Accounting Information, Disclosure, and the Cost of Capital

In this paper we examine whether and how accounting information about a firm manifests in its cost of capital, despite the forces of diversification. We build a model that is consistent with the Capital Asset Pricing Model and explicitly allows for multiple securities whose cash flows are correlated. We demonstrate that the quality of accounting information can influence the cost of capital, both directly and indirectly. The direct effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect the firm's assessed covariances with other firms' cash flows, which is nondiversifiable. The indirect effect occurs because higher quality disclosures affect a firm's real decisions, which likely changes the firm's ratio of the expected future cash flows to the covariance of these cash flows with the sum of all the cash flows in the market. We show that this effect can go in either direction, but also derive conditions under which an increase in information quality leads to an unambiguous decline in the cost of capital.     

Credit Reporting, Relationship Banking, and Loan Repayment

How does information sharing between lenders affect borrowers repayment behavior? We show—in a laboratory credit market—that information sharing increases repayment rates, as borrowers anticipate that a good credit record improves their access to credit. This incentive effect of information sharing is substantial when repayment is not third‐party enforceable and lending is dominated by one‐shot transactions. If, however, repeat interaction between borrowers and lenders is feasible, the incentive effect of credit reporting is negligible, as bilateral banking relationships discipline borrowers. Information sharing nevertheless affects market outcome by weakening lenders' ability to extract rents from relationships.     

Figuring Out the Fed—Beliefs about Policymakers and Gains from Transparency

In this paper, I use a Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm to estimate a model of private‐sector behavior that does not feature private‐sector knowledge of the monetary policymaking process and, instead, leaves firms and households uncertain about how monetary policy is set. The private sector entertains two competing views of monetary policymaking, which I estimate. Firms and households use Bayes' law on a rolling data sample to distinguish between those two models. I use this setup to study the evolution of beliefs about the Federal Reserve and the possible gains from transparency.     

Options in Compensation: Promises and Pitfalls

We derive the optimal compensation contract in a principal–agent setting in which outcome is used to provide incentives for both effort and risky investments. To motivate investment, optimal compensation entails rewards for high as well as low outcomes, and it is increasing at the mean outcome to motivate effort. If rewarding low outcomes is infeasible, compensation consisting of stocks and options is a near‐efficient means of overcoming the manager's induced aversion to undertaking risky investments, whereas stock compensation is not. However, stock plus option compensation may induce excessively risky investments, and capping pay can be important in curbing such behavior.     

EASY MONEY OR HARD TIMES? HEALTH AND 401(k) LOANS

Rising health care costs and declining personal savings rates are nearly synonymous with household medical debt. For some, defined contribution (DC) retirement savings plans provide a ready source of funds to meet these medical debts. We examine whether health status and health insurance coverage predict the likelihood of having a DC loan using data from the Federal Reserve's triennial Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) from 1989 to 2007. We find that poor health raises the likelihood that a household will borrow from their DC plans, even controlling for other forms of debt, access to credit, and whether households are covered by health insurance. Our estimates of the amount of the DC loan, taking selection effects into account, indicate that DC loan amounts are also influenced by health status; those with poor health borrow more from their DC plans. Apart from health status, once a household decides to borrow from their retirement funds, race and education also influence how much to borrow. We argue that public policy can improve the long‐term financial retirement security of households by offering more opportunities to save for medical emergencies, while cautiously maintaining the opportunity to borrow from DC plans. (JEL D12, D14, D91)     

Asset Fire Sales and Purchases and the International Transmission of Funding Shocks

We identify a new channel for the transmission of shocks across international markets. Investor flows to funds domiciled in developed markets force significant changes in these funds' emerging market portfolio allocations. These forced trades or “fire sales” affect emerging market equity prices, correlations, and betas, and are related to but distinct from effects arising purely from fund holdings or from overlapping ownership of emerging markets in fund portfolios. A simple model and calibration exercise highlight the importance to these findings of “push” effects from funds' domicile countries and “co‐ownership spillover” between markets with overlapping fund ownership.     

The Economics of Disclosure and Financial Reporting Regulation: Evidence and Suggestions for Future Research

This paper discusses the empirical literature on the economic consequences of disclosure and financial reporting regulation, drawing on U.S. and international evidence. Given the policy relevance of research on regulation, we highlight the challenges with (1) quantifying regulatory costs and benefits, (2) measuring disclosure and reporting outcomes, and (3) drawing causal inferences from regulatory studies. Next, we discuss empirical studies that link disclosure and reporting activities to firm‐specific and market‐wide economic outcomes. Understanding these links is important when evaluating regulation. We then synthesize the empirical evidence on the economic effects of disclosure regulation and reporting standards, including the evidence on International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) adoption. Several important conclusions emerge. We generally lack evidence on market‐wide effects and externalities from regulation, yet such evidence is central to the economic justification of regulation. Moreover, evidence on causal effects of disclosure and reporting regulation is still relatively rare. We also lack evidence on the real effects of such regulation. These limitations provide many research opportunities. We conclude with several specific suggestions for future research.     

Smoothing the waves of pension funding: Could changes in funding rules help avoid cyclical under‐funding?

Defined benefit pensions are still an important part of retirement income security for 44 million people. After 2000, these plans experienced extreme difficulties. Although the magnitude of the problem was unprecedented, its causes were not. Interest rate and asset prices decline in a recession, when earnings are low. Pension funding rules reflect this regularity. This requires additional contributions when times are bad. We address this counter‐cyclicality through three proposed rule changes. We use a simulation model to evaluate these. Our results indicate that counter‐cyclicality would have diminished, while funding adequacy would have improved.     

Adjustment strategies of multinational enterprises to changing national competitiveness

This article establishes a link between four combinations of relative firm‐specific advantages and comparative advantage and the adjustment strategies of multinational firms. Based on the distribution of firms across advantage combinations, hypotheses on four adjustment strategies are developed: expansion, rationalization, exit and relocation. Upon a detailed analysis of a representative sample of manufacturing firms for 1990–2000, a consistent competitiveness ranking of domestic and foreign firms across industries and over time is derived. The strategies followed by the firms are reflected by the development of employment, value‐added and exports. Results show that firms are not distributed entirely in line with comparative advantage, but the dynamic interaction (“match”) of location‐advantage and firm‐specific advantage seems to be decisive. Results also confirm that domestic and foreign firms partly react differently under a given advantage combination. The following principles for location policies are suggested: the empirically measured mismatch of firm capabilities and location advantages determine when direct and indirect measures should be used. The intensity of policy measures should be oriented towards the competitiveness ranking derived.     

Earnings Management and Cultural Values

Using theory and empirical data from social psychology to measure for cultural differences between countries, this research studies the effect of individualism, defined as the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups ( Hofstede 1980 ), and egalitarianism, defined as a society's cultural orientation with respect to intolerance for abuses of market and political power ( Schwartz 1994, 2004 ) on earnings management. This research finds a significant cultural influence on earnings management. Specifically, the results show that countries scoring high on individualism tend to have lower levels of earnings management. Using the Schwartz (1994, 2004 ) framework, this study finds that egalitarianism is negatively related to earnings management. The analysis shows that, besides the formal investor protection, it is relevant to consider cultural differences to explain earnings management. This analysis also supports the idea that culture may be an important element in the discussion of global convergence towards a single corporate governance model, or the implementation of corporate governance codes inspired by codes from societies with different cultural values.