Drivers and outcomes of importer adaptation in international buyer–seller relationships

Notwithstanding the growing literature on international buyer–seller relationships, limited attention has been given to the crucial role of adaptation in enhancing relationship performance, especially from the standpoint of the importer. This article reports the findings of a study, conducted among 167 British importers, focusing on the factors that drive their adaptation in the working relationship with Western European or U.S. export manufacturers, as well as its resulting performance outcomes. It was revealed that trust positively affects commitment and cooperation, while communication positively influences cooperation but has no effect on commitment. Both commitment and cooperation subsequently lead to importer adaptation. It was also found that adaptive importers tend to be more conducive to effective and efficient relationship outcomes. Finally, the study confirmed that both the links between adaptation and relationship effectiveness and adaptation and relationship efficiency are moderated by both the level of dependence on and distance from the exporter.     

Equilibrium in risk-sharing games

The large majority of risk-sharing transactions involve few agents, each of whom can heavily influence the structure and the prices of securities. In this paper, we propose a game where agents’ strategic sets consist of all possible sharing securities and pricing kernels that are consistent with Arrow–Debreu sharing rules. First, it is shown that agents’ best response problems have unique solutions. The risk-sharing Nash equilibrium admits a finite-dimensional characterisation, and it is proved to exist for an arbitrary number of agents and to be unique in the two-agent game. In equilibrium, agents declare beliefs on future random outcomes different from their actual probability assessments, and the risk-sharing securities are endogenously bounded, implying (among other things) loss of efficiency. In addition, an analysis regarding extremely risk-tolerant agents indicates that they profit more from the Nash risk-sharing equilibrium than compared to the Arrow–Debreu one.     

No arbitrage of the first kind and local martingale numéraires

A supermartingale deflator (resp. local martingale deflator) multiplicatively transforms nonnegative wealth processes into supermartingales (resp. local martingales). A supermartingale numéraire (resp. local martingale numéraire) is a wealth process whose reciprocal is a supermartingale deflator (resp. local martingale deflator). It has been established in previous works that absence of arbitrage of the first kind (\(\mbox{NA}_{1}\)) is equivalent to the existence of the (unique) supermartingale numéraire, and further equivalent to the existence of a strictly positive local martingale deflator; however, under \(\mbox{NA}_{1}\), a local martingale numéraire may fail to exist. In this work, we establish that under \(\mbox{NA}_{1}\), a supermartingale numéraire under the original probability \(P\) becomes a local martingale numéraire for equivalent probabilities arbitrarily close to \(P\) in the total variation distance.     

Effective risk aversion in thin risk‐sharing markets

We consider thin incomplete financial markets, where traders with heterogeneous preferences and risk exposures have motive to behave strategically regarding the demand schedules they submit, thereby impacting prices and allocations. We argue that traders relatively more exposed to the market portfolio tend to behave in a more risk tolerant manner. Noncompetitive equilibrium prices and allocations result as an outcome of a game among traders. General sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of such equilibrium are provided, with extensive analysis of two‐trader transactions. Even though strategic behavior causes inefficient social allocations, traders with sufficiently high risk tolerance and/or high initial exposure to tradable securities obtain more utility gain in the noncompetitive equilibrium, when compared to the competitive one.     

A Strategic Social Action Framework: Theorizing and analyzing the alignment of social media affordances and organizational social action

Social media is a relatively new and dynamic field dealing with the development and use of social media technologies by individuals and more recently by organizations. Although several frameworks and models have been proposed for studying social media, most provide only limited insights into the complex social activities that are supported by the strategic usage of social media in organizational settings. In this article, we take up this challenge and introduce a Strategic Social Action Framework for analyzing social media technologies and their strategic usage in and by organizations. This framework is based on Habermas’ theory of social action and the idea that social media platforms serve as sets of rules and resources that mediate strategic organizational (inter-)actions involving these platforms. We demonstrate the value of the framework by theoretically delineating the appropriateness of the framework to specific social media tools, as well as by empirically analyzing the strategic use of two publicly available social media platforms—Facebook and Twitter—by three large airlines—Delta, KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, and JetBlue. Our findings reveal that when implementing social media in organizational contexts, developers and managers should critically evaluate (a) the need for supporting a rich variety of action types, (b) the possible role of social media support in the specific action situation, and (c) the strategic alignment of social media affordances and specific social action categories. Finally, we discuss theoretical and practical implications as well as directions for future research.     

Gray Shades of Green: Causes and Consequences of Green Skepticism

Consumer skepticism of corporate environmental activities is on the rise. Yet research on this timely, intriguing, and important topic is scarce for both academics and practitioners. Building on attribution theory, we develop and test a theoretically anchored model that explains the sources and consequences of green skepticism. The study findings reveal that consumers’ perceptions of industry norms, corporate social responsibility, and corporate history are important factors that explain why consumers assign different motives to corporate environmental actions. In addition, the results show that while intrinsic motives exert a strong negative effect on green skepticism, extrinsic motives have no discernible effect. Furthermore, the findings indicate that green skepticism prompts consumers to seek more information about the products, sparks negative word of mouth to friends and acquaintances, and forestalls purchase intentions. The study offers several implications for corporate and public policy makers and presents fruitful research directions.     

GENERALIZED SUPERMARTINGALE DEFLATORS UNDER LIMITED INFORMATION

We undertake a study of markets from the perspective of a financial agent with limited access to information. The set of wealth processes available to the agent is structured with reasonable economic properties, instead of the usual practice of taking it to consist of stochastic integrals against a semimartingale integrator. We obtain the equivalence of the boundedness in probability of the set of terminal wealth outcomes (which in turn is equivalent to the weak market viability condition of absence of arbitrage of the first kind) with the existence of at least one strictly positive deflator that makes the deflated wealth processes have a generalized supermartingale property.     

MULTIPLICATIVE APPROXIMATION OF WEALTH PROCESSES INVOLVING NO‐SHORT‐SALES STRATEGIES VIA SIMPLE TRADING

A financial market model with general semimartingale asset–price processes and where agents can only trade using no‐short‐sales strategies is considered. We show that wealth processes using continuous trading can be approximated very closely by wealth processes using simple combinations of buy‐and‐hold trading. This approximation is based on controlling the proportions of wealth invested in the assets. As an application, the utility maximization problem is considered and it is shown that optimal expected utilities and wealth processes resulting from continuous trading can be approximated arbitrarily well by the use of simple combinations of buy‐and‐hold strategies.     

Filtration shrinkage,the structure of deflators,and failure of market completeness

Finance and Stochastics - We analyse the structure of local martingale deflators projected on smaller filtrations. In a general continuous-path setting, we show that the local martingale parts in...     

Rules for the disposition of tariff revenues and the determination of common external tariffs in customs unions

This paper is about the determination of common external tariffs (CETs) in customs unions (CUs). We first examine how the relationship between preferences over CET levels, technology and the distribution of factor ownership in a CU is conditioned by the rule that determines the disposition of tariff revenues. We then explore how majority voting at the country level translates these preferences into an equilibrium CET. Among other things, we find that, when revenues are partitioned in proportion to members’ imports, tariff preferences may be polarized, the trade patterns of some CU members may be endogenous, and, as a result, their payoff functions may not be single-peaked. This leads to voting outcomes that dramatically differ from those arising under other sharing rules (e.g., the ‘population’ and ‘consumption’ rules) and raises the possibility of a Condorcet paradox.