Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets

A regulated upstream monopolist provides an input to firms in a downstream market. If the monopolist enters the downstream market, a natural concern is that it will act so as to raise its downstream rivals' costs. An offsetting incentive is that a higher downstream price will reduce demand for the input, which reduces the monopolist's profit. Conditions under which one incentive dominates the other are derived. The monopolist may desire to lower its downstream rivals' costs rather than raise them. These findings suggest that regulatory policy towards such downstream entry should not focus exclusively on the ability to discriminate.     

Global Strategy in the Internet Era

This article examines the joint effects on business strategy of the Internet and globalization. It develops a framework for evaluating how the Internet affects the globalization potential of individual industries and the global strategies that companies should adopt. The impact of the Internet will not be uniform. Not only do its direct effects vary from one industry to another, but also it speeds up globalization at different rates in different industries. The article shows how to use the Internet to support five types of global strategy: market participation, products and services, activity location, marketing, and competitive moves.     

The geography of tourism: An introduction

The geography of tourism is limited by a dearth of published research in geographic journals, the relatively few individuals who actively participate in the sub-discipline, and the lack of prestige the subject matter specialty has in geography. Despite these imperfections geographers make important contributions to the study of tourism because of their unique point-of-view. This characteristic perspective is seen in the context of a conceptual frame-of-reference which consists of a matrix based on two trichotomies. An analysis and interpretation of this framework and its application to the nine substantive articles included in the special issue constitute a majority of the article.     

Quasitransitive social preference: why some very large coalitions have very little power

Summary. If only the strict part of social preference is required to be transitive then Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives implies that there is a coalition containing all but one individual that cannot force x to be socially ranked above y for at least half of the pairs of alternatives (x,y). Received: August 29, 1996; revised version: March 24, 1997     

The complete incremental cost test for cross-subsidies with a sub-modular cost function

The complete Incremental Cost Test for cross-subsidies can be difficult to apply to a multi-product enterprise because every possible subset of products must be tested. However, this combinatorial problem can be avoided when the enterprise’s cost function is sub-modular by identifying the smallest subset of products causing the maximum cross-subsidy. This subset contains all of the products, and only those products, that are responsible for the cross-subsidies left by a stipulated set of prices. In addition, the subset can often be identified with a simple and efficient Myopic Algorithm. The algorithm should be particularly useful as a method for detecting cross-subsidies in regulated enterprises and networks because the cost functions for these industries are typically sub-modular.     

Accounting for optimism and pessimism in expected utility

We provide a preference foundation for decision under risk resulting in a model where probability weighting is linear as long as the corresponding probabilities are not extreme (i.e., 0 or 1). This way, most of the elegance and mathematical tractability of expected utility is maintained and also much of its normative foundation. Yet, the new model can accommodate the extreme sensitivity towards changes from 0 to almost impossible and from almost certain to 1 that has widely been documented in the experimental literature. The model can be viewed as “expected utility with the best and worst in mind” as suggested by Chateauneuf, Eichberger and Grant (Chateauneuf, Alain, Eichberger, Jürgen, Grant, Simon, 2007. Choice under uncertainty with the best and worst in mind: NEO-Additive capacities. Journal of Economic Theory 137, 538–567) or, following our preference foundation, interpreted as “expected utility with consistent optimism and pessimism”.     

Clarence Hatry

Hatry was one of those curiously un-English figures with whom the English peiodically find themselves unable to cope. J.K. Galbraith, The Great Crash 1929     

An interactive decision stratum for the multilevel world model

A world model being developed by the authors for the Club of Rome is described. It is based on an interaction between man—the decision maker or the policy analyst-and the computer. Such a symbiosis avoids the pitfalls of relying solely on the computer for policy analysis, which by necessity leads to a mechanistic view of the situation; it provides also means for a creative use of computer techniques for extending the logical capability of man in long-term planning and analysis while leaving the ultimate responsibility for prediction, planning and decision making in his hands. The model is multilevel and hierarchical, with the world represented not as an aggregate, but as a number of regions with countries grouped according to economic similarity.