The hidden value of air transportation infrastructure

Air transportation is a key strategic asset in that it provides access to markets and thereby enables the economic development of nations. Thus, in order to maintain their competitiveness in a global economy, countries must invest in air transportation infrastructure to ensure their ability to meet current and future demand for aviation services. The objective of this paper is to develop and illustrate a methodology for evaluating the strategic value of air transportation infrastructure, in particular the benefits associated with the ability to react quickly to changes in the market. The hypothesis is that by recognizing and taking advantage of this strategic value, it may be possible to design better policies for aviation infrastructure delivery.The methodology developed here uses system dynamics to model different strategies for infrastructure delivery. These strategies are defined by three variables: the amount of capacity increase, the time to deliver the capacity and the congestion threshold that triggers the need for capacity delivery. Monte Carlo simulation is used to take into account multiple sources of uncertainty. The model shows that a strategy of capacity delivery based on small increments and short response times can yield more benefits than strategies that consider large capacity increases and long response times. Furthermore, in the specific airport example considered here, it was found that a congestion threshold of 75% should be the trigger for capacity enlargements if strategies based on small capacity increments and 1 or 5 years to increase capacity are considered. The lesson for decision-makers is that congestion delays must be addressed with foresight.     

Does institutional quality resolve the Lucas Paradox?

The Lucas Paradox observes that capital flows predominantly to relatively rich countries, contradicting the neoclassical prediction that it should flow to poorer capital-scarce countries. In an influential study, Alfaro, Kalemli-Ozcan, and Volosovych (AKV) argue that cross-country variation in institutional quality can fully explain the Paradox, contending that if institutional quality is included in regression models explaining international capital inflows, a country’s level of economic development is no longer statistically significant. We replicate AKV’s results using their cross-sectional IFS capital flow data. Motivated by the importance of conducting inference in statistically adequate models, we focus on misspecification testing of alternative functional forms of their empirical model of capital flows. We show that their resolution of the Paradox relies on inference in a misspecified model. In models that do not fail basic misspecification tests, even though institutional quality is a significant determinant of capital inflows, a country’s level of economic development also remains a significant predictor. The same conclusions are reached using an extended dataset covering more recent IFS international capital flow data, first-differenced capital stock data and additional controls.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

Enforcing Emissions Trading when Emissions Permits are Bankable

We propose enforcement strategies for emissions trading programs with bankable emissions permits that guarantee complete compliance with minimal enforcement costs. Our strategies emphasize imperfect monitoring supported by a high unit penalty for reporting violations, and tying this penalty directly to equilibrium permit prices. This approach is quite different from several existing enforcement strategies that emphasize high unit penalties for emissions in excess of permit holdings. Our analysis suggests that a high penalty for excess emissions cannot be used to conserve monitoring effort, and that it may actually increase the amount of monitoring necessary to maintain compliance.The authors are grateful to Anthony Heyes and three anonymous referees for their valuable comments. Partial support for this research was provided by the Cooperative State Research Extension, Education Service, U. S. Department of Agriculture, Massachusetts Agricultural Experiment Station under Project No. MAS00871.     

THE DISTRIBUTION OF MONEY BALANCES AND THE NONNEUTRALITY OF MONEY*

Recent monetary models with explicit microfoundations are made tractable by assuming that agents have access to centralized markets after one round of decentralized trade. Given quasi‐linear preferences, this makes the distribution of money degenerate—which keeps the models simple but precludes the discussion of distributional effects of monetary policy. We generalize these models by assuming two rounds of trade before agents can readjust their money holdings to study a range of new distributional effects analytically. We show that unexpected, symmetric lump‐sum money injections may increase short‐run output and welfare, whereas asymmetric injections may increase long‐run output and welfare.     

The effect of political volatility on capital markets in EU accession and neighborhood countries

Political instability has the potential to disrupt financial markets. But how do political institutions affect financial movements in an environment where all institutions are in flux? This paper looks at the effects of formal and informal political volatility in the new EU countries of central and eastern Europe, in the Eastern Neighborhood, and farther afield in Central Asia to answer this question. Using asymmetric GARCH modeling on monthly data, I find that informal political volatility has a significant negative effect on stock returns, while formal political institutions generate much higher financial volatility than changes in monetary policy.     

Technological development at the boundaries of the firm: a knowledge‐based examination in drug development

This paper examines how the knowledge‐based view (KBV) can be applied to firm boundary decisions and the performance implications of those decisions. At the center of the paper is a theoretical and empirical examination of how firms most efficiently organize for technological development. We find that distinct organization approaches are advantaged in the speed of technological development depending on the structure of technological development problems and the depth of firms' technological area experience. We make theoretical and empirical contributions to KBV research that examines knowledge development and transfer. Drug development in the pharmaceutical industry serves as our empirical setting. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Product development with multiple partners: Strategies and conflicts in networks

This paper provides an insight into and discusses the variety of sources of conflict in linking multiple partners in a network to the product development process. Conflict issues are discussed in relation to focal company strategies for product development within networks. On the basis of three case studies representing three different strategic intentions and network situations, our findings suggest that the sources of conflict are related to the actors' definition and negotiation of the development task at hand. The study suggests that the ability to combine and find complementarities in the strategic intentions of the multiple participating actors is essential to accomplish innovation. The paper concludes that influential actors initiating or acceding to changes are crucial for reaching a positive outcome in joint product development.     

Time and process in business network research

This Special Issue of Industrial Marketing Management brings together a range of articles by authors who have undertaken the difficult task of researching time and process in business networks. Understanding interaction processes within a business relationship and network perspective requires the elaboration of time, the central construct by which humans grasp and comprehend change. As an introduction to the articles we present the concept of human time and delineate accordingly three methodological approaches available for the study of network processes. We also introduce the authors' contributions to the special issue that broadly divide into two groups: those that deal with methodological issues concerning the study of processes in business networks and those that consider the role of time and timing for studying business processes.     

A Bayesian Bioeconometric Model of Invasive Species Control: The Case of the Hemlock Woolly Adelgid

In this article we evaluate a US Forest Service plan to mitigate damages from an invasive insect on public, forested land. We develop a dynamic model of infestation and control to explicitly account for biological interactions, baseline conditions, and uncertainty, thus creating a more complete picture of policy impacts than a static cost benefit analysis could provide. We combine the results of the dynamic model with an empirical study of nonmarket forest benefits to create a bioeconomic model of ecosystem management. Estimating the empirical model in a Bayesian framework allows us to treat the economic coefficients of the dynamic model as random variables. We specify distributions for the biological parameters and examine the effects of both biological and economic uncertainty on the predictive distribution of net benefits. We find that the net benefits of the program are positive, and that uncertainty in the biological model contributes substantially more to the variance of our estimate than does uncertainty over the valuation of the resource.