Unique equilibrium in rent-seeking contests with a continuum of types

It is shown that rent-seeking contests with continuous and independent type distributions possess a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.     

On the role of consumer expectations in markets with network effects

We analyze the role of consumer expectations in a Hotelling model of price competition when products exhibit network effects. Expectations can be strong (stubborn), weak (price-sensitive) or partially stubborn (a mix of weak and strong). As a rule, the price-sensitivity of demand declines when expectations are more stubborn. An increase of stubbornness (i) increases (decreases) the parameter region with a unique duopoly equilibrium (multiple equilibria), (ii) reduces competition, (iii) reduces the conflict between consumer and social preferences for de facto standardization, and (iv) reduces the misalignment between consumer and social preferences for compatibility.     

Do unfair perceived own pay and top managers’ pay erode satisfaction with democracy?

Many people are relatively unsatisfied with the democratic system as it currently exists. In this empirical research note, the authors present evidence that German workers, who perceive their own pay or top managers’ pay as unfair, are on average significantly less happy with the democracy in Germany. Thus, fairness perceptions in the labour market and of income inequality seem to have spillover effects on the overall satisfaction with the democratic system.     

Contingent payments in selection contests

The early literature on research contests stressed the advantages of a fixed prize in inspiring R&D effort. More recently the focus has moved towards endogenizing the rewards to research activity in these tournament settings, since this can induce extra effort or enhance the surplus of the buyer. We focus on a research contest as a means of selecting a partner for an R&D enterprise, in an informational setting in which the established providers of R&D services know more about each others’ relative capabilities than does the buyer/sponsor. An alternative use of our model is in choosing between prospective patentees where the Patent Trading Office has less information on the patents than the competitors. This asymmetry creates a source of inefficiency if a rank order contest is used as a selection device; we show how the contest can be modified to improve selection efficiency, while maintaining its simplicity (as only ordinal information is required). The modification that we suggest involves endogenizing the prizes that are awarded contingent upon whether a contestant wins or loses the contest. Furthermore, the payment system and the selection mechanism are detail-free. This paper is part of the project “The Knowledge-Based Society” sponsored by the Research Council of Norway (project 172603/V10).     

DOES BIG GOVERNMENT HURT GROWTH LESS IN HIGH‐TRUST COUNTRIES?

Social trust is linked to both public sector size and to economic growth, thereby helping to explain how some countries combine high taxes with high levels of economic growth. This paper examines if social trust insulates countries against the negative effects of public sector size on growth, documented in several studies. We note that the effect is theoretically ambiguous. In panel data from 66 countries across 40 years, we find no robust evidence of insulation effects: when excluding countries with uncertain trust scores, our results suggest that big government hurts growth also in high‐trust countries, and that the mechanism is by lowering private investments. (JEL H10, O11, P16, Z10)     

Ownership unbundling of natural gas transmission networks: empirical evidence

The European Commission has intensively examined the mandatory separation of natural gas transmission from production and services. However, economic theory is ambiguous on the price effects of vertical separation. In this paper, we empirically analyze the effect of ownership unbundling of gas transmission networks, considered to be the strongest form of vertical separation, on the level of end-user prices. Therefore, we apply different dynamic estimators such as system GMM and the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable estimator to an unbalanced panel consisting of 18 EU countries over 19 years, allowing us to avoid the endogeneity problem and to estimate the long-run effects of regulation. We introduce a set of regulatory indicators as market entry regulation, ownership structure, vertical separation and market structure, as well as account for structural and economic country specifics. Among the different estimators, we consistently find that ownership unbundling has no impact on natural gas end-user prices, while the more modest legal unbundling reduces them significantly. Furthermore, third-party access, market structure and privatization show significant influence, with the latter leading to higher prices.     

Disentangling barriers to internationalization

Abstract. Recent literature on multinational firms has focused on low productivity as a barrier to the internationalization of firms. But labour market frictions or financial constraints may also hamper internationalization. In order to assess the importance of these barriers, we present new empirical evidence on the extensive and intensive margin of exports and foreign direct investment (FDI) based on micro‐level data of German firms. First, we find a positive impact of firm size and productivity on firms’ international activities. Second, labour market frictions can constitute barriers to foreign activities. Third, self‐reported financial constraints have no impact on firms’ internationalization decisions. JEL classification: F23, G2     

A Note on Forecasting Emerging Market Exchange Rates: Evidence of Anti‐herding

Using survey forecasts of a large number of Asian, European, and South American emerging market exchange rates, we studied empirically whether evidence of herding or anti‐herding behavior of exchange‐rate forecasters can be detected in the cross‐section of forecasts. Emerging market exchange‐rate forecasts are consistent with herding (anti‐herding) if forecasts are biased towards (away from) the consensus forecast. Our empirical findings provide strong evidence of anti‐herding of emerging market exchange‐rate forecasters.     

Mortality transition and differential incentives for early retirement

Many studies specify human mortality patterns parametrically, with a parameter change affecting mortality rates at different ages simultaneously. Motivated by the stylized fact that a mortality decline affects primarily younger people in the early phase of mortality transition but mainly older people in the later phase, we study how a mortality change at an arbitrary age affects optimal retirement age. Using the Volterra derivative for a functional, we show that mortality reductions at older ages delay retirement unambiguously, but that mortality reductions at younger ages may lead to earlier retirement due to a substantial increase in the individual?s expected lifetime human wealth.