Intra-industry trade with multinational firms

Recent developments, including the analysis of firm-level adjustment to falling trade costs, have contributed to a revival of interest in intra-industry trade (IIT). Most empirical work still relies on the standard Grubel-Lloyd measure. This however refers only to international trade, disregarding income flows stimulated by repatriated profits of multinational firms. Given the overwhelming importance of the latter, this is a major shortcoming. This paper provides a guide to measurement and estimation of the determinants of bilateral IIT shares from the perspective of new trade theory with multinational firms. We develop an analytically solvable general equilibrium model to investigate the impact of investment costs, multinational activities and income flows from repatriated profits. We also discuss and quantify the bias of the Grubel-Lloyd index associated with repatriated profit flows of multinationals. Using bias-corrected versions of the Grubel-Lloyd index as the dependent variable, we demonstrate that the determinants motivated by our theoretical analysis offer important insights into variations in IIT shares.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.     

Bargaining Outcomes with Double-Offer Arbitration

Increasingly, arbitration is becoming used to resolve bargaining disputes in a variety of settings. Reducing dispute rates is often listed as a main goal in designing arbitration mechanisms. Conventional arbitration and final-offer arbitration are two commonly used procedures, but theoretical examinations of these arbitration procedures show that disputants’ final bargaining positions do not converge and disagreement is likely. This article contains results from a set of experiments designed to compare bargaining outcomes under the two commonly used arbitration procedures with outcomes under an innovative procedure called “double-offer” arbitration (Zeng et al., 1996). This procedure requires that disputants make two final offers at impasse: a primary and a secondary offer. The arbitrator evaluates the pairs of offers using a linear criterion function, and theory suggests the secondary offers converge to the median of the arbitrator’s preferred settlement distribution. Because the procedure’s rules are that convergence of offers generates a settlement at those offers, this theoretical convergence result implies that arbitration is not needed in the end. Experimental results indicate that dispute rates in double-offer arbitration are, on average, about the same as dispute rates in conventional arbitration. However, other results show reason to favor double-offer arbitration. Specifically, in repeated bargaining, there is concern over whether use of an arbitration procedure becomes addictive and makes bargainers more likely to use the procedure in the future-a “narcotic effect.” The data show that double-offer arbitration is non-addictive, whereas both conventional and final-offer arbitration are.     

Teams, Firms and the Evolution of Profit Seeking Behavior

Even as advances in information theory over the last quarter century have cast increasing doubt on the proposition that firms successfully maximize profits, the objective of profit maximization continues to be an axiomatic feature of the neoclassical theory of the firm. This paper attempts to improve our understanding firms by treating the objective function as an open question. Specifically, an ontogenetic thought experiment is undertaken to address the question of what differentiates production teams from firms by asking why team members would sell their control rights to a principal, thereby transforming the team into a firm. What results is an account of the emergence of the objective of profit seeking. Profit seeking emerges endogenously as a more fit alternative than the objective of value maximization, which is less capable of coping with uncertainty through purposive adaptation.     

Punishment,counterpunishment and sanction enforcement in a social dilemma experiment

We present the results of an experiment that explores the sanctioning behavior of individuals who experience a social dilemma. In the game we study, players choose contribution levels to a public good and subsequently have multiple opportunities to reduce the earnings of the other members of the group. The treatments vary in terms of individuals’ opportunities to (a) avenge sanctions that have been directed toward themselves, and (b) punish others’ sanctioning behavior with respect to third parties. We find that individuals do avenge sanctions they have received, and this serves to decrease contribution levels. They also punish those who fail to sanction third parties, but the resulting increase in contributions is smaller than the decrease the avenging of sanctions induces. When there are five rounds of unrestricted sanctioning, contributions and welfare are significantly lower than when only one round of sanctioning opportunities exists, and welfare is lower than at a benchmark of zero cooperation. We thank James Andreoni, participants in seminars at Emory University, the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the University of New South Wales, the University of Sydney, Deakin University, the 2004 North American Regional Meetings of the ESA in Tucson, Arizona, USA, the 2004 IMEBE Meetings in Cordoba, Spain, and the 2005 SAET meetings in Vigo, Spain, for constructive and helpful comments. We thank Elven Priour for programming and organization of the sessions. Instructions for the experiment are available from the authors.     

进言中国企业:如何攻略美国市场

我们正看到一种趋势初露端倪.这种趋势将很快成为下个10年里中国商业战略的"主流".更多的有战略头脑的中国公司开始在全世界展开直接的兼并业务,尤其是在美国.     

Deficit financing,liquidity, and the government budget constraint

This article presents a macroeconomic model in which government deficits are bond financed and the stock of bonds may affect both expected income and liquidity. If either of these effects exists, then comparative statics analysis requires the government budget to be balanced. Temporary divergences from a balanced budget and changes in the maturity structure of the government debt may be analyzed in terms of changes in the stock of bonds. It is shown that traditional fiscal and monetary policies may have a perverse effect; that to ensure effective policy, deficit financing and open market operations should be avoided; and that only policies involving a balanced budget or the financing of deficits or surpluses through changes in the stock of money should be undertaken.     

The philosophical contributions of Ludwig von Mises

This paper was prepared for consideration for a Ludwig von Mises prize that was awared at the Mises Institute's 10th anniversary conference, October 9–11, 1992. I am grateful to Pat Heckman and Ralph Raico for their very helpful suggestions.     

An algebraic theory of multi-product decisions

Summary. We exploit the existence of matrix group symmetries on a production possibility set to identify group symmetries on the profit function. The groups are isomorphic, and provide a pre-ordering on firm preferences over prices. Together with additional structure on the technology, symmetries generate comparative statics on price responses. Linear and other invariances place bounds on firm choice vectors. Reflection group asymmetries on the feasible choice set also support welfare rankings over prices. The methods are adapted to study consumer decisions.Received: 12 August 2002, Revised: 30 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D11, D21, C60, L23. Correspondence to: David A. Hennessy