Board monitoring,firm risk,and external regulation

We examine the relationship between board monitoring and firm characteristics using a broad sample of firms over the 8 year period from 1996 to 2003. We find that board independence and monitoring is negatively related to firm risk in the absence of external regulation. In addition, we find that external regulatory and political pressures affect the level of board monitoring, especially after the increased focus on board composition by the stock exchanges beginning in 1999 and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We find that the sensitivity of the negative relationship between board monitoring and firm risk decreases in the post 1999 period suggesting that firms have increased board monitoring in response to external regulations. We also find that these external regulations have had an asymmetrical impact on high-risk firm. In our empirical analysis we also control for other factors that affect board monitoring and find that firms in which the CEO has longer tenure and greater equity ownership have less board monitoring activity and that there is a negative relationship between the level of board monitoring and the level of shareholder rights.      

Calculating The Cost of Capital of an Unlevered Firm For Use in Project Evaluation

The adjusted present value requires an estimate of the cost of equity of an unlevered firm. Traditional approaches for calculating this cost assume that firms maintain a constant market-value percentage of debt when in fact firms typically use a book-value percentage of debt. In this paper, we present an approach to correctly estimate the cost of equity of an unlevered firm whenever the firm fails to maintain a constant market-value-based leverage ratio. We also demonstrate that both the Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miles and Ezzell (1980) approaches may yield substantial valuation errors when firms determine debt levels based on book-value percentages. In contrast our method makes no errors as long as managers know the marginal tax benefit of debt.     

Interest Rates Fluctuations and the Advantage of Long-Term Debt Financing: A Note on the Effect of the Tax-Timing Option

When interest rates fluctuate, issuing long-term debt may implicitly generate a valuable tax-timing option. The holder of long-term debt has an optimal-trading taxtiming option to immediately realize capital losses if an increase in interest rates lowers the price of the bond below the original issue price. In contrast, if interest rates decrease and the bond price is greater than the original issue price, the holder would prefer to defer the realization of capital gains. This tax-timing option confers an advantage for issuing long-term debt. Our formal presentation also highlights how the tax-timing options of long-term debt may increase the debt capacity of the firm.     

THE IMPLICATIONS OF OECD GROWTH FOR SOUTH AFRICAN EXPORTS

This paper examines the role of OECD growth on South African exports using a vector error correction model. In the long run both OECD growth and the real effective exchange rate were found to influence South Africa's export performance, while in the short run, the real effective exchange rate was found to be an important driver of export growth. The policy implications that emerge from the study underscore the importance of fully exploiting current trading relationships, diversifying South African export destinations and enhancing competitiveness.     

Optimal capital structure: A multi-period programming model for use in financial planning

This paper describes a multi-period, chance constrained mathematical programming model to compute for each period, the firm's optimal debt to equity ratio and the optimal maturity distribution of its debt. The model assumes that the firm's objective is to maximize total value of the firm, and that the firm operates in a world of uncertainty, with corporate income taxes and bankruptcy costs. Finally, the actual coupon rate paid by the firm which is commensurate to the risk of default is endogenously determined by the model.     

The joint determinants of cash holdings and debt maturity: the case for financial constraints

We examine the joint choices of cash holdings and debt maturity for a large sample of firms for the 1985–2013 period. We find that there is a positive relation between debt maturity and cash holdings. Our results hold after taking into account endogeneity among leverage, debt maturity, and cash holding. We posit that this positive relationship will be found among firms facing financial constraints and we find support for this hypothesis. Our results are robust after we control for agency problems, international taxation, bank loan liquidity covenants and default risk.     

Strategic Decision Making of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information

This paper develops a simple signaling model whereby high valuation firm uses levels of investment, debt and dividends to convey information to the market regarding its valuation. Conditions are determined under which investment, debt and dividends are employed in a separating Nash equilibrium. Unlike many other signaling models where the source of asymmetric information concerns only the mean of the firms' cash flow, our model allows for two sources of asymmetric information: the mean and the variance of the cash flow. This paper finds that the choice of signals depends on the relative importance of these two sources of informational asymmetry. For example, we show that high valued firms signal their values by decreasing their debt if the source of asymmetric information is mainly driven by the variance of the cash flows. This latter result differs from the debt signaling models found in the literature. The findings of this paper are consistent with extensive empirical evidence.