A MARKET WITH FRICTIONS IN THE MATCHING PROCESS: AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY*

We construct a laboratory market in which there is a friction in the matching between buyers and sellers. Sellers simultaneously post prices and then buyers simultaneously choose a seller. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the seller's single unit is randomly sold to one of them. Our results show a broad consistency with theoretical predictions, although price dispersion exists and is slow to decay. Prices also exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and buyers' purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.     

The First U.S. Food Stamp Program: An Example of Rent Seeking and Avoiding

Abstract . Rent seeking involves the wasteful expenses incurred to secure, acquire, or maintain a monopoly position. Rent avoiding involves the expenditures undertaken to avoid the imposition of rent-seeking costs. Each represents a social cost of Tullock rectangle loss in addition to the dead-weight or Harberger triangle loss that combined to form the Harberger-Tullock trapezoid social cost. The first Food Stamp Program in the United States came about through the rent-seeking and/or rent-avoiding efforts of farmers, grocers, bankers, and other economic agents and did not lead to the promotion of social welfare. The evidence of these self-interested efforts was gleaned from articles in the New York Times and government documents. The first Food Stamp Program also fits the economic theory of regulation developed by Stigler, Jordan, Peltzman and others, and it involved imposed costs on economic agents as the program evolved.     

Unionism and the public sector

It is incorrect and misleading to speak of unionization as a ‘human right’. The only human right is ‘self-ownership’, i.e. to pursue goals with one's own abilities but with no force or fraud against others. Government cannot dispense rights, only privileges and protections to some at the expense of others. A minimal degree of coercion exercised by government is unavoidable. But labor unions are not governments. Government has granted significant privileges to unions in the private sector, but such are not appropriate for public sector unions.     

Institutionalism versus Orthodoxy

A bstract . Orthodox economics has been quite effective in exploiting equilibrium methodology; equilibrium as a heuristic device, as a theoretical norm, and as a prototype of the scientific method. Also, orthodoxy has contrived the dichotomy of equilibrium-anti-equilibrium to depict institutional thought as being muddled and unscientific. Institutionalists have not successfully countered these attacks, nor have they adequately articulated a comprehensive methodological alternative to orthodoxy. Institutionalists have paid too much attention to the methodological components of institutionalism and have neglected the articulation of a guiding, overall methodology. It is proposed that institutionalists recast the methodological debate by expanding the arena from equilibrium-anti-equilibrium analysis to the broader context of closed versus open systems analysis. This would both help expose the methodological weaknesses of orthodox economics, and demonstrate the relevance and power of institutionalism for socioeconomic investigation.