ENVY-FREENESS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A REPLY TO KOLM'S COMMENT

Abstract. This reply takes up specific points raised by Professor Kolm over which there persists some disagreement between us. It offers a rather broad, philosophically oriented discussion of the issues. I explain why I think Kolm is right in preferring the term 'equity'to that of 'envy-freeness,'but I express moral doubts concerning the interpretation proposed by Kolm of equity as a criterion of equal liberty. On this basis, I then defend my own specific interpretation of equity as a welfarist-egalitarian criterion, and express some reluctance as to the alleged 'moral irrelevance'of individual preferences in the theory of equity. I also briefly discuss the conceptual role played by counterfactuals and try to mitigate somewhat Kolm's critique of the use of axioms involving 'imaginary' situations.     

Local versus Global Assessment of Mobility*

Mobility indices are popular tools designed to quantify the extent of income changes by aggregating “local” distributional change into a “global” scalar according to some rule. For some mobility measures, this aggregation rule is only implicit in their standard definition. We derive an insightful approximation to the (statistical) aggregation rule for the important class of mobility indices introduced by Shorrocks (Journal of Economic Theory 19 (1978), 376–93) and further generalized by Maasoumi and Zandvakili (Economic Letters 22 (1986), 97–102), which enables us to characterize their normative properties. We also develop methods for estimation and inference. A substantive empirical contribution emerges from the comparison of mobility between the United States and Germany. Our methods reveal why income mobility is higher in Germany than in the United States: Higher German mobility in the bottom of the distribution is combined with an implicitly higher weighting by the mobility index at the bottom.     

Sectoral linking of carbon markets: A trade-theory analysis

The linking of emission trading systems (ETS) is a widely discussed policy option for future international cooperation on climate change. Benefits are expected from efficiency gains and the alleviation of concerns over competitiveness. However, from trade-theory it is known that due to general equilibrium effects and market distortions, linking may not always be beneficial for all participating countries. Following-up on this debate, we use a Ricardo-Viner type general equilibrium model to study the implications of sectoral linking on carbon emissions (‘leakage’), competitiveness, and welfare. By comparing pre- and post-linking equilibria, we show analytically how global emissions can increase if one of the ‘linked’ countries lacks an economy-wide emissions cap, although in case of a link across idiosyncratic sectors a decrease of emissions (‘anti-leakage’) is also possible. If – as a way to address concerns about competitiveness – a link between the EU ETS and a hypothetical US system is established, the partial emission coverage of the EU ETS can lead to the creation of new distortions between the non-covered domestic and international sector. Finally, we show how the welfare effect from linking can be decomposed into gains-from-trade and terms-of-trade contributions, and how the latter can make the overall effect ambiguous.     

The European economy at the cross roads: Structural reforms, fiscal constraints, and the Lisbon Agenda

This paper studies the incentives to sustain and extend a monetary union under alternative assumptions about the extent of market reform within the union and accession countries. Lack of labour mobility, or wage/price flexibility, or fiscal reform, brings costs for both new entrants and in the existing union. Countries will therefore want a union where there has been sufficient reform, and also one where markets are more flexible than their own. But existing members will want the same properties of their partners. Fiscal restrictions may exaggerate this incentive mismatch and could therefore delay the necessary reforms. Similarly, too large costs up front may also delay those reforms.     

Action-oriented approaches to technology assessment and working life in scandinavia

Several approaches to action-oriented technology assessment of aspects of working life have been tried out in Scandinavia over the past 15-20 years. This article gives an overview of the experiences in Scandinavia, with emphasis on a Danish point of view. Five different approaches to action-oriented technology assessment are described, based on an analysis of the social actors involved, the target groups for the technology assessment and the associated social mechanisms. These techniques follow the collective resource approach, the cooperative strategies, expert strategies and alternative technology, legal reform strategies and governmental technology promotion policy. None of the approaches proved to be totally effective on its own. The conclusion is that a new combination of approaches to action-oriented technology assessment and the development of a theoretical basis are needed.     

One Cow,One Vote?

We study investment decisions in a farmers' cooperative. Farmers sell their products through the cooperative. Before production takes place the cooperative has to decide on an investment. We study whether voting on investment leads to efficient investment decisions. The answer depends on how the number of votes and the cost of the investment are distributed among the farmers. It is shown that in a variety of settings, there is no reason to suppose that voting rules favoring large farmers —"one cow, one vote" rules — are more efficient than simple majority rule.     

Wolf / Lindacher / Pfeiffer: AGB-Recht. Kommentar

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