AGAINST LEVIATHAN: A REVIEW OF CLASSICAL LIBERALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF NORMAN P. BARRY1

Classical Liberalism in the 21st Century is a collection of essays from colleagues and friends of the late Norman Barry, Professor of Social and Political Theory at the University of Buckingham. Most share Barry's Hayekian perspective. The essays cover themes such as: international competition in trade and between jurisdictions; the corporate social responsibility fad; secular economic errors; policies relating to alleged global warming; the state's impotence at removing externalities; the moral functions of competition; and, above all, Barry's rigour and eloquence in the economic and political case for freedom.     

Who's the Boss at the Top? A Micro‐Level Analysis of Director Expertise,Status and Conformity Within Boards

In this paper we address how director expertise impacts a director's social status and conformity within the board. Our results, derived from two unique multi‐source datasets of peer ratings on director status and conformity of non‐executive directors from Dutch organizations, indicate that industry‐specific expertise and financial expertise differently impact directors’ social status and influence within the board. We find that directors’ individual performance orientation – the motivation to demonstrate expertise – acts as an important contingency for expertise to increase directors’ status within the board. Additional analyses using archival data and interviews with non‐executive directors substantiate our findings and provide additional insight into the dynamics operating within boards. This study extends existing research on boards of directors and provides unique micro‐level insights into the boardroom dynamics that connect director expertise to director status and conformity within boards.     

Seasonality and non-linear price effects in scanner-data-based market-response models

Scanner data for fast moving consumer goods typically amount to panels of time series where both N and T are large. To reduce the number of parameters and to shrink parameters towards plausible and interpretable values, Hierarchical Bayes models turn out to be useful. Such models contain in the second level a stochastic model to describe the parameters in the first level.     

Editorial

Editorial Introduction

Editorial     

Collective Choice and Voluntary Provision of Public Goods*

Some public goods are provided entirely with private contributions, others with a mixture of public and private funding, and still others are entirely publicly funded. In order to study this variation, a model of dual provision is developed that endogenizes public and private funding. Households vote over an income tax that finances public supply of the good and on whether to permit private contributions. While permitting private contributions may lead to a reduction in total provision, a majority always favors permitting private contributions. Results are developed for small and large economies, and the relevance of nonexcludability and noncongestion are investigated.     

TO ADMIT OR NOT TO ADMIT: THE QUESTION OF RESEARCH PARK SIZE

A theoretical model is used to explore the determinants of the optimum size of a private research park and the effect of university affiliation on that optimum size. Parks are assumed to operate as cooperatives where costs are equally shared among the member firms, and optimality occurs when the firms’ average net benefits are maximized. To achieve this, existing members of a park will limit the park's size, denying entry to firms who wish to join and are willing to share the costs. University affiliation may either increase or decrease the optimum size of a park.     

The Myth of Fair Prices: A Graphical Analysis

The issues of fair trade and in particular fair price policies, have been neglected in most international trade courses. The authors show how the latter can be explained to undergraduate students applying the simple graphical methods normally used in general equilibrium trade theory. They show that fair pricing strategies can be looked upon as a suboptimal device for redistributing the gains from trade as compared with a transfer of funds.     

Economic Theory and the Problem of Translation

Institutionalism was the dominant approach to public finance prior to WWII, after which it was eclipsed by Pigouvianism and Keynesianism. This transition defined the career of Wisconsin’s Harold M. Groves (1897–1969). Groves was a notable public finance economist, leading textbook author, and drafter of significant tax and labor legislation. He represented the culmination of a multigenerational institutionalist tradition. In this paper, I examine Groves and postwar public finance as a test case for the legacy of Wisconsin institutionalism. To that end, I consider Groves’s contributions to postwar tax policy, his interactions with Henry C. Simons and Richard M. Musgrave, and his view on Keynesian public finance. I identify some Wisconsin institutionalist contributions to modern public finance and offer an explanation for the postwar decline in institutional public finance.     

Cost structures of banks grouped by strategic conduct

The hypothesis that the banking system consists of firms that use the same production technology is tested and rejected in this study. Six groupings of the population of commercial banks are identified using cluster analysis. The banks are grouped to reflect similar production technologies within groups but different technologies across groups as defined by the strategic conduct (i.e., activities) of the banks. The results suggest that banks in different clusters employ production processes that feature different degrees of substitutability between factors of production, and that the estimates of input substitutability for those groups look quite different from those estimated based on the full population of commercial banks. The impact of the homogeneity production technology assumption on the measurement of cost efficiency is also assessed. The results show that partitioning the industry by strategic conduct reduces the average inefficiency in the industry. These results support those found by others who used similar partitioning criteria but a more narrowly defined sample of banks.