A Mechanism for Inducing Cooperation in Noncooperative Environments: Theory and Applications

We construct a market‐based mechanism that induces players in a noncooperative game to make the same choices as characterize cooperation. We then argue that this mechanism is applicable to a wide range of economic questions and illustrate this claim using the problem of “The Tragedy of the Commons.”     

The Impact of Inflation and Taxation on Tenure Choice and the Redistributive Effects of Home-Mortgage Interest Rate ReguIation*

Judy Yates (1981) notes the regressive redistributive impact of home-mortgage interest rate regulation and offers some explanations. This paper provides an alternative explanation of Yates' observations in terms of the interaction of inflation with the current tax system in Australia. A model of tenure choice in the context of inflation and taxation is developed. In explaining this phenomenon, the model also establishes the regressive nature of the tax subsidy to owner-occupation. Home-mortgage interest rate regulation is then introduced. This reinforces the redistributive bias in the housing finance market. The model is used finally to predict the impact of deregulation. It is concluded that deregulation by itself can only remove redistributive bias resulting from regulated mortgage interest rates. Reform of the tax system is required to eliminate the regressive redistributive effects of the tax subsidy to owner-occupation .     

RATIONING, SPILLOVER, AND INTERLINKING IN CREDIT MARKETS: THE CASE OF RURAL PUNJAB

A parallel market structure may exhibit extensive rationingin the regulated segment, and hence spillover of unsatisfieddemand into the unregulated segment of the market. In the lattersegment, the borrower can choose to bundle loan contracts withoutput marketing through the lender. Using data on Punjabi cultivators,econometric estimation of such a structure yields three principalfindings: (i) most borrowers and non-borrowers were rationedin the regulated market; (ii) demand for credit was fairly inelasticwith respect to the interest rate; (iii) a contractual provisiontying credit to output marketing made informal lenders willingto advance much bigger loans. One pana and a quarter is the lawful rate of interest per monthon one hundred panas, five panas for purposes of trade, tenpanas for those going through forests, twenty panas for thosegoing by sea. For one charging or making another charge a ratebeyond that, the punishment shall be the lowest fine for violence,for witnesses, each one of them, half the fine. If, however,the King is unable to ensure protection, the Qudge) should takeinto consideration the usual practice among creditors and debtors.The Kautiliya Arthasastra (a fourth century BC work on kingshipand statecraft).     

Tax Riots

This paper considers an optimal taxation environment where household income is private information, and the government randomly audits and punishes households found to be underreporting. We prove that the optimal mechanism derived using standard mechanism design techniques has a bad equilibrium (a tax riot) where households underreport their incomes, precisely because other households are expected to do so as well. We then consider three alternative approaches to designing a tax scheme when one is worried about bad equilibria.     

Monetary News Shocks

We pursue an empirical strategy to identify a monetary news shock in the U.S. economy. We use a monetary policy residual, along with other variables in a vector autoregression (VAR), and identify a monetary news shock as the linear combination of reduced-form innovations that is orthogonal to the current residual and that maximizes the sum of contributions to its forecast error variance over a finite horizon. Real GDP declines in a persistent manner after a positive monetary news shock. This contraction in economic activity is accompanied by a fall in inflation and a rapid increase in the nominal interest rate.     

Client Characteristics and the Negotiation Tactics of Auditors: Implications for Financial Reporting

Although the financial statements of an organization are considered a product of management, prior research suggests that a company's financial statements may be affected by the negotiation strategy employed by the auditor when resolving audit differences with management. However, little subsequent research discusses the potential strategies that auditors may employ during the negotiation process. Our study extends the literature by investigating, in a post–Sarbanes‐Oxley environment, whether auditors will employ a reciprocity‐based strategy for the resolution of audit differences and what client characteristics (client management's negotiating style and client retention risk) increase the extent to which it is utilized. Further, we explore the potential effect of a reciprocity‐based strategy on the quality of the financial statements. Such a strategy involves bringing inconsequential items to management and subsequently waiving these items in an effort to encourage management to be more cooperative in the posting of significant income‐decreasing adjustments. The results of experiment 1 indicate that client management's negotiating style and retention risk have an interactive effect on auditors' use of a reciprocity‐based strategy. Specifically, auditors are more likely to utilize a reciprocity‐based strategy when management's negotiating style is competitive and client retention risk is high. Experiment 2 findings suggest that the auditor's use of reciprocity during negotiation can actually result in more conservative financial statements by helping the auditor manage perceived client pressures to waive or reduce proposed adjustments.     

Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information

We study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information. Optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems. The market structure in these economies is similar to that in Bewley (1986) ; agents supply labour and trade risk-free claims to future consumption, subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit. Optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics—an agent's accumulated stock of claims, or wealth, and her current labour income. We show that optimal taxes are generally non-linear and non-separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences.     

THE POVERTY REDUCTION SUCCESS OF PUBLIC TRANSFERS FOR WORKING AGE IMMIGRANTS AND REFUGEES IN THE UNITED STATES

Although there has been some research on the impacts of federal tax and transfer policies on poverty rates for immigrants, virtually no previous work investigates the most disadvantaged group of immigrants: refugees. We estimate probit models for three standard measures of poverty. We find that while immigrants and refugees in particular had much higher poverty rates in the early 1990s, the strong economic growth of the 1990s led to a convergence of those poverty rates by 2000. Our analysis demonstrates that the improvement was largely because of economic conditions and that welfare reform policies appear to have little differential impact on immigrants or refugees. We also find that refugees show a markedly greater response to local labor market conditions than other immigrants or native born. (JEL H3, I3, J1)     

The Impact of Union Corruption on Union Membership

This paper examines the relationship between union corruption actions and union membership. State‐level data from the Office of Labor‐Management Standards, and other sources, are utilized over two study periods (1974–2000 and 2001–2008) to test three hypotheses, including the union corruption hypothesis, as possible explanations for the decline in union membership in the United States over time. Although our initial findings suggest a negative relationship exists between union corruption and membership, after removing the possibility of simultaneous equations bias, we find that changes in corruption do not influence changes in union membership in our sample.