Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors: Implications for Financial Reporting

Although the financial statements of an organization are considered a product of management, prior research suggests that a company's financial statements may be affected by the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor when resolving audit differences with management. However, little subsequent research discusses the potential strategies that auditors may employ during the negotiation process. Our study extends the literature by investigating, in a post–Sarbanes‐Oxley environment, whether auditors will employ a reciprocity‐based strategy for the resolution of audit differences and what client characteristics (client management's negotiating style and client retention risk) increase the extent to which it is utilized. Further, we explore the potential effect of a reciprocity‐based strategy on the quality of the financial statements. Such a strategy involves bringing inconsequential items to management and subsequently waiving these items in an effort to encourage management to be more cooperative in the posting of significant income‐decreasing adjustments. The results of experiment 1 indicate that client management's negotiating style and retention risk have an interactive effect on auditors' use of a reciprocity‐based strategy. Specifically, auditors are more likely to utilize a reciprocity‐based strategy when management's negotiating style is competitive and client retention risk is high. Experiment 2 findings suggest that the auditor's use of reciprocity during negotiation can actually result in more conservative financial statements by helping the auditor manage perceived client pressures to waive or reduce proposed adjustments.     

The Informational Role of the Media in Private Lending

We investigate whether a borrower's media coverage influences the syndicated loan origination and participation decisions of informationally disadvantaged lenders, loan syndicate structures, and interest spreads. In syndicated loan deals, information asymmetries can exist between lenders that have a relationship with a borrower and less informed, nonrelationship lenders competing to serve as lead arranger on a syndicated loan, and also between lead arrangers and less informed syndicate participants. Theory suggests that the aggressiveness with which less informed lenders compete for a loan deal increases in the sentiment of public information signals about a borrower. We extend this theory to syndicated loans and hypothesize that the likelihood of less informed lenders serving as the lead arranger or joining a loan syndicate is increasing in the sentiment of media‐initiated, borrower‐specific articles published prior to loan origination. We find that as media sentiment increases (1) outside, nonrelationship lenders have a higher probability of originating loans; (2) syndicate participants are less likely to have a previous relationship with the borrower or lead bank; (3) lead banks retain a lower percentage of loans; and (4) loan spreads decrease.     

The Resiliency of the High-Yield Bond Market: The LTV Default

This paper investigates the resiliency of the new-issue high-yield bond market by examining the changes in implied default rates of such bonds before and after the largest high-yield bond default, i.e., the LTV bankruptcy. Specifically, the paper compares implied default probabilities of high-yield bonds during the post-LTV period calculated from actual new-issue yields with instrumental default probabilities calculated on the assumption that the default had not occurred. A comparison of these probabilities reveals that the market's perception of default on the high risk segment of the bond market increased significantly after the LTV bankruptcy. However, the effect was transitory, lasting only six months. Thus, the market was resilient to a major default.     

Debt Dynamics

We develop a dynamic trade‐off model with endogenous choice of leverage, distributions, and real investment in the presence of a graduated corporate income tax, individual taxes on interest and corporate distributions, financial distress costs, and equity flotation costs. We explain several empirical findings inconsistent with the static trade‐off theory. We show there is no target leverage ratio, firms can be savers or heavily levered, leverage is path dependent, leverage is decreasing in lagged liquidity, and leverage varies negatively with an external finance weighted average Q. Using estimates of structural parameters, we find that simulated model moments match data moments.     

The Cyclical Behavior of the Price-Cost Markup

A countercyclical markup of price over marginal cost is a key transmission mechanism for demand shocks in New Keynesian (NK) models. This paper reexamines the foundation of those models by studying the cyclicality of the price-cost markup in the private economy. We find that how the markup is measured matters for its unconditional cyclicality. Measures of the markup based on the inverse of the labor share are moderately procyclical, but are moderately countercyclical for some generalizations of the production function. NK models predict that the cyclicality of the markup should vary depending on the nature of the shock. Consistent with the NK model, we find that the markup is procyclical conditional on total factor productivity shocks and countercyclical conditional on investment-specific technology shocks. In contrast, we find that the markup increases in response to a positive demand shock. Thus, the transmission mechanism for the effects of demand shocks in sticky-price NK models is not consistent with the data.     

Profiling,Screening, and Criminal Recruitment

We model major criminal activity as a game in which a law enforcement officer chooses the rate at which to screen different population groups, and a criminal organization (e.g., drug cartel, terrorist cell) chooses the observable characteristics of its recruits. Our model best describes smuggling or terrorism activities at borders, airports, and other security checkpoints. The most effective law enforcement policy imposes only moderate restrictions on the officer's ability to profile. In contrast to models of decentralized crime, requiring equal treatment never improves the effectiveness of law enforcement.     

THE APPLICATION OF CLUSTER ANALYSIS IN STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT RESEARCH: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE

Cluster analysis is a statistical technique that sorts observations into similar sets or groups. The use of cluster analysis presents a complex challenge because it requires several methodological choices that determine the quality of a cluster solution. This paper chronicles the application of cluster analysis in strategic management research, where the technique has been used since the late 1970s to investigate issues of central importance. Analysis of 45 published strategy studies reveals that the implementation of cluster analysis has been often less than ideal, perhaps detracting from the ability of studies to generate knowledge. Given these findings, suggestions are offered for improving the application of cluster analysis in future inquiry.     

Skin in the Game and Moral Hazard

What determines securitization levels, and should they be regulated? To address these questions we develop a model where originators can exert unobservable effort to increase expected asset quality, subsequently having private information regarding quality when selling ABS to rational investors. Absent regulation, originators may signal positive information via junior retentions or commonly adopt low retentions if funding value and price informativeness are high. Effort incentives are below first‐best absent regulation. Optimal regulation promoting originator effort entails a menu of junior retentions or one junior retention with size decreasing in price informativeness. Zero retentions and opacity are optimal among regulations inducing zero effort.     

Labor Force Participation and Monetary Policy in the Wake of the Great Recession

This paper provides compelling evidence that cyclical factors account for the bulk of the post‐2007 decline in the U.S. labor force participation rate (LFPR). We then formulate a stylized New Keynesian model in which the LFPR is practically acyclical during “normal times” but drops markedly following a large and persistent aggregate demand shock. These considerations have potentially crucial implications for the design of monetary policy, especially when interest rate adjustments are constrained by the zero lower bound; specifically, monetary policy can induce a more rapid recovery of the LFPR by allowing the unemployment rate to fall below its natural rate.