Markets,torts, and social inefficiency

We provide a model wherein oligopolists produce differentiated products that also have a safety attribute. Consumption of these products may lead to harm (to consumers and/or third parties), lawsuits, and compensation, either via settlement or trial. Firm‐level costs reflect both safety investment and production activities, as well as liability‐related costs. Compensation is incomplete, both because of inefficiencies in the bargaining process and (possibly) because of statutorily established limits on awards. We compare the market equilibrium safety effort and output levels to what a planner who is able to set safety standards, but takes the market equilibrium output as given, would choose.     

Toward A Convergence Theory For Continuous Stochastic Securities Market Models1

This article reviews some recently developed approximation schemes for financial markets with continuous trading. Two methods for approximating continuous-time stochastic securities market models whose exogenously given prices have continuous sample paths are described and compared One method approximates both the paths and the information structure; the other is an approximation in distribution with a Markovian structure. In both cases, the approximating models have a finite state space, discrete time, and possess the same “structural” properties (e.g., “no arbitrage” and “completeness”) as the continuous model. the latter characteristic is an important criterion for judging the merits of the approximations. Taking advantage of the “structure-preserving” characteristic, one can formulate a convergence theory for frictionless markets with continuous trading. the theory provides convergence results for objects such as contingent claim prices, replicating portfolio strategies (hedging policies), optimal consumption policies, and cumulative financial gains (i.e., stochastic integrals), which are constructed along the approximation. the convergence theory enables one to combine the intuitive appeal of discrete models and the analytic tractability of continuous models to provide new insight into the theory of modern financial markets. We survey the current state of such a convergence theory and illustrate the results with some examples of well-known continuous securities market models.     

VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE OF SEGMENT INFORMATION: FURTHER AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE

This study provides further empirical evidence on incentives for Australian firms to voluntarily report segment information. Various economic reasons why firms may elect to present segment information have been hypothesised in previous research. Bradbury [1992] and McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] found firm size, minority interest and industry membership as significant identifiable characteristics motivating voluntary segmental disclosure. Variables found to be insignificant in Bradbury [1992] which were not examined by McKinnon and Dalimunthe [1993] are tested in this paper. Hypotheses relating to size, financial leverage, assets-in-place, earnings volatility, ownership diffusion, outside equity (minority) interest, overseas association as well as diverse and mining and oil classification hypotheses are empirically examined. Univariate tests and multivariate logit analysis suggest that for a extensive sample of diversified firms, voluntary segment disclosure is significantly related to size, leverage and involvement in mining or oil activities.     

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF STOCK DIVIDENDS-IN-KIND

We investigate share price reactions to announcements of dividends payable in the common stock of corporations different from the issuing firm. We find that firms that declare these dividends (typically investment companies) experience positive abnormal returns upon announcement. We also find that such dividends are more likely to be declared when the shares to be distributed have peaked in value. Consistent with this finding, we document negative announcement-period abnormal returns for firms having their shares distributed. Additional tests reveal that prices respond more negatively when the information signal is strongest, when outside ownership is more dispersed, and when management is more entrenched.