Coordinated strategies for economic cooperation between Europe and the United States

Zusammenfassung Koordinierte Strategien für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit zwischen Europa und den Vereinigten Staaten. - In diesem Aufsatz wird die dynamische Spieltheorie auf die Koordinierung der Politik zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und der EWG in einem stark aggregierten Modell angewandt und folgendes gezeigt: (i) Eine Politik, die den Einflu\ von Ma\nahmen anderer L?nder vernachl?ssigt, führt in den USA zu Fiskalischen Einschr?nkungen und einer Verminderung der staatlichen Interventionen, in Europa dagegen zu einer Nachfragestimulierung, verbunden mit einer kontinuierlichen Herabsetzung des Diskontsatzes. Die EWG-L?nder sind, da sie ihre Politik nicht koordinieren, nach einigen Jahren wegen Zahlungsbilanzschwierigkeiten zu einer kontraktiven Nachfragepolitik gezwungen. (ii) Koordinierte Strategien best?tigen, da\ nicht-synchronisierte Politiken die Weltwirtschaft stabilisieren k?nnen. (in) Kooperation verbessert die wirtschaftlichen Leistungen, ausgedrückt in den Wachstumsraten und den Zahlungsbilanzen. Allerdings erbringt die ausdrückliche Zusammenarbeit kaum noch zus?tzliche Vorteile zu denen, die bereits im Rahmen der vollen Koordinierung erreicht werden k?nnen.

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Resumen Estrategias coordinadas de cooperación económica entre Europa y los EEUU.- La aplicación de un modelo dinámico de teoría de juegos a la coordinatión de política económica entre los EEUU y la CEE, como parte de un modelo altamente agregado de la economía mundial, permite concluír en este trabajo que (i) políticas que ignoran la influencia de medidas tomadas en otros países dan lugar a una contractión fiscal y a una menor interventión del Gobierno en los EEUU, pero a una estimulación de la demanda combinada con reducciones continuas de la tasa de descuento en Europa; al seguir políticas descoordinadas los países de la CEE están obligados a contraer la demanda agregada al cabo de unos a?os, debido a los problemas de balance de pagos, (ii) estrategias coordinadas confirman que políticas no sincronizadas pueden estabilizar la economía mundial; (iii) la cooperación favorece a la economía en términos de tasas de crecimiento y balance de pagos. Sin embargo, los beneficios adicionales de una cooperatión explícita resultan marginales en comparación con los beneficios ya alcanzados por la solución con coordinación total.

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Résumé Stratégies coordonnées pour la coopération entre l’Europe et les E.U. - En appliquant la théorie dynamique de jeu à la coordination de politique entre les E.U. et la CEE dans un modèle fortement agrégé de l’économie mondiale, cet article arrive aux conclusions suivants: (i) La politique qui ignore l’influence des actions suivies dans d’autres économies mène à la réduction fiscale et à moins interventions gouvernementales dans les E.U., mais à une stimulation de la demande avec des réductions continuelles du taux d’escompte en Europe. En cas d’une politique pas coordonnée les pays CEE sont forcés à prendre des mesures pour freiner la demande agrégée après quelques années à cause des problèmes de la balance des paiements. (ii) La stratégie coordonnée confirme que des politiques pas synchronisées pourraient stabiliser l’économie mondiale. (iii) La coopération peut élever le taux de croissance et améliorer la balance des paiements. Cependant, les gains additionnels d’une coopération explicite sont petits en comparaison avec les bénéfices déjà gagnés à l’aide d’une solution complètement coordonne’e.

     

Earnings Performance and Discretionary Disclosure

While the influence of earnings performance on disclosure is a fundamental issue in the disclosure literature, our understanding of this influence is limited. In this paper, I examine a comprehensive set of disclosures from a sample of firms experiencing an extended period of seasonally adjusted earnings increases. I study how these firms adjust disclosure in response to earnings increases, how disclosure changes as the period of strong earnings performance nears an end and how firms disclose during a subsequent period of earnings decline. I find an increase in disclosure during the period of increased earnings. This increase is pervasive across all types of disclosure and tends to be bundled with earnings announcements. The market responds positively to this disclosure. Firms continue to disclose at a high level as they approach earnings declines. However, they shift to disclosures that focus on the positive short-term results and do not discuss the impending decreases. While this behavior is systematic, the market does not appear to anticipate the subsequent earnings declines. Once the firms announce earnings declines, the magnitude of disclosure returns to the level provided prior to the increased earnings.     

