When is a tax neutral?

A proportional income tax is said to be neutral if variations in the tax rate do not affect the optimal composition of the consumption commodities of a utility maximizing consumer. It is shown that neutrality obtains if and only if the indirect utility function of the consumer is groupwise homothetic. If the income tax rates on labor and property incomes are allowed to differ, then neutrality obtains if and only if the indirect utility function of the consumer is homothetically separable. If, in addition, it is required that the proportional income tax be neutral with respect to not only consumption commodities but also to leisure, then 'the indirect utility function must have the form: $\text{V = V(f(w)+H}{}^1\text{(p))}$, where w and p are the normalized prices of leisure and consumption respectively, and H¹(p) is homogeneous of degree one in p.     

Potron and the Perron–Frobenius Theorem

Maurice Potron is an important precursor of the study of linear models of production and, in particular, of input–output analysis. We show that, contrary to Abraham-Frois and Lendjel's interpretation which we consider as unfaithful to Potron's model, there is a clear connection between his theory and the Perron-Frobenius theorem.     

Transparency on the consumer side and tacit collusion

This paper investigates the effects on tacit collusion of increased market transparency on the consumer side of a market in a differentiated Hotelling duopoly. Increasing market transparency increases the benefits to a firm from undercutting the collusive price. It also decreases the punishment profit. The net effect is that collusion becomes harder to sustain. In the limiting homogeneous market, the effect vanishes. Here market transparency does not affect the possibilities for tacit collusion.     

Unexpected windfalls,education, and mental health: evidence from lottery winners in Germany

This paper investigates the causal impact of large unexpected windfalls on individual mental health, physical health, as well as health behaviors. I use a large individual-level panel data set of lottery winners from Germany between the years 2000 and 2011 and observe lottery winners before and after winning a large lottery prize. Mental health declines immediately after winning a large lottery prize for individuals with low education and low levels of financial literacy. While these individuals report being happier after winning the lottery, evidence from commonly used SF-12 measures of mental health indicates that winners with low education experience increased role limitations due to emotional problems, are more anxious, and have less energy after their win. The impact on various measures of mental health is highly robust, statistically significant, economically significant, and persists for up to two years after the win. Unexpected windfalls have no impact on the mental health of individuals with high education or high financial literacy. Winning the lottery has no impact on individuals’ health behaviors such as smoking or alcohol consumption, and it has no impact on doctor visits, hospital stays, or illness-related work absences regardless of education level.     

Persistence of Shocks to Output in Austria and Theories of Economic Growth

The paper analyzes the degree of output persistence in GDP in order toempirically discriminate between the Solow growth model, the perfect competition endogenous growth model and the imperfect competition endogenous growth model for the case of Austria. Wefind that a shock in the growth rate of output induces a permanent and larger effect on the level of GDP. This leads us to refute the Solow growth model and the perfect competition model of endogenous growth.We may not reject the imperfect competition growth model.     

Decreasing absolute prudence: Characterization and applications to second-best risk sharing

In this paper, we provide two basic properties of utility functions u which exhibit decreasing absolute prudence i.e. (− u/u″)′ ≤ 0. These properties are used to examine the allocation of risks in an economy when some agents bear non-transferable risks. We show that it is fair Pareto-efficient to let those with a non-transferable risk bear relatively less of the transferable risk in the economy if and only if absolute prudence is decreasing. In another model, there is a complete set of contingent markets, but some agents have no direct access to them. We examine the fair efficient allocation of risk in a pool gathering a trader and a non-trader. Decreasing absolute prudence provides an upper bound to the share of the pool's risk that should be borne by the trader.