The Causal Impact of Media in Financial Markets

Disentangling the causal impact of media reporting from the impact of the events being reported is challenging. We solve this problem by comparing the behaviors of investors with access to different media coverage of the same information event. We use zip codes to identify 19 mutually exclusive trading regions corresponding with large U.S. cities. For all earnings announcements of S&P 500 Index firms, we find that local media coverage strongly predicts local trading, after controlling for earnings, investor, and newspaper characteristics. Moreover, local trading is strongly related to the timing of local reporting, a particular challenge to nonmedia explanations.     

The Capitalization of Consumer Financing into Durable Goods Prices

Using loan‐level data on millions of used‐car transactions across hundreds of lenders, we study the consumer response to exogenous variation in credit terms. Borrowers offered shorter maturity decrease expenditures enough to offset 60% to 90% of the monthly payment increase. Most of this is driven by shifting toward lower‐quality cars, but affected borrowers offset 20% to 30% of a monthly payment shock by negotiating lower prices for equivalent cars. Our results suggest that durable goods prices adjust to reflect credit terms even at the individual level, with one year of additional loan maturity increasing a car's price by 2.8%.     

Quantitative Easing in the 1930s

During the 1934–39 recovery from the U.S. Great Depression, overnight interest rates were usually at a lower bound. Meanwhile, American monetary authorities followed policies related to today's debates on quantitative easing: they tried to stabilize yields on Treasury bonds with open market operations; they created rapid growth in high‐powered money; and they allowed transitory factors to affect high‐powered money. Effects of these policies on bond yields reveal a portfolio effect of short‐duration asset supply on term premiums. This portfolio effect helps explain why high‐powered money growth was associated with recovery of real activity over 1934–39.     

The Empirics of International Monetary Transmission: Identification and the Impossible Trinity

The transmission of monetary policy across borders is central to many open economy models. Research has tried to evaluate the “impossible trinity” through estimating international interest rate linkages under alternative exchange rate regimes using realized base country interest rates. Such interest rates include anticipated and endogenous elements, which need not propagate internationally. We compare international interest rate responses under pegged and non‐pegged regimes to identified, unanticipated, and exogenous U.S. interest rate changes and realized U.S. interest rate changes. We find important differences in estimated transmission from the two sets of measures—identified interest rate changes demonstrate a greater concordance with the impossible trinity than realized rate changes.     

Competing for Attention: Lobbying Time‐Constrained Politicians

We develop a model of lobbying in which a time and resource constrained policymaker first chooses which policy proposals to learn about, before choosing which to implement. The policymaker reviews the proposals of the interest groups who provide the highest contributions. We study how policy outcomes and contributions depend on policymaker constraints and the design of the “Contest for Attention.” Among other results, awarding attention to the highest contributors generally guarantees the first best policy outcome. It can also lead to the highest possible contributions, suggesting that a policymaker may not need to sacrifice policy in order to maximize contributions. Our results also give insight into other settings where agents compete for a decision maker's attention.     

EXPERIMENTAL WORK ON SUBSIDIES,MORAL HAZARD,AND MARKET POWER IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS

Laboratory markets are created to capture the important features of agricultural commodity markets. Sellers make production decisions and hold inventories before goods are sold. In a posted‐bid auction environment, price supports create a moral hazard for sellers. Part of the price‐support subsidy is transferred to buyers in the form of lower prices, which are close to those predicted by the buyers' Cournot level. The subsidy program is expensive for this reason. Lump‐sum payments correct the moral hazard problem and are better at transferring income to sellers. However, transfers made at the beginning of each production period cause a decline in production levels. (JEL D44, C92)     

Option Momentum

This paper investigates the performance of option investments across different stocks by computing monthly returns on at-the-money straddles on individual equities. We find that options with high historical returns continue to significantly outperform options with low historical returns over horizons ranging from 6 to 36 months. This phenomenon is robust to including out-of-the-money options or delta-hedging the returns. Unlike stock momentum, option return continuation is not followed by long-run reversal. Significant returns remain after factor risk adjustment and after controlling for implied volatility and other characteristics. Across stocks, trading costs are unrelated to the magnitude of momentum profits.     

Stealth Acquisitions and Product Market Competition

We examine whether and how firms structure their merger and acquisition deals to avoid antitrust scrutiny. There are approximately 40% more mergers and acquisitions (M&As) than expected just below deal value thresholds that trigger antitrust review. These “stealth acquisitions” tend to involve financial and governance contract terms that afford greater scope for negotiating and assigning lower deal values. We also show that the equity values, gross margins, and product prices of acquiring firms and their competitors increase following such acquisitions. Our results suggest that acquirers manipulate M&As to avoid antitrust scrutiny, thereby benefiting their own shareholders but potentially harming other corporate stakeholders.