The case for trend-stationarity is stronger than we thought

In DeJong and Whiteman (1991a), we concluded that 11 of the 14 macroeconomic time-series originally studied by Nelson and Plosser (1982) supported trend-stationarity. Phillips (1991) criticizes this inference, claiming that our procedure is biased against integration, and that our results are sensitive to model and prior specification. However, Phillips' alternative models and priors bias his results in favour of integration; despite these biases, Phillips' own findings indicate that the data provide the greatest relative support to trend-stationarity. This result is similar to our own (1989, 1990, 1991b) findings concerning the sensitivity of our results; the trend-stationarity inference is remarkably robust.     

Some Loans Are More Equal than Others: Third–Party Originations and Defaults in the Subprime Mortgage Industry

We show how agency problems between lenders (principals) and third–party originators (TPO; agents) imply that TPO–originated loans are more likely to default than similar retail–originated loans. The nature of the agency problem is that TPOs are compensated for writing loans, but are not completely held accountable for the subsequent performance of those loans. Using a hazard model with jointly estimated competing risks and unobserved heterogeneity, we find empirical support for the TPO/default prediction using individual fixed–rate subprime loans with first liens secured by residential real estate originated between January 1, 1996, and December 31, 1998. We find that apparently equal loans (similar ability to pay, option incentives and term) can have unequal default probabilities. We also find that, initially, the agency–cost risk was not priced. At first, the market did not recognize the higher channel risk, since TPO and retail loans received similar interest rates even though the TPO loans were more likely to default. We also show that this inefficiency was short–lived. As the difference in default rates became apparent, interest rates on TPO loans rose about 50 basis points above otherwise similar retail loans.     

Confrontation analyses of United States-Soviet grain negotiations

From 1976 until 1991, the government of the former Soviet Union bought wheat and coarse grains grown in the United States, from private grain companies, under the terms of Long Term Agreements (LTAs). The author conducted interviews with U.S. and Soviet government officials actively involved in the negotiations to establish the terms of those LTAs. Analyses of the negotiations were carried out using confrontation theory. The subsequent analysis shows how the changing issues, actors and positions over time affected the grain trading relationship between the two countries.     

Costly information production and optimal capital structuring: Theory and implications for finance and accounting

By considering a broad class of securities offerings that we termcapital structurings, a firm can always avoid pooling with firms whose prospects are poorer. This result implies that firms need not indulge in costly information gathering, hoping thereafter to signal to investors. One application allows us to describe a new theory of capital structurings, in which firms choose their capital structure not (as in traditional capital structure signaling theory) to signal privately known prospects, but rather to signal that no (productively useless) investigation of prospects has been pursued. A second application addresses the issue of the impossibility of informationally efficient capital markets: firms are capable of establishing conditions under which investors will recognize informational efficiency. The authors wish to acknowledge helpful comments by participants in seminars at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and the Univeristy of Tsukuba. Particular thanks go to Adam Brandenburger and an anonymous referee. Naturally, any remaining errors are the responsiblity of the authors. C.J.J. is on leave at the Council of Economic Advisers. This article reflects the opinions of the authors and not that of the Council of Economic Advisers. Much of the work for this article was conducted while E.H.R. was on leave at the Institute of Socio-Economic Planning at the University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305, Japan.     

Who Is My Peer? A Valuation‐Based Approach to the Selection of Comparable Firms

This study presents a general approach for selecting comparable firms in market-based research and equity valuation. Guided by valuation theory, we develop a "warranted multiple" for each firm, and identify peer firms as those having the closest warranted multiple. We test this approach by examining the efficacy of the selected comparable firms in predicting future (one- to three-year-ahead) enterprise-value-to-sales and price-to-book ratios. Our tests encompass the general universe of stocks as well as a sub-population of so-called "new economy" stocks. We conclude that comparable firms selected in this manner offer sharp improvements over comparable firms selected on the basis of other techniques.     

Multiunit Auctions in Which Almost Every Bid Wins

We consider multiunit auctions in which there are enough units so that each bidder but one wins every unit on which he bids. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategy for three different payment rules: the pay-your-bid auction, the uniform-price auction in which the price equals the lowest winning bid, and the uniform-price auction in which the price equals the highest losing bid. We also consider the Vickrey pricing rule. In the case we examine, the auctions are all efficient and thus are revenue equivalent. The equilibria illustrate several phenomona that cannot arise in single-unit auctions. Even though the auctions are expected-revenue equivalent, different bidders may end up paying very different amounts. Also, in contrast to single-unit auctions, changing the seller's reservation price affects revenues, even if it remains below the lowest possible value to bidders.