Lab and framed lab versus natural experiments: Evidence from a risky choice experiment

Some recent papers have studied data from TV game shows to examine the behaviour of individuals towards risk. It is generally agreed that data from these shows are useful in detecting individual risk aversion in the field, with both “real life” subjects and incentives. Field experiments also include some interesting reality features that could affect individuals’ behaviour and possibly lead to different findings. This paper aims at investigating lab versus field evidence in risk taking attitudes, especially controlling for framing effects. To assess whether the behaviour of subjects in the field is consistent with that of experimental subjects, we designed an experiment to mimic (with experimental rewards and subjects) the rules of a well-known Italian TV game show, Affari Tuoi, in two different settings: a traditional lab setting, where the game was played individually (109 subjects) (Treatment 1); and a framed lab, in which the experiment was replicated in the Italian public television (RAI) studio where the show was actually recorded, with a smaller sample of undergraduate students (33) and in the presence of an audience (Treatment 2). Our comparison between the two different settings aims at establishing whether the presence of an audience, or of a situation that reproduces the stress that contestants must experience in the TV studio, can affect experimental subjects’ choices. We did not find any significant evidence of framing effects: students behave in a similar way in the two lab settings, responding essentially to incentives. Comparing the risk attitudes shown by experimental subjects in the two lab treatments with those exhibited by the contestants in the field, we found that contestants in the TV show are generally more risk averse than students in the lab.     

Risk and Crisis Management in the Reformed European Agricultural Policy

Currently there is ample discussion among EU Institutions (European Commission, European Parliament, and Member States' governments) on the opportunity for setting up a comprehensive EU‐wide framework on risk and crises in agriculture. In the meantime, within the limits of the WTO rules on agriculture, national governments are allowed to intervene through direct compensation to farmers in case of exceptional events that cause damages to farming operations and through subsidies to crop insurance programs. Such schemes are quite expensive for domestic budgets and some Member States are trying to switch some of their cost to the Community's budget, although an expansion of financial resources devoted to agriculture in Europe is rather unlikely. Moving from the recently emanated proposal of the European Commission, this paper discusses the main issues related to public intervention for risk and crises management in agriculture. Actuellement, les institutions européennes (Commission européenne, Parlement européen et gouvernements des pays membres) discutent intensément de l'opportunité d'élaborer un cadre général pour l'ensemble de l'Union européenne sur les crises et les risques dans le secteur agricole. Entre‐temps, selon les règles de l'OMC sur l'agriculture, les gouvernements nationaux peuvent intervenir en accordant des compensations financières directes aux agriculteurs en cas de circonstances exceptionnelles causant des dommages aux exploitations agricoles ainsi que des subventions aux programmes d'assurance récolte. Ces interventions amputent considérablement les budgets nationaux, et certains pays membres tentent de transférer une partie de leurs coûts au budget de l'Union européenne, bien qu'il soit peu probable que les ressources financières consacrées à l'agriculture en Europe augmentent. A la lumière de la récente proposition de la Commission européenne, le présent article traite des principaux thèmes liés à l'intervention publique dans la gestion des risques et des crises dans le secteur agricole.     

OBSERVABLE MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND SPATIAL COMPETITION

In this paper we investigate the relationship between product market competition and managerial incentives within a circular city model with observable agency contracts. With respect to the case of unobservability studied by Raith (2003 ), we find that optimal managerial contracts provide lower incentives, and that equilibrium expected prices and profits are higher. Changes in competition fundamentals have ambiguous effects, but observable contracts alleviate their impact on incentives. Finally, observability involves three major implications: managerial incentives are higher under price regulation than under competition; prices may increase with the number of firms; consumer welfare may diminish when competition increases.     

On the role of retaliation in trade agreements

This paper analyzes the role of retaliation in trade agreements. It shows that, in the presence of private information, retaliation can always be used to increase the welfare derived from such agreements by the participating governments. In particular, it is shown that retaliation is a necessary feature of any efficient equilibrium.We argue that retaliation would not be necessary if governments could resort to international transfers or export subsidies to compensate for terms-of-trade externalities. Within the current world trading system, though, in which transfers are seldom observed whereas export subsidies are prohibited, the use of the remaining trade instruments in a retaliatory fashion might be optimal. The model is used to interpret the retaliatory use of antidumping observed in the last decades, and the proliferation of these measures relative to other trade remedies.     

WELFARE ENHANCING COORDINATION IN CONSUMER COOPERATIVES UNDER MIXED OLIGOPOLY

The recent globalization of world economies has led the retail markets of developed countries towards increasing levels of integration and strategic interdependence. A non negligible share of retail and food markets is currently served by co‐operative societies. Consistently with this trend, the consumer cooperatives have recently experienced increasing levels of integration. The main aim of this paper is to study the welfare effects of coordination among consumer cooperatives competing in quantities in a mixed oligopoly against profit‐maximizing firms. We show that, in absence of agency problems, under increasing or constant returns to scale a higher output coordination of the consumer cooperatives does not affect the total welfare as long as a nonnegative profit constraint holds in these firms. On the other hand, under decreasing returns to scale, the consumer cooperatives contribute more to social welfare when acting on behalf of all consumers. This is because, by coordinating consumers’ preferences, these firms can reduce their market output, thus helping the market to come closer to the first best. All together these results seem to provide an argument in favour of the recent process of integration involving consumer cooperatives in many developed countries.     

Is the international propagation of financial shocks non-linear?: Evidence from the ERM

This paper tests for the presence of non-linearities in the propagation of devaluation expectations among the countries that were members of the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the EMS. We show that whenever it is possible to estimate a model for financial interdependence, a full-information technique to detect such non-linearities is more efficient than the limited-information estimator proposed, in a similar context, by Rigobon (2000). This happens, in particular, when the periods of market turbulence are relatively short. Our evidence suggests that non-linearities in the propagation of devaluation expectations were a general phenomenon in the ERM. Normally the non-linearity amounts to a stronger effect in the same direction, but sometimes, as in the Dutch case, it implies a significant effect in the opposite direction: evidence of flight-to-quality.     

Organizational culture in a terminally ill hospital

This study analyzed an organizational culture in a community hospital in Texas to measure organizational culture change and its impact on Patient Satisfaction (PS). The study employed primary and secondary data, combining quantitative and qualitative methods for a case study. Participant observation was used and archival data were collected to provide a better understanding of the organizational culture and the context in which change was taking place. This study also applied a "Shared Vision" of the organization as the central process in bringing forth the knowledge shared by members of the community hospital who were both subjects and research participants. The results from the study suggest an increase in PS due to the shared vision of one subculture within the hospital. There were powerful subcultures in this organization based on occupation and specialization, and their interests and functional orientations were not conducive to a systems approach. Hospital management was conducted in "silos" and there was lack of feedback between organizational levels of the hospital, especially in financial management, with organizational dysfunctionality in reacting and adapting to the health care market.     

New firm location: An equilibrium model and its disequilibrium dynamics

This paper is centered on two basic statements: i) the birth of new firms is spatially related to location factors endowment and ii) the set of location factors can support only up to a given number of firms.The paper firstly defines the regional ex-ante demand for firms as a function of location factors set. In the following step a definition of regional equilibrium stock of firms is given and a static equilibrium model of new firms birth is built up. In a dynamic disequilibrium model the net birth of firms is a function of two disequilibrium terms: a sectoral and a regional one.The sectoral disequilibrium depends on the industry production structure, the regional disequilibrium is linked to the adaptation elasticity of location factors set to an exogenous shock.Finally, a first estimation on Italian data is performed, on the basis of which some new lines of analysis are suggested.