Regional Effects of Exchange Rate Fluctuations

We exploit differences across U.S. states' exposure to trade to study the effects of changes in the exchange rate on economic activity. Across states, trade-weighted exchange rate depreciations are associated with increased state exports, reduced state unemployment, and higher state hours worked. The effects are particularly strong during periods of economic slack. A multiregion model with interstate trade and labor flows, calibrated to match state-level trade data and migration flows, replicates the empirical relationship between exchange rates and unemployment. The high degree of interstate trade plays an important role in transmitting shocks across states in the first year, whereas interstate migration shapes cross-sectional patterns in later years. We use the model to study the regional effects of tariffs in the United States. The model suggests that a 25% Chinese import tariff on U.S. goods would be felt throughout the United States, even in states with small direct linkages to China, raising unemployment rates by 0.2 to 0.7 percentage points in the short run.     

The Relative Effectiveness of Spot and Derivatives‐Based Intervention

This paper studies the relative effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention in spot and derivatives markets. We use Brazilian data where spot and nondeliverable futures intervention have been used in tandem for more than a decade. The analysis finds evidence of a link between both modes of intervention and the exchange rate. In line with theory, the impact of spot intervention is strikingly similar to that of futures intervention when convertibility risk is limited. We show that both types of interventions also affect the level and the price of hedging risk in the foreign exchange market.     

Mandatory IFRS Reporting around the World: Early Evidence on the Economic Consequences

This paper examines the economic consequences of mandatory International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) reporting around the world. We analyze the effects on market liquidity, cost of capital, and Tobin's q in 26 countries using a large sample of firms that are mandated to adopt IFRS. We find that, on average, market liquidity increases around the time of the introduction of IFRS. We also document a decrease in firms' cost of capital and an increase in equity valuations, but only if we account for the possibility that the effects occur prior to the official adoption date. Partitioning our sample, we find that the capital‐market benefits occur only in countries where firms have incentives to be transparent and where legal enforcement is strong, underscoring the central importance of firms' reporting incentives and countries' enforcement regimes for the quality of financial reporting. Comparing mandatory and voluntary adopters, we find that the capital market effects are most pronounced for firms that voluntarily switch to IFRS, both in the year when they switch and again later, when IFRS become mandatory. While the former result is likely due to self‐selection, the latter result cautions us to attribute the capital‐market effects for mandatory adopters solely or even primarily to the IFRS mandate. Many adopting countries make concurrent efforts to improve enforcement and governance regimes, which likely play into our findings. Consistent with this interpretation, the estimated liquidity improvements are smaller in magnitude when we analyze them on a monthly basis, which is more likely to isolate IFRS reporting effects.     

NON-SEPARABLE CONSUMPTION-LABOR CHOICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL TRANSMISSION OF MONETARY POLICY SHOCKS: A NOTE

This paper derives in the model developed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (1995) a steady state that is stationary in the presence of monetary policy shocks. To this end, the impact of monetary policy shocks on the current account is shut off by assuming that the preferences of households exhibit a particular non-separability between consumption and labor supply. [F31, F41]     

The Interaction of Legal and Social Norm Enforcement

Although legal sanctions are often nondeterrent, we frequently observe compliance with “mild laws.” A possible explanation is that the incentives to comply are shaped not only by legal, but also by social sanctions. This paper employs a novel experimental approach to study the link between legal and social norm enforcement. We analyze whether the two institutions are complements or substitutes. Our results show that legal sanctions partially crowd out social norm enforcement. Mild laws nevertheless give scope for a potentially large, positive welfare effect, as a higher level of compliance is achieved at lower social enforcement costs.     

How Do Firms Implement Impairment Tests of Goodwill?

This study seeks first to examine how firms implement impairment tests as required by IAS 36, and second, to explore factors which may explain why some firms are not entirely in compliance with IAS 36. It is based on a survey which includes 58 completed questionnaires representing 73% of the firms on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange that recognize goodwill on the balance sheet. The findings imply a variety in the application of IAS 36. Based on our analysis, it is difficult to determine whether this simply indicates that firms adopt an approach suited to their organizational and economic structures, or if it reveals that firms are uncertain as how to apply the standard. Our analysis further indicates inconsistencies in the implementation of IAS 36. This includes both how firms define a CGU and how they estimate the recoverable amount. Further, multivariate analysis reveals that the inconsistencies detected here are less likely in firms that systematize the procedures for impairment testing and use persons with considerable valuation experience. The findings should be of interest to a number of parties including firms, financial advisers, auditors, standard setters and users of financial statements.     

ANNOUNCEMENTS AND CREDIBILITY OF MONETARY POLICY

An infinitely repeated monetary policy game à la Barroand Gordon is considered. Before the game starts the governmentannounces a policy rule. If there is a slight probability thatgovernment is honest and a slight probability that the governmentmakes mistakes, then a sufficiently patient government willhave average loss close to its commitment loss in all sequentiallyrational equilibria of the infinitely repeated game.     

WHAT HAPPENS WHEN DEMAND IS ESTIMATED WITH A MISSPECIFIED MODEL?*

We conduct Monte Carlo experiments to investigate the biases of assuming a misspecified demand model. We study continuous models (linear, log‐linear and AIDS), and discrete choice models (logit) in the context of differentiated products and aggregate data. Estimating demand with the ‘wrong’ model yields varying degrees of bias in estimated elasticities, but the logit model can yield unbiased estimates for a certain size of the assumed market potential. Merger simulations confirm the key importance of market potential in logit estimation suggesting that a discrete choice model may be preferable even when the discreteness of the purchase decision is questionable.