Foreign direct investment and entrepreneurship: Does the role of institutions matter?

Development economics, international business, and entrepreneurship literature suggest that foreign direct investment (FDI) has significant positive spillover effects for entrepreneurial activities of host economies. However, the findings of past research are mixed, and they do not always confirm this suggestion. We argue that the reason for conflicting findings may be because of an incomplete understanding of the factors that influence the FDI-entrepreneurship nexus in different contexts. Previous studies have carried out only limited exploration of the contingencies in the FDI and domestic entrepreneurship relationship that may depend on the host country’s institutional capacity. We argue that not all countries can reap the rewards from FDI equally. Rather, we hypothesize that countries need to have a sufficient degree of institutional capacity relevant to specific conditions and appropriate threshold levels to successfully capture the positive spillover effects of FDI on domestic entrepreneurship. Utilizing panel data from 2006 to 2016 for 97 emerging markets, developing and developed countries (at different income levels), and a System Generalized Method of Moments (SGMM) estimator that controls for instrument proliferation in dealing with endogeneity problems, we test this hypothesis. We find that FDI has a negative (crowding-out) effect on domestic entrepreneurship at below-threshold levels of institutional capacity, and a positive (crowding-in) effect at above-threshold levels of institutional capacity. The crowding-out effect diminishes as the institutional capacity changes or improves to meet mutating economic environment conditions. Our findings are robust across a wide range of aggregate and disaggregate measures of different types of institutions and alternative empirical strategies.     

Regulating a monopolist with limited funds

Summary. We consider the problem of regulating a monopolist with unknown costs when the regulator has limited funds. The optimal regulatory mechanism satisfies four properties. The first property is bunching at the top, that is the more efficient types produce the same quantity irrespective of their costs. The second property is separability of less efficient types. The third property is full bunching of types when the available fund is small enough. The fourth property of the mechanism is that it is a third best one, that is, the output under this regulatory mechanism is strictly lower than the second best output for any given type.Received: 14 June 2004, Revised: 31 August 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D82, H42, L51. Correspondence to: Manipushpak MitraThe authors would like to thank Georg Nöldeke for encouraging this work. The authors are also thankful to Debajyoti Chakrabarty, Sougata Poddar and one anonymous referee for helpful comments and important suggestions. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft Graduiertenkolleg (DFG) 629 at the University of Bonn and from the Brussels Capital Region. The authors would like to thank the seminar participants at the EEA Conference 2003 (Stockholm), at the Indian Statistical Institute (New Delhi and Kolkata), at the Jadavpur University (Kolkata) and at the Centre for Studies in Social Sciences (Kolkata). The authors are solely responsible for the errors that may remain. An earlier version of this paper was called Financing infrastructure under budget constraints. Since the applicability of the problem developed in the earlier version is not limited to infrastucture, in this vers ion we have changed the name and content to incorporate this generality.