嫘祖归来兮

嫘祖这位伟大的人文始祖,德配黄帝,衣被天下,福泽万民,功高日月。但许多人却不知道,她生于盐亭,葬于盐亭。     

公司法人人格否认原则适用的条件与限制

公司法人人格否认原则是公司法人制度的补充,这一原则旨在保护公司债权人的利益和禁止股东利用法人人格逃避法律责任。适用法人人格否认原则必须符合特定的条件:公司法人人格在形式上合法存在,出资人或股东滥用公司法人人格严重损害债权人的利益或逃避法律责任,出资人或股东实际在造成损害的范围内承担责任。应当严格掌握法人人格否认的适用条件,依照正当程序确定股东对公司的连带责任,防止滥用法人人格否认,违反公司法的基本原则。     

Why is there no momentum in the Taiwan stock market?

Momentum strategies usually do not produce significant profits in emerging stock markets. Chui, Titman, and Wei [Chui, A. C. W., Titman, S., & Wei, K. C. J. (2000). Momentum, legal systems and ownership structure: An analysis of Asian stock markets. Working paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic University, Chui, A. C. W., Titman, S., & Wei, K. C. J. (2006). Individualism and momentum around the World. Working Paper, Hong Kong Polytechnic University] argue that the lack of profitability is due to cultural differences. In this paper, we look at one of the largest emerging markets, the Taiwan stock market. We find that DOWN markets occur more frequently and momentum profits are more negative following DOWN markets in Taiwan than in the US. Taken together, our findings suggest that the lack of profits from momentum strategies in emerging markets may be due more to the state-dependence of momentum discovered by Cooper, Gutierrez, and Hameed [Cooper, M. J., Gutierrez R. C., & Hameed, A. (2004). Market states and momentum. Journal of Finance, 59, 1345–1365] rather than to cultural differences.     

关于组建深圳市新华书店发行集团的研究与论证

<正> 按照新闻出版署关于深化图书发行体制改革,培育和规范图书市场的要求,为进一步贯彻党的十五大精神,加快国有企业改革步伐,深圳市新华书店发行集团调研小组赴成都、重庆、广州等地进行了考察,并对部分省市组建发行集团的情况进行了认真调研。本着“统一规划,分步实施”的原则,以建立现代企业制度为目标,提出了成立深圳市新华书店发行集团的研究论证方案。通过战略性重组来组建特区的发行集团,既是贯彻市委市政府组织实施大公司大集团的战略部署;又是适应深圳二次创业,创建现代文化名城的需要。     

文化是影响世界的国家力量

文化是一国增强国民自信、提升国家地位的精神力量,也能转化成物质力量充实国家整体实力。博大精深的中国文化是宝贵的国家实力资源,应成为抵制不良文化入侵、增加国家财富、扩大中国对世界影响的国家力量。     

中央投资项目地方配套资金问题研究——以福建省新增投资项目为例

受地方财力困难等因素影响,中央投资项目地方资金配套压力进一步加大。针对地方财政收支矛盾加剧情况,本文从加强管理、拓宽融资渠道等方面提出了解决地方配套资金困难的建议。     

Corporate investment and stock market valuation

We study the driving forces behind the positive association observed between corporate investment and stock market valuation, and how they interact with managerial equity incentives and informativeness of investment. We build a dynamic model where managers use investment choices to influence investors' opinions about firms' future prospects and increase the market valuation. The incentives to manipulate the valuation processes increase with managerial equity incentives and informativeness of investment. Our empirical findings support the model's predictions that the tendency of using investment to boost market valuation is stronger when managerial stock ownership is high or when earnings quality is low (i.e., there is strong reliance on investment for information).