Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination

Most international monetary policy games are modelled as prisoners' dilemma games. Political scientists suggest however that other game-theoretic structures (chicken, stag-hunt and deadlock games) could be more appropriate to describe international monetary coordination. This paper provides some empirical evidence on this issue, by studying the case of European monetary coordination from 1979 to 1989. First, central banks' and governments' preferences are revealed through an analysis of their actual behaviour. Then, the dynamic game describing policymakers' interactions is simulated under alternative institutional arrangements: coordination, defection, sub-group coalitions, etc. The main conclusion is that the stylised facts derived from those experiments seem not to be consistent with the implications of the prisoners' dilemma framework. Consistency is instead found with the features of a stag-hunt game. CEPR and FEEM This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Average Internal Rate of Return and Investment Decisions: A New Perspective

The internal rate of return (IRR) is often used by managers and practitioners for investment decisions. Unfortunately, it has serious flaws: (1) multiple real-valued IRRs may arise; (2) complex-valued IRRs may arise; (3) the IRR is, in general, incompatible with the net present value (NPV) in accept/reject decisions; (4) the IRR ranking is, in general, different from the NPV ranking; (5) the IRR criterion is not applicable with variable costs of capital. The efforts of economists and management scientists in providing a reliable project rate of return have generated over the decades an immense bulk of contributions aiming to solve these shortcomings. This article offers a complete solution to this long-standing unresolved issue by changing the usual perspective: the IRR equation is dismissed and the evaluator is allowed to describe the project as an investment or a borrowing at his discretion. This permits showing that any arithmetic mean of the one-period return rates implicit in a project reliably informs about a project's profitability and correctly ranks competing projects. With such a measure, which we call average internal rate of return, complex-valued numbers disappear and all the above-mentioned problems are wiped out. The economic meaning is compelling: it is the project return rate implicitly determined by the market. The traditional IRR notion may be found as a particular case.     

Environmental innovation policy and international competition

We consider one polluting industry in an open economy. The national government implements a policy of industrial pollution control, by inducing appropriate technological innovation to reduce toxic emissions. The emission-reducing innovations are developed through firm-specific costly investments. Under different hypotheses on market structure (perfect competition, Bertrand and Cournot oligopoly), international competition forces the national government to subsidize innovation. The appropriate subsidy scheme varies according to the information available to the government and according to market structure. If information is asymmetric, the subsidy must include the information premium necessary to separate different types of firms.     

Technical efficiency and scale efficiency in the Italian banking sector: a non-parametric approach

Measures of technical and scale efficiencies are derived in the Italian banking industries by implementing non-parametric Data Envelopment Analysis on a cross section of 174 Italian banks taken in 1991. The methodology of the parametric and non-parametric approaches to measure efficiency are discussed. The existence of both technical and allocative efficiency is established. This result is robust to modifications in the specification of inputs and outputs suggested by the Intermediation Approach and by the Asset Approach. In implementing both the Intermediation and the Asset Approach the traditional specification of inputs is modified to allow an explicit role for financial capital. In addition, regression analysis is used on a bank-specific measure of inefficiency to investigate determinants of banks' efficiency. Efficiency is best explained by productive specialization, size and, to a lesser extent, by location.     

An Empirical Study of the Impact of Corruption on Environmental Performance: Evidence from Panel Data

This paper extends the empirical debate on the effects of corruption on environmental degradation by considering a recently available measure of environmental quality, the Environmental Performance Index. This indicator is more comprehensive than the measures of air pollutant emissions commonly used in the literature and, in particular, can also capture the impact of pollution on human health. This allows for a better understanding of the actual effects of a wide range of human activities on the ecosystem. From a panel data analysis, two regularities emerge. First, corruption deteriorates the overall environmental quality. This effect is robust and persistent. Second, our findings highlight the improvement of environmental quality as income rises, even at an initial level of development. This is not in contradiction with the EKC hypothesis because an increase in income levels provides positive externalities on the whole environmental quality by compensating the mere negative effects induced by industrialization on the emission levels. As a consequence, in emerging economies, policies fighting corruption and enhancing development are very likely to improve the environmental performances.     

Decomposition of Net Final Values: Systemic Value Added and Residual Income

This paper proposes a model aiming at decomposing the Net Final Value of a project under certainty. It makes use of a systemic outlook: the investor's net worth is regarded as a dynamic system whose structure changes over time. On this basis, a profitability index is presented, here named Systemic Value Added (SVA), which lends itself to a periodic decomposition: the periodic shares formally translate the economic concept of residual income (or excess profit). While as an overall index the Systemic Value Added coincides with the Net Final Value (NFV) of an investment, the systemic partition of a SVA is shown to differ from the NFV decomposition model proposed by Peccati (1987, 1991, 1992), which in turn bears a strong resemblance to Stewart's (1991) EVA model. The SVA model and the NFV–based model bear interesting relations: by introducing the concept of a shadow project the SVA model can be re–shaped so that the decomposition of the SVA can be accomplished by applying Peccati's argument to the shadow project , or, which is the same, by computing the shadow project 's Economic Value Added. The paper then generalizes the approach allowing for a portfolio of projects, multiple debts and multiple synchronic opportunity costs of capital, for which a tetra–dimensional decomposition is easily obtained.