Earnings Management and the Long-Run Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings

Issuers of initial public offerings (IPOs) can report earnings in excess of cash flows by taking positive accruals. This paper provides evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter. IPO issuers in the most "aggressive" quartile of earnings managers have a three-year aftermarket stock return of approximately 20 percent less than IPO issuers in the most "conservative" quartile. They also issue about 20 percent fewer seasoned equity offerings. These differences are statistically and economically significant in a variety of specifications.     

Contagion or Competition: Going Concern Audit Opinions for Real Estate Firms

We examine whether intra–industry information transfers from going–concern audit opinion announcements create contagion or competitive stock price reactions for other real estate firms operating in the same line of business. Using returns from publicly-traded land subdivision/development firms and Real Estate Investment Trusts, we find modest evidence supporting a competitive effect among rival firms as a result of another real estate firm announcing the receipt of a Going Concern Opinion (GCO) from its independent auditors.     

Foreign affiliates of the world largest financial groups: Locations and governance

This paper has two objectives. The first is the documentation of the relative importance of the largest financial groups in the world. The list of top 50 financial groups ranked by total assets in 2003 is compared to a similar list available for 1986. The second objective is to examine where financial firms are expanding their operations and to document some of the factors that may explain the most-favoured locations of these financial groups.The results of this study have two important implications. First, they indicate that location-specific advantages such as size, human capital and cultural distance, do provide an explication of the internationalization of financial firms. Second, they show that good governance has a strong impact on the choice of countries by firms.     

Is there cyclical bias in bank holding company risk ratings?

This paper examines whether bank holding company (BHC) risk ratings are asymmetrically assigned or biased over business cycles from 1986 to 2003. In a model of ratings determination which accounts for bank characteristics, financial market conditions, past supervisory information, and aggregate macro-economic factors, we find that bank exam ratings exhibit inter-temporal characteristics. First, exam ratings exhibit some evidence of examiner bias for several periods analyzed. When the business cycle turns, examiners sometime depart from standards that they set during the previous phases of the cycle. However, this bias is not widespread or systematic. Second, exam ratings exhibit some inertia. Our results suggest that examiners rate on the side of not changing (rather than upgrading or downgrading) an institution’s exam rating. Third, we find robust evidence of a secular trend towards more stringent examination BHC ratings standards over time.     

How to identify your enemies before they destroy you

We've all heard the stories about corporate giants who ignored disruptive innovations and paid a steep price: Think what the personal computer did to Digital or Japanese economy cars did to the Big Three automakers. Big companies now spend a lot of time and money trying to make sure they don't get blindsided by their smaller, leaner counterparts. But it's not easy to distinguish genuine threats from also-rans as they emerge. Most of the nascent technologies that typically bombard executives will not amount to competitive threats and deserve to be ignored. As a result, disruptions are usually not taken seriously until they become obvious--when it's often too late. A disruptive innovation is a technology, product, or process that creeps up from below an existing business and threatens to displace it. Usually, the disrupter offers lower performance and less functionality at a much lower price. The product or process is good enough to meet some customers' needs; others welcome the disruption's simplicity. Gradually, it improves to the point where it displaces the incumbent. But, the authors argue, disruption isn't inevitable. They have developed a tool that can help companies detect potential disruptive innovations while management still has time to respond effectively. The tool's decision-making methodology harnesses the organization's collective wisdom to determine how likely it is that a particular innovation will seriously damage an incumbent's business. The methodology has two components: an analytical instrument and an organizational process. There's nothing magical about it--but it gets managers to think systematically about identifying and addressing threats to the core business. And the tool's rigorous approach can spell the difference between flailing around and acting effectively in the face of a serious competitive threat.