Welfare reform: A game theoretic perspective

Traditionally, the debate over welfare reform has been infused with passion and driven by ideology, but reform itself has proceeded in careful steps. In recent years, however, the status quo has been dramatically altered as the need for fundamental change has become apparent as the starting point for reform. Using the state of Wisconsin’s aggressive approach to welfare reform as a model of what is administratively possible, we portray reform as an n-person iterated coordination game in order to examine potential outcomes under the larger rubric of ratinal decision-making and utility maximization. In so doing, we demonstrate that game theory offers an alternative framework for dissecting and discussing complex social issues such as welfare reform.     

Spot asset carry cost rates and futures hedge ratios

Since the 1970s, futures hedge ratios have traditionally been calculated ex-post via economically structure-less statistical analyses. This paper proposes an ex-ante, more efficient, computationally simpler, general “carry cost rate” hedge ratio. The proposed hedge ratio is biased, but its bias is readily mitigatable via a stationary Bias Adjustment Multiplier (BAM). The 2-part intuition for the BAM and its stationarity is as follows. First, the paper reasons that the “traditional” hedge ratio should uncover the carry cost rate and shows that it does, albeit inefficiently. Then, since both the “traditional” and “carry cost rate” hedge ratios are driven by the carry cost rate, it may be that their ratio (for implementation in the same prior periods) is stationary and useful as an ex-ante BAM for the “carry cost rate” hedge ratio; the paper tests these conjectures and finds support for both. Specifically, the paper shows that the “bias-adjusted carry cost rate” hedge ratio, defined as the average product of the ex-post BAMs from prior periods and the current ex-ante “carry cost rate” hedge ratio, has higher hedge-effectiveness than that for either the “traditional” or “naive” benchmark hedge ratios in diverse real and simulated markets.

     

Conflict Management for Effective Top Management Teams and Innovation in China*

abstract Top management teams may be critical for developing organizations that can keep abreast of marketplace changes and innovate. Several streams of strategy research have argued that conflict and diversity promote top management team effectiveness. This study proposes that how top management teams manage conflict can greatly contribute to their effective leadership of organizational innovation. A total of 378 executives from 105 organizations in China completed measures of conflict management (cooperative, competitive, and avoiding) and productive conflict (an outcome of conflict). Separately, 105 CEOs from these firms indicated their team's effectiveness and their organization's innovativeness. Results support the theory that conflict management can contribute to making top management teams effective. Structural equation analysis suggests that cooperative conflict management promotes productive conflict and top management team effectiveness that in turn result in organizational innovation. These results, coupled with previous research, were interpreted as suggesting that cooperative conflict management is an important contributor to effective top management teams even in the collectivist culture of China.     

Construction of block designs admitting an Abelian automorphism group

Construction of block designs admitting an action of a presumed automorphism group consists of two basic steps: 1.construction of orbit structures for the given automorphism group, 2. construction of block designs for the orbit structures obtained in 1. For an abelian group G, the second step, called indexing, often lasts too long, because there are too many possibilities to be enumerated with today's computer facilities. To make such a construction possible we use a principal series of the group G to obtain a refinement of the orbit structures.     

Information asymmetry and investor valuation of IPOs: top management team legitimacy as a capital market signal

The condition of information asymmetry between current owners and potential IPO investors creates a context wherein the legitimacy of the top management team (TMT) may serve as a valid signal of value to potential investors. The results confirm our hypotheses that TMT legitimacy is negatively correlated with post‐IPO stock value run‐up. Our results support a previously unexplored view of the TMT as an important signal of value in IPOs, and suggest that dual benefits accrue to the TMT selection process in IPO firms. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Flexibility in Strategic Decision Making: Informational and Ideological Perspectives

Adaptation is a crucial challenge for organizations, and an important theme in the strategy and organization theory literature. We still have much to learn, however, about the strategic processes by which adaptation is achieved. In this paper we focus on a basic element in the adaptation process, i.e. flexibility within the strategic decision-making process. We concentrate on strategic decisions because these choices are the most important adaptations the firm makes. We suggest that the core of all organizational adaptation is a decision-making process. Unless the decision-making process itself is flexible, it is unlikely the organization can be flexible enough to adapt. We derive hypotheses concerning the factors that lead to flexibility (versus rigidity) from both information processing and ideological perspectives, and test them in a study involving 57 strategic decisions in 25 companies. Our results identify three contextual factors related to both perspectives -- including competitive threat, slack and uncertainty -- that are helpful in understanding flexibility in strategy decision making. While managers appear to be more flexible when decisions are uncertain, we found that in the very conditions where managers need the most flexibility (high competitive threat and low slack), they are least likely to be flexible.     

Markets for contracts: experiments exploring the compatibility of games and markets for games

Summmary. The research explores the relationship between games and the economic environment in which the games might be embedded. The focus is on a market institution in which agents buy and sell rights to participate in a follow-on stage of strategic interaction. The central question posed concerns how two different types of processes, the game and the market, interact. The market converges to a competitive equilibrium that is consistent with the Nash equilibrium that obtains in the game, and the convergence of the market to a competitive equilibrium lags the convergence of behaviors in the game to a Nash equilibrium.