Investor Protection and Firm Liquidity

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relation between investor protection and firm liquidity. We posit that less protective environments lead to wider bid-ask spreads and thinner depths because they fail to minimize information asymmetries. The Hong Kong equity market provides a unique opportunity to compare liquidity costs across distinct investor protection environments, but still within a common trading mechanism and currency. Our empirical findings verify that firm liquidity is significantly affected by investor protection. Regression and matched-sample results show that Hong Kong-based equities exhibit narrower spreads and thicker depths than their China-based counterparts.     

On the causes of China''s agricultural crisis and the great leap famine

Recently researchers have conducted extensive investigations on China's Great Leap crisis. In this article, we critically review this literature and argue that, since the grain production collapse was not the only factor that led to the famine, the causes of these two catastrophes require separate examination. At the theoretical level multidimensional factors were responsible for the crisis. However, existing empirical findings mainly support the exit right hypothesis to explain the dramatic productivity fluctuations in Chinese agriculture, and support grain availability and the urban-biased food distribution system as important causes of the famine. We suggest that additional empirical research is needed to assess the relative importance of the proposed causes.     

More evidence that university administrators are utility maximizing bureaucrats

Coates and Humphreys (2000) found evidence that administrators affect enrollment supply and faculty demand using a panel of eleven public colleges and universities in Maryland, implying that institutions have enough market power to permit the preferences of administrators to influence these variables. We extend this framework to include political constraints on administrators behavior and add data from public higher education in Virginia. The results from these extensions are consistent with the earlier findings. However, we find that political considerations and differences in the governance of higher education in the two states have relatively little influence on enrollment supply and faculty demand decisions of university administrators.JEL Classification: I21, I28Paper prepared for the Research Conference Its Better to Rely on Well-designed Institutions Than on Well-behaved People held at UCLA, May 18/19, 2001. We thank Bob Lowry for comments on an earlier draft of this paper and Nicole Myers and Ryan Mutter for able research assistance.     

The modern welfare state: Problems and suggested reforms

This article examines some of the major market failures and government failures at work in the modern welfare state and investigates the political reasons for ignoring these failures in formulating welfare state policy. Next, the article examines some recent economic developments that endanger the welfare state: the expansion of international trade, skill-biased technological change, and the restructuring of firms. Finally, it suggests some policy approaches that may help make the welfare state more efficient and equitable.     

BORN AGAIN: GLOBALIZATION'S SIXTEENTH CENTURY ORIGINS (ASIAN/GLOBAL VERUS EUROPEAN DYNAMICS)

Abstract.   Globalization began when all heavily populated land masses began interacting – both directly and indirectly via other land masses – in a sustained manner with deep consequences for all interacting regions. Globalization emerged during the sixteenth century. Dynamism emanating from within China played a pivotal role. Valid hypotheses concerning globalization's emergence must accommodate evidence from numerous disciplinary debates. Discussion of globalization's birth in terms of economic issues alone – for example, O'Rourke and Williamson's price convergence of the 1820s – is doomed. The central role of economic history – including Chinese economic history – becomes salient when arguments are formulated in the context of a multidisciplinary, global historical narrative.     

如何选择非执行董事会领导人

采用一种正式流程来选择非执行董事会领导人正当其时。明确定义其职责是一个良好的开端。自从股票挂牌上市的要求促使许多美国企业任命一位独立董事担任董事会的董事长、首席董事或主持会议董事以来，这些企业一直在努力解决一个问题，即这位董事会领导人究竟应该做哪些事，以及如何为这一职位找到合适的人选。     

When is discretion superior to timeless perspective policymaking?

The monetary policy literature assumes increasingly that policy is formulated according to the timeless perspective (Woodford, 1999a). However, by treating appropriately the auxiliary state variables that characterize the timeless perspective equilibrium when evaluating policy performance, this paper shows that discretionary policymaking can be superior to timeless perspective policymaking and identifies model features that make this outcome more likely. Using standard New Keynesian DSGE models, discretion is found to dominate timeless perspective policymaking when the price/wage Phillips curves are relatively flat, due, perhaps, to firm-specific capital (or labor) and/or Kimball (1995) aggregation in combination with nominal rigidities. These results suggest that studies applying the timeless perspective might also usefully compare its performance to discretion, paying careful attention to how policy performance is evaluated.     

Monopolistic screening under learning by doing

This article investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework where agents' production technologies display learning effects and agents' learning rates are private knowledge. In a simple two‐period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over‐ or underexploited crucially depends on whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). We further show that an overexploitation of learning effects can occur also if the full‐commitment assumption is relaxed.     

Share reacquisitions,surplus cash,and agency problems

Share repurchases help alleviate agency costs of surplus cash by restricting management’s scope to waste corporate resources. But why do self-interested managers agree to disgorge surplus cash in the first place? This study examines the intervening effect of managerial monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms on the decision to distribute excess cash through a share repurchase. Findings indicate that repurchases substitute for cash retention decisions that would otherwise prove costly for shareholders, and that better managerial incentive alignment and closer monitoring by external shareholders are important factors stimulating such payouts.