MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

The effects of advertising and solicitation on audit fees

Leading academic and professional accountants have suggested that the crisis in auditing over the past few years may have had its origin in deregulation which allowed firms to advertise their services and solicit new clients, encouraging accounting firms to become more commercial. In this paper, we look at this issue in New Zealand which has the unique distinction of having separated two key forms of deregulation, namely advertising and solicitation, by 6 years. This allows us to separately examine the effect of each form of market competition on audit fees. We find that advertising is associated with increases in fees, not decreases, which suggests that quality-based advertising took place, and not price-based advertising. In contrast, solicitation corresponded with a general decrease in average fees for clients of the Big 8. We interpret this result as indicating an increase in competition among accounting firms. Our results suggest that there may be a much more complex relationship among market competition, advertising and solicitation, and fees than the arguments used to originally justify deregulation.     

Balanced wealth creation across cooperative economics

Cooperation is a necessary condition, along with competition, for the creation of wealth, innovation and knowledge. We briefly re-visit and critique certain neo-classical arguments in regards to pure competition and profit maximization that continue to be carried forward by current neo-liberal thought. We also attempt to illustrate the unbalanced and damaging outcomes of neo-liberal logic across the lens of enactment; as well as across our own discernment of holographic analogies to the individualism–collectivism dyad that exist within our complex environments. Within the spirit of evolutionary economics and complexity theory, early and more recent theoretical and empirical underpinnings for cooperation are presented, with the argument that it, combined with competition, leads to more well-balanced wealth creation—be it regional, national or global in character. Finally, we review competitive vs cooperative economic approaches across the lens of emergent complex systems. We then present two possible ‘future’ scenarios: one extreme outcome occurring as a result of truncating or de-balancing the individual vs collective dyad and its holographic analogies; while another outcome attempts to integrate a more inherent balance within these same dyads.     

FRA: Teaching Financial Accounting with a Goal-Based Scenario

This paper reports on the development of FRA (Financial Report Analyst), an intelligent, multimedia educational software system which is designed to teach financial statement analysis to business students and professional trainees. FRA is based on a new kind of teaching architecture called a goal-based scenario, a “learning by doing” environment in which the student acts in a realistic role and obtains helpful coaching while performing assigned tasks. In FRA, the student plays the role of a lending analyst at a bank who must make important commercial lending decisions. Usability tests of FRA have been conducted with students in the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University. The paper discusses: theoretical advantages of goal-based scenarios; the architecture of FRA; and ongoing and future research.     

Better sales networks

Anyone in sales will tell you that social networks are critical. The more contacts you have, the more leads you'll generate, and, ultimately, the more sales you'll make. But that's a vast oversimplification. Different configurations of networks produce different results, and the salesperson who develops a nuanced understanding of social networks will outshine competitors. The salesperson's job changes over the course of the selling process. Different abilities are required in each stage of the sale: identifying prospects, gaining buy-in from potential customers, creating solutions, and closing the deal. Success in the first stage, for instance, depends on the salesperson acquiring precise and timely information about opportunities from contacts in the marketplace. Closing the deal requires the salesperson to mobilize contacts from prior sales to act as references. Managers often view sales networks only in terms of direct contacts. But someone who knows lots of people doesn't necessarily have an effective network because networks often pay off most handsomely through indirect contacts. Moreover, the density of the connections in a network is important. Do a salesperson's contacts know all the same people, or are their associates widely dispersed? Sparse networks are better, for example, at generating unique information. Managers can use three levers--sales force structure, compensation, and skills development--to encourage salespeople to adopt a network-based view and make the best possible use of social webs. For example, the sales force can be restructured to decouple lead generation from other tasks because some people are very good at building diverse ties but not so good at maintaining other kinds of networks. Companies that take steps of this kind to help their sales teams build better networks will reap tremendous advantages.     

Social indicators and technology assessment

The relationship between what is known as “social indicators” and what is called “technology assessment” is one between two “social technologies”. Both are at a relatively early stage of development and both carry the burdens associated with great expectations and enthusiastic missionaries.     

The Impact of No-Fault Legislation on Automobile Insurance

Abstract

Since its inception, the effectiveness of no-fault legislation has been highly debated. Although some research suggests that no-fault laws are effective in reducing costs, other evidence suggests that the current no-fault systems may not meet the original objectives. This study provides a detailed assessment of the relation of no-fault laws and automobile insurance losses for the period 1994 to 2007. By examining total automobile insurance losses along with liability and personal injury protection losses, we are able to determine if and how specific provisions of the laws are related to claims costs. We find a negative relation between the presence of a no-fault law and total losses, which suggests that no-fault systems are associated with lower losses than the traditional tort system. In addition, an examination of no-fault-only states suggests that specific provisions of no-fault laws, such as thresholds and limitations on benefits, have some effect on losses. With the sunset of Colorado’s no-fault legislation in 2003, the recent passage of Personal Injury Protection Reform in Florida, and proposed federal choice legislation, the overall impact of no-fault as well as the specific components of the laws are of heightened importance to consumers, insurers, and lawmakers.