OECD imports: diversification of suppliers and quality search

We posit that OECD buyers are in a continuous search for best quality suppliers from developing countries. We build a simple model of adverse selection and quality screening which captures this feature. The model predicts that diversification happens by “bouts”, or temporary episodes, during which OECD buyers search for high-quality suppliers. Each diversification episode is followed by a phase of re-concentration on the best performers, until those fail (which happens stochastically), triggering new search phases. The model also shows that concentration across origin is highly volatile, especially for goods with high-quality heterogeneity. Finally, as the set of suppliers expands and buyers continue sampling, the overall trend is an increased diversification across time. We empirical explore these conjectures using OECD imports over time (1963–2006) and measuring their concentration across 250 origin countries at the product level (1,300 products). We provide strong empirical evidence corroborating the model predictions.     

Market Access and Welfare under Free Trade Agreements: Textiles under NAFTA

The effective market access granted to textiles and apparelunder the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is estimated,taking into account the presence of rules of origin. First,estimates are provided of the effect of tariff preferences combinedwith rules of origin on the border prices of Mexican final goodsexported to the United States and of U.S. intermediate goodsexported to Mexico, based on eight-digit Harmonized System tariff-linedata. A third of the estimated rise in the border price of Mexicanapparel products is found to compensate for the cost of complyingwith NAFTA’s rules of origin, and NAFTA is found to haveraised the price of U.S. intermediate goods exported to Mexicoby around 12 percent, with downstream rules of origin accountingfor a third of that increase. Second, simulations are used toestimate welfare gains for Mexican exporters from preferentialmarket access under NAFTA. The presence of rules of origin isfound to approximately halve these gains.     

The protectionist bias of duty drawbacks: evidence from Mercosur

In a political-economy setting where tariffs and duty drawbacks are endogenously chosen through industry lobbying, it is shown that full duty-drawbacks are granted to exporters who use imported intermediates in their production. This in turn decreases their incentives to counter-lobby against high tariffs on their inputs. In equilibrium, higher tariffs will be observed on these goods. The creation of a regional block will change the political equilibrium. Duty-drawbacks will be eliminated on intra-regional exports, which in turn will lead to lower tariffs for goods used as inputs by intra-regional exporters. Evidence from Mercosur suggests that the elimination of duty-drawbacks for intra-regional exports led to increased counter-lobbying by users of intermediate products. In its absence the common external tariff would have been on average 3.5 percentage points (25 percent) higher.     

TRADE DIVERSIFICATION,INCOME, AND GROWTH: WHAT DO WE KNOW?

This paper surveys the empirical literature on export and import diversification and its linkages with growth. We review widely used measures of diversification and the evidence about their evolution focusing on how export diversification relates to trade liberalization and economic development. We also discuss the linkages between trade diversification and productivity at the firm and industry level, highlighting new advances on the linkages between import diversification and productivity.     

TRADE POLICY AND MARKET POWER: FIRM‐LEVEL EVIDENCE

This article identifies the effect of trade policy on market power through new data and a new identification strategy. We identify market power by observing how exporting firms price discriminate across markets following variations in bilateral exchange rates. Pricing‐to‐market is prevalent in all countries in our sample, even among small firms, although it is increasing in firm size. More importantly, we find that the effect of nontariff measures (NTMs) is not isomorphic to that of tariffs. Whereas tariffs reduce the market power of foreign firms through rent‐shifting effects, NTMs reinforce the market power of nonexiting firms, domestic and foreign alike.