Volume,Volatility, and New York Stock Exchange Trading Halts

Trading halts increase, rather than reduce, both volume and volatility. Volume (volatility) in the first full trading day after a trading halt is 230 percent (50 to 115 percent) higher than following “pseudohalts”: nonhalt control periods matched on time of day, duration, and absolute net-of-market returns. These results are robust over different halt types and news categories. Higher posthalt volume is observed into the third day while higher posthalt volatility decays within hours. The extent of media coverage is a partial determinant of volume and volatility following both halts and pseudohalts, but a separate halt effect remains after controlling for the media effect.     

Private Sector Influences on Monetary Policy in the United States

I examine the extent to which the Federal Reserve's monetary policy actions are correlated with the expressed wishes of private sector lobbying groups. I update and extend work by Havrilesky (1990, 1993) regarding the effect of signals from the banking industry through the Federal Advisory Council (FAC). I also construct a new database containing statements from non-financial interest groups. I find that monetary policy actions are correlated with signals from non-financial groups before 1979 but not after, and are correlated with signals from the FAC after 1979 but not before. I also find that the Fed's policy stance more closely matches the preferred stance of the banking industry after 1979.     

Stealing Deposits: Deposit Insurance,Risk‐Taking,and the Removal of Market Discipline in Early 20th‐Century Banks

Deposit insurance reduces liquidity risk but can increase insolvency risk by encouraging reckless behavior. Several U.S. states installed deposit insurance laws before the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and those laws applied only to some depository institutions within those states. These experiments present a unique testing ground for investigating the effect of deposit insurance. We show that deposit insurance removed market discipline constraining uninsured banks. Taking advantage of World War I's rise in world agricultural prices, insured banks increased their insolvency risk and competed aggressively for deposits. When prices fell after the war, the insurance systems collapsed and suffered high losses.     

THE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF SUBFIELD ENTRY

The emergence of technical subfields is a common phenomenon in dynamic as well as relatively stable industries. The proper strategic response to the emergence of a subfield, that is, the decision on whether to enter or not to enter, is a key determinant of future firm performance. We propose that this entry decision is not a simple one. The effects of subfield entry may be influenced by strategic factors related to the subfield as well as to the greater industry environment. In this study, we apply a population ecology framework to the study of subfield birth and evolution and use this perspective to develop and test several propositions related to the effects of subfield entry on performance. The data pertain to the evolution of the automatic teller machine subfield over the first 9 years of its existence for a population of over 3500 banks. Our results support the population ecology framework, generally emphasizing the positive performance consequences of early subfield entry. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Inflation Persistence, Monetary Policy, and the Great Moderation

There is growing evidence that the empirical Phillips curve within the United States has changed significantly since the early 1980s. In particular, inflation persistence has declined sharply. This paper demonstrates that this decline is consistent with a standard dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model in which: (i) the variability of technology shocks has declined and (ii) the central bank more aggressively responds to inflation.     

CEO DUALITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: WHAT'S THE FUSS?

Rising shareholder activism following poor corporate performance and a subsequent drop in shareholder value at many major U.S. corporations had rekindled interest in duality and corporate governance. Despite limited empirical evidence, duality (chairman of the board and CEO are the same individual) has been blamed, in many cases, for the poor performance, and failure of firms to adapt to a changing environment. In examining the relationship between duality and firm performance, this study considers the announcement effects of changes in duality status, accounting measures of operating performance for firms that have changed their duality structure, and long-term measures of performance for firms that have had a consistent history of a duality structure. Our results suggest that: (1) the market is indifferent to changes in a firm's duality status; (2) there is little evidence of operating performance changes around changes in duality status; and (3) there is only weak evidence that duality status affects long-term performance, after controlling for other factors that might impact that performance.     

TOP MANAGEMENT TEAM STRATEGIC CONSENSUS,DEMOGRAPHIC HOMOGENEITY AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: A REPORT OF RESOUNDING NONFINDINGS

In this study, we hypothesized that relationships among top managers' goals consensus, means consensus, demographic homogeneity and firm performance would be positive and stronger in a stable industry environment than in a dynamic one. Utilizing a more rigorous methodology, the significant findings of earlier studies could not be replicated. Although the questions remain interesting and important ones, we believe pursuing this line of inquiry further will yield results inconsistent at best and fruitless at worst. Therefore, we urge future researchers to cautiously tread the perilous methodologic minefield that led to our nonfindings.     

Analyst Forecast Consistency

We show empirically that analysts who display more consistent forecast errors have greater ability to affect prices, and that this effect is larger than that of stated accuracy. These results lead to three implications. First, consistent analysts are less likely to be demoted and are more likely to be nominated All Star analysts. Second, analysts strategically deliver downward‐biased forecasts to increase their consistency (if at the expense of stated accuracy). Finally, the benefits of consistency and of “lowballing” (accuracy) are increasing (decreasing) in institutional investors’ presence.     

PRICES AND ENDOGENOUS MARKET STRUCTURE IN OFFICE SUPPLY SUPERSTORES*

We consider the relationship between prices and market structure for office supply superstores in the U.S. which was central to the Federal Trade Commission's opposition to the merger of Staples and Office Depot. Due to potential biases in a standard regression, we employ a two‐stage approach in which a model of endogenous market structure provides correction terms for a second stage price regression. Using a cross‐section of data on market structures and Staples' prices, we find that excluding the correction term substantially distorts the importance of competitors as the two‐stage model yields stronger negative relationships between prices and market structure variables.