Capital Structure and Regulation: Do Ownership and Regulatory Independence Matter?

We study the effect of ownership structure and regulatory independence on the interaction between capital structure and regulated prices using a comprehensive panel data of publicly traded European utilities. We find that firms in our sample tend to have a higher leverage if they are privately controlled and regulated by an independent regulatory agency. Moreover, the leverage of these firms has a positive and significant effect on their regulated prices, but not vice versa. Our results are consistent with the theory that privately controlled regulated firms use leverage strategically to obtain better regulatory outcomes.     

Modelling International Policy Games: Lessons from European Monetary Coordination

Most international monetary policy games are modelled as prisoners' dilemma games. Political scientists suggest however that other game-theoretic structures (chicken, stag-hunt and deadlock games) could be more appropriate to describe international monetary coordination. This paper provides some empirical evidence on this issue, by studying the case of European monetary coordination from 1979 to 1989. First, central banks' and governments' preferences are revealed through an analysis of their actual behaviour. Then, the dynamic game describing policymakers' interactions is simulated under alternative institutional arrangements: coordination, defection, sub-group coalitions, etc. The main conclusion is that the stylised facts derived from those experiments seem not to be consistent with the implications of the prisoners' dilemma framework. Consistency is instead found with the features of a stag-hunt game. CEPR and FEEM This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Decomposition of Net Final Values: Systemic Value Added and Residual Income

This paper proposes a model aiming at decomposing the Net Final Value of a project under certainty. It makes use of a systemic outlook: the investor's net worth is regarded as a dynamic system whose structure changes over time. On this basis, a profitability index is presented, here named Systemic Value Added (SVA), which lends itself to a periodic decomposition: the periodic shares formally translate the economic concept of residual income (or excess profit). While as an overall index the Systemic Value Added coincides with the Net Final Value (NFV) of an investment, the systemic partition of a SVA is shown to differ from the NFV decomposition model proposed by Peccati (1987, 1991, 1992), which in turn bears a strong resemblance to Stewart's (1991) EVA model. The SVA model and the NFV–based model bear interesting relations: by introducing the concept of a shadow project the SVA model can be re–shaped so that the decomposition of the SVA can be accomplished by applying Peccati's argument to the shadow project , or, which is the same, by computing the shadow project 's Economic Value Added. The paper then generalizes the approach allowing for a portfolio of projects, multiple debts and multiple synchronic opportunity costs of capital, for which a tetra–dimensional decomposition is easily obtained.     

Decomposing multifactor productivity in Italy from 1998 to 2004: evidence from large firms and SMEs using DEA

This paper presents a firm-level analysis of multifactor productivity (MFP) in Italy between 1998 and 2004. Using data envelopment analysis (DEA) technique, MFP change are measured for 31 industries and decomposed into efficiency change and technical change (which in turn is interpreted as the combined effect of technical progress and scale economies). The results highlight the stagnation in many Italian production activities and even a decrease in MFP in some industries. A non-parametric statistical test on the results obtained from DEA reveals that the analysed larger firms have been more likely to perform better in efficiency than the smaller ones. This outcome seems to complement the Schumpeterian view of a relatively high attitude of larger firms towards technological innovation and productivity growth.     

Fixed-mobile integration

Fixed-line incumbents often also own the largest mobile network. We consider the effect of this joint ownership on market outcomes. Our model predicts that while fixed-to-mobile call prices to the integrated mobile network are more efficient than under separation, those to rival mobile networks are distorted upwards, amplifying any incumbency advantage. This result is robust to changes in the competitiveness of the fixed market and to the presence of fixed-mobile substitution. As concerns potential remedies, a uniform off-net pricing constraint leads to higher welfare than functional separation, and even allows to maintain some of the efficiency gains.     

The role of human sustainability in professional service firms. Evidence from Italy

Sustainability is a central topic for an increasing number of companies, as a part of their business strategies. Human sustainability, that is, preserving and improving the quality of human life, in other words, maintaining and advancing human capital, appears as one relevant issue in that context. Humans and human capital are the foremost resources for professional service firms. Their role in the international economic scenario will most likely depend on how they deal with human sustainability and the wellbeing of their people. In this perspective, the paper investigates the antecedents, and organisational implications, of human sustainability in such firms using a structural equation model (SEM) developed on 4,301 questionnaires filled by Italian Chartered Accountants. Findings shed new lights on some implications of human sustainability. Results show that human sustainability has a direct and significative impact on a firm's ability to innovate, fostering creativity and intellectual capital, thus being significant for corporate performance. As a practical implication, firms should accordingly shape their business strategies towards accounting for human sustainability aspects.     

Entrepreneurial drain under moral hazard: A high-yield sector curse?

We describe a two-sector, general-equilibrium model of productive sorting under output risk and incomplete information. Risk-neutral (entrepreneurial) individuals can either produce alone, or - acting as employers/insurers - team up with risk-averse (non-entrepreneurial) individuals. Although the latter option has the potential to generate more surplus, when effort is unobservable and risk is high, the moral hazard problem in mixed matches may be too severe for mixing to be attractive to both risk-aversion types, leading to a segregated equilibrium in which risk-averse individuals select low-risk, low-yield activities. An increase in the profitability of the riskier sector can then trigger a switch from a mixed to a segregated equilibrium and cause aggregate output to fall. Evidence from a panel of non-OECD countries - showing that the presence of uninsured, small-scale mining firms has a negative impact on the relationship between natural resource exports and agrarian productivity - suggests that this ‘high-yield sector curse’ might be present in natural resource-rich, low-income countries.     

Labour mobility and the redistributive effects of trade integration

This paper addresses the role of mobility costs in shaping the effects of trade integration on wage inequality and welfare. We present a three-factor, two-sector model in which the production technology exhibits capital-skill complementarity and the cost of moving across sectors differs between unskilled and skilled workers. Results show that trade integration increases aggregate welfare, but it also raises wage inequality, both within and across skill categories. We also model a public re-training program, financed by a proportional tax levied on skilled workers, which reduces the mobility cost of unskilled workers. We show that even if the re-training programme entails some welfare losses, it can reduce both within and between wage inequality, while still making free trade Pareto superior with respect to the no-trade regime.