Does direct foreign investment affect domestic credit constraints?

Firms in developing countries cite credit constraints as one of their primary obstacles to investment. Direct foreign investment may ease credit constraints by bringing in scarce capital. Alternatively, if foreign firms borrow heavily from domestic banks, they may crowd local firms out of domestic capital markets. Using firm data from the Ivory Coast, we test whether: (1) domestic firms are more credit constrained than foreign firms, and (2) whether borrowing by foreign firms exacerbates domestic firm credit constraints. Results provide support for both hypotheses. We also find that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less financially constrained than other domestic enterprises.     

频率不受运放参数影响的文氏桥振荡器

本文介绍一组（12个）新的正弦振荡器，这组振荡器使用两个运算放大器，其振荡频率不受单极点有源元件增益带宽之积的影响。这种特性是由本文所介绍的电路结构取得的，即不需要调节。     

Herd on the Street: Informational Inefficiencies in a Market with Short-Term Speculation

Standard models of informed speculation suggest that traders try to learn information that others do not have. This result implicitly relies on the assumption that speculators have long horizons, i.e., can hold the asset forever. By contrast, we show that if speculators have short horizons, they may herd on the same information, trying to learn what other informed traders also know. There can be multiple herding equilibria, and herding speculators may even choose to study information that is completely unrelated to fundamentals.     

The Long Run Growth and Productivity Performance of the United Kingdom

This paper examines Britain's long run growth and productivity performance since the late nineteenth century, taking an international comparative perspective and disaggregating by sector. Britain was richer than the United States and Germany in 1870 largely because of high levels of labour productivity in services and agriculture rather than in industry, together with a highly favourable structure, particularly a small share of the labour force in agriculture. By 1990, the productivity gap in manufacturing had not grown bigger. Rather, the deterioration in Britain's overall comparative labour productivity position has been concentrated in services and agriculture, together with the effects of structural change, particularly the later shift of labour out of agriculture in the United States and Germany.     

From Planning Models to Descriptive General Equilibrium

I had known Manohar Rao for a long time. For many years I tried to lure him to join the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research. He always gave me his disarming smile but his loyalty to Bombay University and to his students was unshakable. He was deeply interested in improving tools for better policy analysis. Hence in this paper I raise some related issues.

     

Annuity Values in Defined Contribution Retirement Systems: Australia and Singapore Compared

Annuities promise to play an increasingly important role in countries with national defined contribution retirement systems. In this article we examine life annuities in two countries, Singapore and Australia, each of which has a national mandatory pension program. Exploiting data on annuity pricing and purchase behaviour, we compare the money's worth of life annuity products across these two nations. Our results indicate that, after controlling on administrative loadings, there are important differences in measured adverse selection. Part of the explanation may be due to the different structures of the two countries’retirement systems.     

Quality Competition and Social Welfare in Markets with Partial Coverage: New Results*

We use a vertical product differentiation model under partial market coverage to study the social welfare optimum and duopoly equilibrium when convex costs of quality provision are either fixed or variable in terms of production. We show the following new results. First, under fixed costs, the social planner charges a uniform price for the single variant that just covers costs of quality provision. Like the duopoly equilibrium, this socially optimal pricing entails a partially uncovered market, but a smaller share of the market is served compared with the duopoly equilibrium. Second, for the variable cost case, it is socially optimal to provide both high‐ and low‐quality variants, but market shares need not be equal. This differs from the result in fully covered markets. Third, in the duopoly equilibrium, the quality spread is too wide under variable costs relative to the social optimum. Under fixed costs, the duopoly produces two variants, but quality is too low relative to the social optimum, which has only one variant.