board processes, and that these governance effects manifest themselves most strongly in situations where boards are more powerful. We discuss these findings in terms of their relevance for theories of demography, agency, and power. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal Sharing of Foodborne Illness Prevention between Consumers and Industry: The Effect of Regulation and Liability

Consumers and the food industry can both prevent foodborne illness. Two questions are explored: what is the socially optimal level of preventative effort by each and can tort and regulatory instruments induce such behavior? Analysis is complicated by two aspects of food safety technology: one party's effort can affect the marginal effectiveness of the other party's effort and damage functions can be nonconvex. Previous analysis of accidents under torts and regulation fails to consider these generalizations. Indeed, results concerning the ability of tort and regulatory instruments to induce first-best and second-best behavior often contradict previous results in the literature.