Corporate Governance: A Problem of Hierarchies and Self Interest

A bstract . Any realistic theory of the firm must take into account the governing structure of the enterprise. Unfortunately, neoclassical economic theory ignores most of the problems associated with firm goal structures and the issue of corporate governance. We argue that shareholder wealth maximization under less than perfectly competitive conditions has serious normative deficiencies. From a positive point of view, it appears that shareholders have such a weak position with respect to governance that they have little influence upon goal structures as well. It is observed that directors rarely function in the idealized trusteeship capacity. Efforts by government to make corporations more "responsible" may involve nothing more than attempts to strengthen the public sector at the expense of the corporate and, hence, may not be in the interest of shareholders at all.

With corporations subject to increased regulation and government controls, two questions emerge: First, who should control corporate diction making (The corporate governance question.) Second, what is the appropriate role of corporations in our society. (The corporate responsibility question.) Corporate governance refers to shareholders. Corporate responsibility refers to alleged responsibility of the corporation to something called the social needs of the community¹

     

Continuity and Change: Labour Market Programs and Education Expenditure

Since 1971 Australian governments have varied expenditure on labour market programs and education. This article attempts to explain these changes in the context of several straightforward hypotheses concerned with political processes. In both policy areas the evidence is generally consistent with four views: that ALP governments spend relatively more than coalition governments; that ALP expenditure is more likely to be directed to the public sector, and coalition expenditure to the private sector; that governments of both political persuasions tend to move towards their opponents' position in budgets immediately preceding elections; and that, after the marked changes initiated in the 1972 to 1974 period, the parties have become increasingly similar in expenditure terms. Apparently there have been important differences between the political parties in government, but these distinctions have become less clear–cut over recent years.     

High-frequency data from the U.S. Census Bureau during the COVID-19 pandemic: small vs. new businesses

Business Economics - Small businesses experienced very sharp declines in activity, business sentiment, and expectations early in the pandemic. While there has been some recovery since then,...     

Negotiator Relationships: Construct Measurement, and Demonstration of Their Impact on the Process and Outcomes of Negotiation

The study of negotiations is giving increasing attention to relationships between the negotiating parties. This study describes the development of a multidimensional index to measure the strength of the various facets of relationships. Results from a laboratory study that used this instrument show that cohesive relationships encourage information-sharing and discourage use of coercive tactics, both of which have direct or indirect effects on the attainment of integrative outcomes, negative affect, and the negotiators' ongoing relationship.     

A Sensitivity Analysis of IRR Leasing Models

In this article we argue that advances made in automation, communication, and manufacturing portend a dramatic reversal of the “bigger is better” approach to cost reductions prevalent in many basic infrastructure industries; for example, transportation, electric power generation, and raw material processing. We show that the traditional reductions in capital costs achieved by scaling up in size are generally matched by learning effects in the mass production process when scaling up in numbers instead. In addition, using the U.S. electricity generation sector as a case study, we argue that the primary operating cost advantage of large unit scale is reduced labor, which can be eliminated by employing low-cost automation technologies. Finally, we argue that locational, operational, and financial flexibilities that accompany smaller unit scale can reduce investment and operating costs even further. All of these factors combined imply that with current technology, economies of numbers may well dominate economies of unit scale. Yet realizing the full potential of small unit scale will require technologists and business leaders to develop a new ability to “think small.”     

Australian Student Loans

The Australian Government introduced the so-called ‘AUSTUDY Supplement’ in the 1992–93 budget. The scheme gives AUSTUDY recipients the option of trading in up to $2000 per year of their grant for $4000 of an income-contingent loan, to be paid back according to the current HECS arrangements, implying that the Government is acting as an insurer against future default by students. This article addresses the theoretical basis of the scheme, and explores two related questions: will it be in the financial interests of average students to take up the option? and what is likely to be the take-up rate of loans? Through the use of both cross-sectional data and the HARDING microsimulation model it is demonstrated that for many students the loan option will result in financial advantages, and that the take-up rate is likely eventually to be high.     

EFFICIENCY AND BARGAINING POWER IN THE INTERBANK LOAN MARKET

Using detailed transactions‐level data on interbank loans, we examine the efficiency of an overnight interbank lending market and the bargaining power of its participants. Our analysis relies on the equilibrium concept of the core, which imposes a set of no‐arbitrage conditions on trades in the market. For Canada's Large Value Transfer System, we show that although the market is fairly efficient, systemic inefficiency persists throughout our sample. The level of inefficiency matches distinct phases of both the Bank of Canada's operations as well as phases of the 2007–8 financial crisis. We find that bargaining power tilted sharply toward borrowers as the financial crisis progressed and (surprisingly) toward riskier borrowers.