Taking a Second Look in a Warped Crystal Ball: Explaining the Accuracy of Revised Forecasts

The fundamental questions we address are whether firms with a higher initial forecasting ability are able to accurately revise the exit forecasts of their investments; and how co‐investment partners and value‐adding commitment with their investment influence the main effect. We explore these questions with novel and unique data collected via mixed research methods on venture capital firms’ forecasts of 114 portfolio companies. We find that venture capital firms that are better at making initial forecasts are less effective in revising their forecasts. In addition, while the number of co‐investment partners positively moderate this relationship, venture capital firms’ value‐adding commitment moderates it negatively. Our findings contribute to the literature on organizational forecasting as well as inter‐organizational knowledge transfer and knowledge creation. They also provide novel insights into venture capital literature and practice.     

Financial Participation: Does the Risk Transfer Story Hold in France?

Several articles report a positive effect of financial participation (profit sharing (PS) and employee share ownership) on firms' economic performance. This increase can be obtained in two main ways: by increasing the effort (extrinsic, intrinsic or commitment) of workers, directly or indirectly through worker selection; or by transferring more risk to the workers. The question is, of course, not neutral. Indeed, if the risk transfer story is true then it means that the increase of economic performance is obtained at the expense of workers, who take on the burden of more risks. The question is especially important in France where financial participation is associated with tax exemption for firms and where it is forbidden by law to substitute base wage and PS. The purpose of our article is to use an employer–employee dataset to answer the question of whether financial participation schemes are mainly designed as a risk transfer (from firms to workers) device.     

The relevance of political affinity for the initial acquisition premium in cross‐border acquisitions

Research summary : In the context of economic nationalism, we investigate the relevance of political affinity between countries to the initial acquisition premium offered in cross‐border acquisitions. Political affinity is defined as the similarity of national interests in global affairs. We argue that political affinity affects how foreign acquirers anticipate their bargaining position in their negotiations with domestic target firms. With decreasing political affinity, the host government becomes increasingly likely to intervene against foreign firms in an acquisition deal. Consequently, foreign acquirers need to provide a more lucrative initial offer to dissuade target firms from leveraging government intervention to oppose the acquisition. Our prediction is supported by strong evidence that political affinity, as revealed by UN general assembly voting patterns, leads to lower initial acquisition premiums. Managerial summary : Media reports suggest that politics plays an important role in international business transactions. However, we still know very little about how bilateral political relations affect corporate decision‐making. In this article, we analyze the influence of the quality of bilateral political relations on the bidding behavior of foreign acquirers in cross‐border acquisitions. We argue that the host government is more likely to intervene against the foreign acquirer during deal negotiations if the quality of bilateral political relations is poor. A lower political affinity between countries therefore decreases the bargaining power of the acquirer and pushes up the initial bid premium the acquirer has to offer to the local target. Our empirical results confirm our argument. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.     

Government expenditure,external and domestic public debt,and economic growth

This paper analyzes the relationship between government expenditure, tax on returns to assets, public debt, and growth in an endogenous growth model. Public debt is composed of two components, domestic debt and external debt. We show conditions for existence, uniqueness, and multiplicity of the steady states. More precisely, existence of steady state requires a sufficiently high productivity and a sufficiently low tax on returns to assets. We also provide the effects of an increase in the tax rate on returns to assets on the steady state. In particular, the relation between public spending and the tax rate has a bell shape. Domestic debt unambiguously increases with tax whereas external debt displays an inverted U‐shaped curve. A high tax rate leads to a reallocation of public debt in favor of domestic debt (to the detriment of external debt). The effect of taxation on consumption (and production) also displays a nonlinear pattern when the output elasticity of capital is lower than unity (the effect is monotonously increasing if this elasticity is unity). We also derive the conditions under which a tax increase can boost or reduce the balanced growth rate.     

Tenure Security and Long‐term Investment on Tenanted Land: Evidence from Colonial Taiwan

We use farm diary data from Taiwan in the 1920s and 1930s to estimate the impacts of a state‐wide tenancy reform on tenants’ investment in the farmland and production outcome. The reform, commencing in 1922, enhanced the tenure security for the tenants by promoting written contracts that extended tenure length from 1 year to 5–6 years, and by establishing government‐sponsored organizations for dispute settlements. Our estimations rely on a difference‐in‐difference framework, where self‐cultivated farms are used as the control group. We find that the reform encouraged tenants to make investments in the irrigation and drainage system of the farms, which is expected to have long‐lasting benefits for production. The improved irrigation/drainage system led to significant efficiency gains for the farms. In contrast, the reform did not affect tenants’ usage of fertilizer much, which benefits production for only a crop season or a year.     

Remittances,Dutch Disease,and Manufacturing Growth in Developing Economies

Remittances have grown tremendously in magnitude and economic importance in the past four decades, providing economies with additional disposable incomes and even serving as buffers against economic downturns. It is thus but fitting to ask how remittances have impacted on growth, particularly on manufacturing growth. This note presents a simple model linking remittances and manufacturing growth via a ‘Dutch Disease’ channel. Using Blundell and Bond's (1998) system general method of moments on a panel dataset of 56 developing economies from 1992 to 2016, we verify that remittances adversely affect manufacturing growth in economies that experience high real appreciation rates. This result is robust to alternate specifications, such as the inclusion of financial development indicators, the expansion of the sample to include high‐income economies, and the use of different sample periods.     

2018 KLEIN LECTURE: INDIVIDUAL AND AGGREGATE LABOR SUPPLY IN HETEROGENEOUS AGENT ECONOMIES WITH INTENSIVE AND EXTENSIVE MARGINS

We study business cycle fluctuations in heterogeneous agent general equilibrium models featuring intensive and extensive margins of labor supply. A nonlinear mapping from time devoted to work to labor services generates operative extensive and intensive margins. Our model captures the salient features of the empirical distribution of hours worked, including how individuals transit within this distribution. We study how various specifications influence labor supply responses to aggregate technology shocks and find that abstracting from intensive margin adjustment can have large effects on the volatility of aggregate hours even if fluctuations along the intensive margin are small.     

HOUSE PRICES AND CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY

I characterize how house price shocks affect consumption inequality using a life cycle model of housing and nonhousing consumption with incomplete markets. I derive analytical expressions for the dynamics of inequalities and use these to analyze large house prices swings seen in the United Kingdom. I show that movements in consumption inequality were large, that they correspond with the theoretical predictions qualitatively, and that the model explains a large fraction of the movements quantitatively. I demonstrate the accuracy of this analysis using an extended model's full nonlinear solution. Finally, accounting for house price shocks alters estimates of labor–income risks using cross‐sectional data.     

ON THE TIMING OF PRODUCTION DECISIONS IN MONETARY ECONOMIES

In most macroeconomic models inflation tends to be harmful. In this article, we show that by simply changing the timing of production decisions by firms from “on demand” to “in advance,” some inflation can boost welfare as long as goods are sufficiently perishable. The main conclusion from this research is that by effectively hiding the strategic interaction between supply and demand, assuming production on demand is not without loss of generality.