On modeling incentive systems which utilize pollution charges for pollution abatement

This paper examines a scheme of economic incentives for environmental protection, in which spatially differentiated pollution taxes are in use in compensating the pollution abatement costs. A simple mathematical model is described which determines an incentive system that encourages polluters to reduce the discharges to an acceptable level of ambient quality standards in a cost-effective manner. It is shown that the vector of pollution charges has to be proportional to the marginal abatement cost vector, but is smaller than the latter in magnitude. It is demonstrated that a necessary incentive effect may be achieved even if the total pollution charge is much lower (about three times) than the total abatement costs. It is also estimated how this charge incentive system reconciles conflicting criteria of cost-effectiveness and of equity. These conclusions are verified by numerical experiments with real data.     

How to handle donor complaints

Responding to donor complaints takes great care. But know who's complaining and keep things in perspective.     

How public opinion really works

The public's thinking on issues progresses through seven predictable stages, the dean of American pollsters finds. Politicians make a big mistake just looking at raw numbers.     

EMBEDDED MATRICES FOR FINITE MARKOV CHAINS

For an arbitrary subset A of the finite state space 5 of a Markov chain the so–called embedded matrix P _A is introduced. By use of these matrices formulas expressing all kinds of probabilities can be written down almost automatically, and calculated very easily on a computer. Also derivations can be given very systematically.     

TECHNOLOGY AND SPAN OF CONTROL: WOODWARD REVISITED

This study of production operations in 95 New Jersey manufacturing firms explains the widely replicated curvilinear relationship between first line supervisory span of control and Woodward's technological complexity scale. Revisiting Woodward led to the initial proposition that the relationship was a by-product of the differing degree of task variability among the major types of production operations. A subsequent literature review of administrative requirements suggested the importance of size, complexity and automaticity on supervisory span of control. Our data indicate that variations in the span of control of production operations classified according to Woodward's scale are attributable to the underlying effects of size and task complexity. Technology, whether operationalized as Woodward's production types or automaticity of machinery explained little variation in the span of control of first line supervisors.