‘Market failure’ arguments are a poor guide to policy

‘Market failure’ is frequently offered as a justification for government intervention in the economy. Proponents of interventions can point to almost limitless examples of markets which do not meet all the criteria for Pareto optimality and argue that government taxation, subsidies or regulation can perfect them, maximising social welfare. But comparing market outcomes with an unattainable and unidentifiable ideal is not useful in a world of imperfect knowledge and government failure. It is better to compare market outcomes against realistic alternatives. Furthermore, even within the market failure paradigm, concepts such as ‘public goods’ and ‘negative externalities’ are routinely misunderstood and inconsistently applied. This leads to predictably poor policy outcomes.     

The Information Content of NAV Estimates

The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics - This paper investigates whether analysts’ estimates of firm fundamental value transmit unique information to security markets. Previous work...     

The long‐run effect of government ideology on economic freedom

According to popular attitudes in Western democracies, the choice between right‐wing and left‐wing parties is a choice between socialism and unbridled free markets. In contrast, the cold and staid research of academia has frequently concluded that particular political parties do not really matter, as whichever party is elected will be closely tethered to the will of the median voter. This article considers the effects of the ideology of parties in power over the long run (1928–95) on economic freedom in subsequent periods. Right‐wing governments are found to have modest, positive effects on economic freedom, but the effects are not particularly robust. The findings here are consistent with others elsewhere, which conclude that there is minor, uneven evidence of an effect. Nonetheless, historically small effects may not be indicative of the future, should these effects be poorly indicative of today's tumultuous political landscape.     

Is faster or slower trading better? An examination of order type execution speed and costs

We examine order type execution speed and costs for US equity traders. Marketable orders that execute slower exhibit lower execution costs. Those who remove liquidity faster and pay higher trading costs transact in smaller size, spread trading across more venues, take more liquidity, and are better informed. Nonmarketable limit orders that execute slower exhibit greater adverse selection; and larger, uninformed traders who concentrate their trading in fewer venues submit them. Our findings suggest that slowing down the trading process, when faster options exist, can benefit certain market participants who seek to cross the bid–ask spread.     

Private School Usage in Australia 1975–2010: Evidence from the Household Expenditure Surveys

The use of private schools in Australia has increased greatly since the 1970s. This article shows that most of the growth has been concentrated in attendance at low-fee schools, while the growth in using high-fee schools has been modest. Furthermore, the increase has occurred for households at all income levels, for both single-parent and two-parent households, for households of all sizes, and irrespective of whether the household reference person is born in Australia or elsewhere. However, increasing income and changes in household composition can account only for a small part of the trend.     

Size and information revelation in securities trading

We examine differences in information content between order submission sizes and trade sizes by U.S. equity traders. Increasing (decreasing) order submission (trade) size is reflective of information. The result suggests that better-informed traders want to trade in a large size, but that they engage in stealth trading practices or break larger orders into smaller sizes in order to conceal information. While prior studies tend to narrowly focus on trade executions at the market-centre level, our findings indicate that order submission size varies significantly from trade size and that both sizes are informative about future prices, albeit in an inverse manner.     

Why Do Traders Split Orders?

We examine factors that influence decisions by U.S. equity traders to execute a string of orders, in the same stock, in the same direction, around the same time. Order splitting is more likely to occur when traders submit larger‐size orders and when market depth and trading activity are lower. Order splitters demand liquidity more and pay higher trading costs, but their overall performance is better. When controlling for execution time, split orders are more informative than single orders. Our results suggest that order splitting arises from a variety of factors, including informational differences, order and trader characteristics, and market conditions.     

The impact of nominal stock price on ex-dividend price responses

In this paper, we examine whether nominal stock price can help to explain the ex-dividend day anomaly where stock prices drop by less than the dividend amount on the ex-dividend date. We find that stocks with lower nominal prices have ex-dividend day price drops that are more consistent with theoretical predictions based on an efficient market. After controlling for factors that have been previously documented to influence ex-dividend day stock price behavior, price-drop-to-dividend ratios are closer to one for lower priced stocks. To further explore this phenomenon, we examine the change in the price-drop-to-dividend ratio around stock splits. Firms that split their shares have a larger price-drop-to-dividend ratio after the split, and companies that reverse split their shares have a smaller price-drop-to-dividend ratio after the split. Our evidence indicates that ex-dividend day stock price behavior is influenced by the nominal price of a share and that this relation could also influence the decision to split a firm’s shares.