Some comparative-statics results for nonlinear input-output models of a multisectored economy,and related results for nonlinear price-demand relations

For a nonlinear version of the linear input-output model of Leontief, we consider the effect, on the vector x of total gross outputs, of changes in the components of the final-demand vector c. For example, it is shown that, for a certain important class of models, the “large-change elasticity” of any component of x, with respect to any component of c, is less than or equal to unity. Some similar results are proved concerning properties of nonlinear price-demand relations for the case in which all goods are weak gross substitutes. Unlike earlier work in this general area, we do not introduce hypotheses concerning the indecomposability or homogeneity of certain mappings. For that reason, the results are valid for the price-demand relation for a single firm, or for any collection of firms.     

Researching Preferences,Valuation and Hypothetical Bias

A number of recent papers in environmental economics have focused on the process of researching preferences – agents are uncertain about preferences but with effort may narrow their uncertainty. This issue has arisen in formulating bids in contingent valuation (CV) as well as the debate over the divergence between WTP and WTA. In the context of CV, it has been suggested that the hypothetical nature of the preference elicitation process biases responses. This paper provides both a theoretical model and experimental evidence to contribute to this debate. The model is a model of competitive bidding for a private good with two components that are particularly relevant to the debate. The first component is that bidders are unsure of their own value for the private good but may purchase information about their own value (researching preferences). The second component is that there is a probability that the auction is hypothetical – that the winning bidder will not get the private good and will not pay the winning bid. The experiment tests this theoretical model of bidding equilibrium and analyzes the effects of variations in the parameters (hypotheticalness, information costs and number of agents) on the endogenous variables (such as the proportion of bidders who become informed and the winning bid). Experimental results suggest that an increase in the hypotheticalness of an auction tends to decrease the likelihood that bidders pay for information on their valuation with an ambiguous effect on the winning bid.      

An efficient budget allocation policy for decentralisation of responsibility for site decontamination projects

Selection and execution of site decontamination projects is often best left to local authorities, in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, even though the budget for such projects is made available through a central authority. In this paper we suggest a practical budget allocation policy which a central authority can employ to allocate budgets to local authorities, while still optimising the central authority's environmental objective function. The procedure is fully consistent with the principle of decentralisation of responsibility for selection and execution of projects, and requires a minimum information exchange between local and central levels. Despite the information asymmetry between local and central levels, incentive compatibility problems can be (partially) prevented by choosing an appropriate evaluation mechanism. At the same time, the procedure is computationally effective and efficient, and can guarantee a fair budget allocation, making it easy to implement and politically acceptable.     

A model of project evaluation with limited attention

Summary This paper characterizes the optimal policy for a model in which manager may adopt an endogenous number of projects but has only limited resources to devote to their evaluation and maintenance. In any period, the manager may discard any subset of existing projects but may evaluate only one existing or one new project which is then either discarded or restored. Both its current return and the probability with which a project may be restored depends only on the number of periods since its last evaluated. For a manager whose objective is to maximize the sum of discounted returns, the optimal policy takes one of two forms. A discard policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project in each period and discard current projects at some critical age. An age inspection policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project only if all current projects are sufficiently young.Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Research Resource Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roy Radner for valuable assistance in the early stages of the work.     

Veblen's Theory of Institutional Change: An Explanation of the Deregulation of Japanese Financial Markets

A bstract In his 1915 essay "The Opportunity of Japan," Thorstein Veblen theorized that traditionai Japanese institutions would undergo evolutionary change as Japan exploited borrowed industrial technology and became integrated into the global business enterprise system. This article explains the recent liberalization of Japanese financial markets which followed Japan's rise to economic prominence within the context of Veblen's theory of institutional development of the enterprise system. The Japanese process of financial deregulation is reviewed, Veblen's predictions Japan are presented and an explanation provided for the liberalization of Japanese financial markets .     

The demand for game day attendance in college football: an analysis of the 1997 Division 1‐A season

This paper develops a predictive model which includes game, team and university specific factors that are likely to influence game day demand for Division 1‐A college football. Attendance during the 1997 regular season is used as the dependent variable. Tobit estimates of two separate equations reveal that the quality of both teams, traditional rivalry and membership of specific conferences have a significant influence on demand. In addition, colleges with lower enrollments and a higher percentage of off‐campus students attract smaller crowds. The presence of a nearby professional football team also detracts from a college team's drawing power. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equipment replacement policy: a survey

Over the past ten years there has been a considerable increase in application of theoretically correct measurement methods in determining the economic life of equipment. Approximately 89% of the firms surveyed have equipment replacement policies. The discounted rate of return method is the most widely used in determining the service life of equipment; the MAPI formula is not widely used. Difficulties in applying a replacement policy can be classified into three groups: operational, organizational, and economic. The problems mentioned most often are operational. In organizational difficulties there is usually a lack of coordination between staff and line managers. Economic problems are generally the limited funds available for equipment replacement. Formal educational programs are lacking for the development of equipment replacement managers. For the firms having replacement policies, individuals with engineering degrees are preferred over those in other disciplines for the management of the equipment replacement policy.     

Keeping Two Sets of Books: The Relationship Between Tax and Incentive Transfer Prices

Multinational enterprises use two types of transfer prices: the tax transfer price to achieve optimal tax outcomes and the incentive transfer price to provide appropriate incentives to offshore managers. The two optimal transfer prices are independent if taxable income is assessed using the formula apportionment approach. Under the separate entity approach, however, they are interdependent: they both decrease as the penalty for noncompliance with the arm's length principle increases; and the tax transfer price decreases and the incentive transfer price increases as the marginal cost of production increases. We also examine the case where the incentive transfer price is negotiated rather than dictated by the parent. The results are robust to different market structures and tax environments.     

Estimation of a non-invertible moving average process: The case of overdifferencing

The effect of differencing all of the variables in a properly specified regression equation is examined. Excessive use of the difference transformation induces a non-invertible moving average (MA) process in the disturbances of the transformed regression. Monte Carlo techniques are used to examine the effects of overdifferencing on the efficiency of regression parameter estimates, inferences based on these estimates, and tests for overdifferenccing based on the estimator of the MA parameter for the disturbances of the differences regression. Overall, the problem of overdifferencing is not serious if careful attention is paid to the properties of the disturbances of regression equations.