Is Wheat a Homogeneous Product?

A hedonic approach is used to test for two kinds of product differentiation for wheat. It is shown that wheat is differentiated by end use and by country of origin. This simply recognizes the fact that buyers purchasing wheat for different purposes put different weights on quality criteria and that country-specific factors such as weather as well as grading and inspection systems matter. The results suggest that between 1980 and 1988, wheat protein content had a significant influence on price. This influence varies over time and across wheat categories.     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

Asset pricing under quantile utility maximization

“Focus on the downside, and the upside will take care of itself” is a famous quote among professional investors. By considering an agent who follows this advice, we reproduce the first and second moments of stock returns, risk-free rate and consumption growth. The agent's behavior toward risk is analogous to a relative risk aversion of about 3 under expected utility, the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is about 0.5 and the time discount factor is below 1. In particular, the proposed model separates time and risk preferences in an innovative way.     

Dynamic duopoly with learning through market experimentation

Summary This paper analyzes how learning behaviors can substantially modify the outcome of competition in an oligopolistic industry facing demand uncertainty. We consider the case of a symmetric duopoly game where firms have imperfect information about market demand and learn through observing the volume of their sales. The main body of the paper consists in showing how market experimentation can explain the existence ofprice-dispersion in an oligopolistic industry. We study this phenomenon and its dynamic evolution in the context of an Hotelling duopoly model; we then extend the analysis to general demand functions and toN-firm oligopolies. We discuss some implications of the public good aspect of information about market demand. We then conclude with a few comments on what happens when the value of information in the oligopolistic industry is negative.We are very grateful to Patrick Bolton for his helpful advice. We also wish to thank Richard Caves, Anthony Creane, Jean-Jacques Laffont, Andreu Mas-Colell, Eric Maskin, Jean-Charles Rochet, Margaret Slade, John Sutton, Jean Tirole, Mike Whinston and an anonymous referee.     

Evaluating risks-based communities of Mafia companies: a complex networks perspective

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This paper presents a data-driven complex network approach, to show similarities and differences—in terms of financial risks—between the...     

Resale price maintenance and collusion

The article revisits the conventional wisdom according to which vertical restrictions on retail prices help upstream firms to collude. We analyze the scope for collusion with and without resale price maintenance (RPM) when retailers observe local shocks on demand or retail costs. In the absence of RPM, retail prices react to retailers' information, and deviations from collusive behavior are thus difficult to detect. By eliminating retail price flexibility, RPM facilitates the detection of deviations but reduces profits and thus increases the short‐run gains from a deviation. Overall, RPM can facilitate collusion and reduce total welfare when firms adopt it.     

Market Power and the Power Market: Multi-Unit Bidding and (In)Efficiency in Electricity Auctions

In this paper we apply auction theory to the modelling of competition in a multi-unit wholesale electricity market. Bidding strategies of multi-plant producers are derived and examined assuming various degrees of market concentration. Unlike previous literature, which mainly focuses on demand uncertainty, we assume both demand and cost uncertainty as well as cost differentials among the two types of generating units considered in the model, namely baseload units and peak units. Results indicate that the System Marginal Price (competitive pricing) rule provides incentives for bid shading on the part of all those generators-units who have a non-null probability of setting the market price. We also show that the extent of the bid shading is positively affected by the differential in the endowments of the baseload generation capacity of multi-plant firms. The inefficiency of the resulting allocation is also examined and some policy implications are briefly discussed.