Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets

A regulated upstream monopolist provides an input to firms in a downstream market. If the monopolist enters the downstream market, a natural concern is that it will act so as to raise its downstream rivals' costs. An offsetting incentive is that a higher downstream price will reduce demand for the input, which reduces the monopolist's profit. Conditions under which one incentive dominates the other are derived. The monopolist may desire to lower its downstream rivals' costs rather than raise them. These findings suggest that regulatory policy towards such downstream entry should not focus exclusively on the ability to discriminate.     

Global Strategy in the Internet Era

This article examines the joint effects on business strategy of the Internet and globalization. It develops a framework for evaluating how the Internet affects the globalization potential of individual industries and the global strategies that companies should adopt. The impact of the Internet will not be uniform. Not only do its direct effects vary from one industry to another, but also it speeds up globalization at different rates in different industries. The article shows how to use the Internet to support five types of global strategy: market participation, products and services, activity location, marketing, and competitive moves.     

Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997     

The complete incremental cost test for cross-subsidies with a sub-modular cost function

The complete Incremental Cost Test for cross-subsidies can be difficult to apply to a multi-product enterprise because every possible subset of products must be tested. However, this combinatorial problem can be avoided when the enterprise’s cost function is sub-modular by identifying the smallest subset of products causing the maximum cross-subsidy. This subset contains all of the products, and only those products, that are responsible for the cross-subsidies left by a stipulated set of prices. In addition, the subset can often be identified with a simple and efficient Myopic Algorithm. The algorithm should be particularly useful as a method for detecting cross-subsidies in regulated enterprises and networks because the cost functions for these industries are typically sub-modular.     

Accounting for optimism and pessimism in expected utility

We provide a preference foundation for decision under risk resulting in a model where probability weighting is linear as long as the corresponding probabilities are not extreme (i.e., 0 or 1). This way, most of the elegance and mathematical tractability of expected utility is maintained and also much of its normative foundation. Yet, the new model can accommodate the extreme sensitivity towards changes from 0 to almost impossible and from almost certain to 1 that has widely been documented in the experimental literature. The model can be viewed as “expected utility with the best and worst in mind” as suggested by Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (Chateauneuf, Alain, Eichberger, Jürgen, Grant, Simon, 2007. Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: NEO-Additive capacities. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 538–567) or, following our preference foundation, interpreted as “expected utility with consistent optimism and pessimism”.     

Clarence Hatry

Hatry was one of those curiously un-English figures with whom the English peiodically find themselves unable to cope. J.K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929     

The future of the uplands

Upland areas provide UK society with many important functions, goods and services, but have experienced a number of disturbing trends and face an uncertain future. This paper outlines historic, current and future drivers of environmental, economic, socio-cultural and policy change in UK uplands, and assesses how these have affected or are likely to affect ways in which land is used and the provision of ecosystem services. Information is synthesised into scenarios summarising a range of possible futures anticipated for UK uplands to 2060 and beyond. Finally, innovations in science, technology, governance and policy are evaluated that could enable uplands to continue providing key ecosystem services under a range of scenarios. The paper concludes that many upland areas will need to be prepared for significant reductions in grazing and prescribed burning. Conversely, other areas could experience agricultural intensification, for example significant increases in grazing or an expansion of arable or bioenergy crops into upland valleys, due to anticipated increases in global demand for food and energy. These scenarios will take place in the context of climate change. Many may take place together and may interact with each other, with complex and unpredictable implications for the upland environment, economy and society. In this context, a number of advances are needed in science, technology and policy to maintain viable upland communities and the future provision of ecosystem services. These may include funding for ecological and hydrological restoration via carbon offsetting or other means. It may also involve advances in ecosystem service modelling, mapping and valuation, which through stakeholder participation could facilitate more integrated rural planning. New forms of environmental governance need to be explored that can empower those interested in developing upland economies to maintain thriving upland communities, while managing the ecosystem services they provide as efficiently as possible.     

Diagrammatic Approach to Capacity-Constrained Price Discrimination

This paper presents a diagrammatic solution to the firm's profit-maximizing price discrimination problem in the face of capacity constraints. Airlines, hotels, and other firms practice yield management, allocating fixed capacity to customer groups paying different prices. In these cases, the firm's short-run problem is not a decision about production levels, but it is one of allocating a fixed number of output units among customers. Our diagram shows that the conditions for profit-maximizing price discrimination are very different under these circumstances than in the standard model in which the firm is not constrained by capacity.     

Measuring the social costs of suboptimal combinations of policy instruments: A general framework and an example

Since most agricultural programs employ two or more policy instruments simultaneously, it is notable thai little research has attempted to find optimal instrument combinations and no research exists which evaluates the social costs (unrealized benefits) of combining instruments suboptimally. In our paper we report a simple and feasible method to find optimal policy instrument combinations, and we provide the first general, formal approach to measuring the social costs of suboptimal policy instrument combinations. Our approach is illustrated in an analysis for live major U.S. crops (corn, feed grains, wheat, rice, cotton). The simple model we employ for the illustration suggests that except lor the feed grains program, the observed programs combined policy instruments quite suboptimally. We conclude that agricultural economics research now can and should begin placing increased emphasis on studying optimal policy instrument combinations.