The new regionalism: trade liberalization or insurance?

Several of the recently negotiated regional trade agreements contain significantly fewer concessions by the large countries to smaller countries than vice versa. In this paper, we compute post‐retaliation Nash tariffs by region under various regional trade arrangements using a calibrated numerical general equilibrium model of world trade. Regional agreements constrain strategic behaviour within each trading area, and (in the Customs Union case) enhance it outside the bloc. Results confirm the intuition that without side payments large‐small country regional agreements (such as the Canada‐U.S. agreement) would not have occurred. Le nouveau régionalisme: libéralisation du commerce ou assurance? Dans plusieurs des accords de libre échange régionaux négociés récemment, les grands pays accordent beaucoup moins de concessions aux petits pays que les petits aux grands. Dans cet article, les auteurs mesurent, à l'aide d'un modèle numérisé d'´equilibre général du commerce mondial, les droits de douane à la Nash après ajustements réciproques. Il semble que les accords régionaux contraignent les comportements stratégiques dans chaque bloc, et (dans le cas de l'union douanière) renforcent les comportements stratégiques hors du bloc. Ces résultats confirment l'intuition qui suggère que, sans ces arrangements parallèles, les accords entre grands et petits pays (comme l'accord U.S.A.‐Canada) ne se matérialiseraient pas.     

New indicators of price competitiveness and effective exchange rates

New Indicators of Price Competitiveness und Effective Exchange Rates. - In this paper we propose new indicators of price competitiveness and effective exchange rates that provide more accurate information about the overall competitive position of a given country with respect to the traditional indices. The new methodology uses one of the so-called “superlative” index numbers that are characterized by very small approximation errors, which are of higher order than those present in the tradi-tional indices. The empirical evidence in four Italian exporting sectors show that the proposed indicators may differ from the traditional ones more than three percentage points not only in the end of the examined period, but also during the intermediate years.     

Why Do Governments Privatize Abroad?

Privatization through global equity market placement has largely contributed to financial market development and integration. Despite the relevance of the fact, the reasons underlying governments' choice to sell shares of privatized companies abroad are still poorly understood. This paper presents new evidence for a sample of 233 share issue privatizations in 20 OECD countries, showing that redistribution concerns and the objective of domestic financial market development make domestic privatization more likely. However, if budget constraints are binding, governments tend to sell abroad a larger quantity of shares, particularly when corporate governance at home is weak.     

Regional Economic Integration and the Location of Multinational Firms

A theoretical model of international location is applied to a process of regional economic integration in which a set of countries mutually removes barriers to trade and investment, thus overcoming the traditional ‘hub and spoke’ setup of regional agreements. The theoretical results are matched with actual trade and foreign investment data from a sample of some 4,200 multinational firms who have invested in Central and Eastern Europe over the 1990–1999 period. Controlling for the effects of the reduction in trade barriers through a proper specification of a gravity model, it is found that the conventional outcome of an agglomeration of economic activities in the centre of the integrating area does not necessarily hold. Multilateral regional integration agreements can act as an important dispersion force significantly driving the location of multinational firms. A panel probit econometric exercise confirms the findings. JEL no. F12, F15, F21     

Business fluctuations in Italy, 1861-1913: The new evidence

Band-pass filters and structural time-series models are applied to the new estimates of Italy’s domestic product from 1861 to 1913. These indicate a strong four-year cycle, derived from the agricultural sector, which curiously (and perhaps spuriously) vanishes after 30 years. Over the longer term GDP and the services reflect the long swing in industrial production, tied to the investment cycle. Agriculture seems marked instead by a further cycle of some 12-15 years, and also by a long wave related to the sector’s terms of trade.     

International Process Standards and North–South Trade

This paper examines the choice between alternative trade-based approaches to reducing global environmental damage, such as trade-related process standards and tariff-based approaches. Estimates of the effects of alternative policies are presented, using a calibrated global trade model with pollution externalities. It is found that both trade-related process standards and tariff-based policies are rather ineffective at reducing global emissions. The adoption of general process standards, however, might be exceedingly costly to developing countries.     

Trade and Environment: Bargaining Outcomes from Linked Negotiations

Some recent literature has explored physical and policy linkages between trade and the environment. This paper explores linkage through leverage in bargaining, whereby developed countries can use trade threats to achieve improved developing-country environmental management, while developing countries can use environmental concessions to achieve trade discipline in developed countries. A global numerical simulation model is used to compute bargaining outcomes from linked trade and environment negotiations. Results indicate joint gains from expanding the trade bargaining set to include the environment. However, compared with bargaining with cash side-payments, linked negotiations on policy instruments provide significantly inferior outcomes for developing countries.     

Incentive regulation and investment: evidence from European energy utilities

This paper investigates the relationship between investment and regulatory regimes (incentive vs. rate-of-return regulation) for a sample of EU energy utilities from 1997 to 2007. We control for the effect of firm ownership and for cross-country differences in the underlying energy demand and energy supply. To deal with potential endogeneity of the regulatory regime, we apply instrumental variable methods (2SLS and GMM). Our results show that investment rate is higher under incentive regulation than under rate of return regulation. Using original data on the regulatory tools (X factor and WACC), we find that investment of incentive regulated firms appears highly sensitive to the X factor, consistent with efficiency- and profit-seeking motivations. Electric utilities investment is also sensitive to the level and change in the weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Finally, we find that the positive relationship between private control and investment is not robust to IV estimations, suggesting that in Europe regulation may have reduced the differences between private and public firms’ incentives to invest.     

A continuous time model of European growth,integration and technology diffusion: The role of distance

Economists have been devoting increasing attention to the diffusion process of knowledge in economic activities. However, the models till now developed concentrate mostly on the dynamics determined by the steady state, when dealing with the interaction among many countries. Instead, we present a non-linear model where explicitly formalize the disequilibrium as starting point. We evaluate theoretically and empirically, with a continuous time analysis applied to panel data, the integration process of some main European countries by considering a simultaneous interaction among output, technology and business services. In this process we take particular care of distance, as a strategic variable over time, and of the following consequences on the convergence to the steady state. On this subject we also show a closed form solution in presence of a linear constraint on technology among countries.