Adding and subtracting Black-Scholes: A new approach to approximating derivative prices in continuous-time models

We develop a new approach to approximating asset prices in the context of continuous-time models. For any pricing model that lacks a closed-form solution, we provide a closed-form approximate solution, which relies on the expansion of the intractable model around an “auxiliary” one. We derive an expression for the difference between the true (but unknown) price and the auxiliary one, which we approximate in closed-form, and use to create increasingly improved refinements to the initial mispricing induced by the auxiliary model. The approach is intuitive, simple to implement, and leads to fast and extremely accurate approximations. We illustrate this method in a variety of contexts including option pricing with stochastic volatility, computation of Greeks, and the term structure of interest rates.     

Speed of convergence to market efficiency: The role of ECNs

Chordia, Roll and Subrahmanyam (2005, CRS) estimate the speed of convergence to market efficiency based on short-horizon return predictability of the 150 largest NYSE firms. We extend CRS to a broad panel of NYSE stocks and are the first to examine the relation between electronic communication networks (ECNs) and the corresponding informational efficiency of prices. Overall, we confirm CRS's result that price adjustments to new information occur on average within 5–15 min for large NYSE stocks. We further show that it takes about 20 min longer for smaller firms to incorporate information into prices. Most importantly, we demonstrate that the speed of convergence to market efficiency is significantly related to the type of trading platform where orders are executed, even after controlling for relative order flows, trading costs, volatility, informational effects, trading conditions, market quality, institutional trading activity, and other firm-specific characteristics. Our findings provide direct answers and insights to issues raised in a recent SEC concept release document.     

Testing conditional factor models

Using nonparametric techniques, we develop a methodology for estimating and testing conditional alphas and betas and long-run alphas and betas, which are the averages of conditional alphas and betas, respectively, across time. The estimators and tests can be implemented for a single asset or jointly across portfolios. The traditional Gibbons, Ross, and Shanken (1989) test arises as a special case of no time variation in the alphas and factor loadings and homoskedasticity. As applications of the methodology, we estimate conditional CAPM and multifactor models on book-to-market and momentum decile portfolios. We reject the null that long-run alphas are equal to zero even though there is substantial variation in the conditional factor loadings of these portfolios.     

Do actions speak louder than words? An empirical investigation of corporate environmental reputation

In this study, we investigate the extent to which firms’ environmental performance is reflected in perceptions of their environmental reputation and whether environmental disclosure serves to mediate the negative aspects of poorer environmental performance associated with those assessments. We also examine whether differences in environmental performance and environmental disclosure appear to be associated with membership selection to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index (DJSI), a factor we also believe may be associated with perceptions of environmental reputation. Based on a cross-sectional sample of 92 US firms from environmentally sensitive industries, we find that environmental performance measured using Trucost environmental performance scores is negatively related to both reputation scores and membership in the DJSI. We argue this is due to the more extensive disclosure levels of firms that are worse performers and the finding of a significant positive relation between environmental disclosure and both the environmental reputation measures and DJSI membership. Finally, we show that the DJSI designation positively influences perceptions of corporate reputation. Overall, our results suggest that voluntary environmental disclosure appears to mediate the effect of poor environmental performance on environmental reputation. Perhaps more troubling, our results also suggest that membership in the DJSI appears to be driven more by what firms say than what they do. Thus, like voluntary disclosure, the DJSI may actually be hindering improved future corporate environmental performance.     

Can incentives mitigate student overconfidence at grade forecasts?

Research shows that college students exhibit bias in their forecasts of exam performance. Most students are overconfident in their forecasts, academically weaker students are the most overconfident, and top-performing students are underconfident. The literature identifies negative repercussions of these biases, including inadequate preparation for exams. A recurring attribute of this literature is the absence of meaningful incentives for students to forecast accurately. We implement an extra credit scheme to incentivize accurate forecasts. Depending on how forecast bias is measured, the scheme mitigates bias by top-performing students and marginally mitigates bias by other students. Our results have several implications. First, we illustrate an extra credit tool instructors can use to incentivize students to make more thoughtful assessments of their future exam performance. Second, we show how the association between incentives and forecast bias differs across student groups. Finally, we show that results in this literature are sensitive to how bias is measured.     

Citizen participation in public administration: investigating open government for social innovation

In recent years, public sector organizations have increasingly focused on citizen contribution by adopting instruments known from open innovation. By collaborating with the periphery and leveraging external knowledge, government institutions initiate social innovation and stimulate a positive change for society. This article examines the involvement of citizens in an ideation platform initiated by a local government and investigates the motivations affecting participation intensity. Drawing on self‐determination theory, we analyze what motivates citizens to participate in an open government platform and how these motivations influence participation quantity. Based on a survey among platform users and the analysis of usage data from the platform operator, we find that motivations of citizen participation in public administration greatly vary across forms of participation. Whereas, intrinsic motivation is positively associated with producing and consuming platform content, external and introjected regulation negatively relate to individuals’ active contribution. At the same time, external regulation is positively associated with evaluation behavior.     

What drives the disappearing dividends phenomenon?

We study the determinants of dividend payout policy and examine the role of liquidity, risk and catering in explaining the changes in propensity to pay. Our results indicate that risk plays a major role in firms’ dividend policy. The evidence substantiates from a large sample of firms representing 18 countries over the sample period from 1989 to 2011. For firms in the US, France, UK and Other European markets, liquidity is additionally an important determinant of dividend policy. We find that, although catering incentives persist only among firms in common law countries and not in civil law countries, after adjusting for risk there is little support for catering theory even among firms incorporated in common law countries. Our results indicate that catering incentives reflect the risk-reward relationship in the changing propensity to pay dividends.     

Raising rivals' costs: The entry of an upstream monopolist into downstream markets

A regulated upstream monopolist provides an input to firms in a downstream market. If the monopolist enters the downstream market, a natural concern is that it will act so as to raise its downstream rivals' costs. An offsetting incentive is that a higher downstream price will reduce demand for the input, which reduces the monopolist's profit. Conditions under which one incentive dominates the other are derived. The monopolist may desire to lower its downstream rivals' costs rather than raise them. These findings suggest that regulatory policy towards such downstream entry should not focus exclusively on the ability to discriminate.