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61.
Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
We characterize generally the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions public goods game for two consumers with private information.The two consumers simultaneously make voluntary contributions to the public good, and the contributions are refunded if the total falls short of the cost of the public good. Several families of equilibria (step‐function, regular and semi‐regular) are studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for regular and semi‐regular equilibrium allocations to be interim incentive efficient are derived. In the uniform distribution case we prove (i) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient regular equilibria when the cost of production is large enough and (ii) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient semi‐regular equilibria when the cost of production is low enough. Step‐function equilibra are proved to be interim incentive inefficient. 相似文献
62.
Didier Laussel 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2008,17(4):895-911
In a model where a monopolistic downstream firm (assembler) negotiates simultaneously with each of its n subcontractors the prices of the complementary components which enter its product, we show that backward integration is limited by a strategic negative effect: the prices and profits of independent suppliers increase when a merger reduces their number. Mergers are profitable only if the downstream firm buys at least two thirds of its suppliers. In an endogenous acquisition game à la Kamien and Zang (1990) the only merged equilibrium occurs when there is only one subcontractor. In a sequential acquisition game full integration is not an equilibrium when the number of suppliers is at least five. 相似文献
63.
Didier Laussel 《Journal of International Economics》2007,71(1):148-166
We study a two-country two-sector model with free entry and monopolistic competition where both industries use labour to produce differentiated goods. The two countries are identical except for size. Labour is freely mobile across industries but it cannot move internationally. Transport costs affect both industries. The location of industries and the pattern of trade are the results of the interaction of two effects: the home market effect and the wage differential effect. The main results are: (i) if the two countries are sufficiently close in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), a continuous fall in transport costs from a prohibitive level to zero is associated with a reversal in the pattern of trade at some intermediate level. For large transport costs, the large country is a net exporter of the more differentiated good. For lower transport costs, the large country becomes a net exporter of the less differentiated good; (ii) if the two countries are very different in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), the larger country is always a net exporter of the less differentiated good. 相似文献
64.
As suggested by human capital theory, workers with flexible contracts participate less often in training than those with permanent
contracts. We find that this is merely due to the fact that flexworkers receive less employer-funded training, a gap they
can only partly compensate for by their own training investments. Flexworkers particularly participate less in firm-specific
training that is meant to keep up with new skill demands than workers with permanent contracts. However, for those who participate
in employer-funded firm-specific training, a temporary contract appears to facilitate the transition to a permanent contract
with the same employer. However, this does not hold for participation in self-paid training. This training, which is usually
general training, does not help in finding a better job. 相似文献
65.
This article investigates the impact of retailer personality on consumers' satisfaction with and loyalty to the retailer, measured through attitude and future behavioral intentions. Data were collected on a convenience sample of 372 customers of a specific retailer. Using partial least squares analysis (PLS), we show that four traits (“congeniality”, “originality”, “conscientiousness” and “preciousness”) have a direct or indirect impact on one of the dependent variables studied. Hence, this article proposes a model of the consequences of retailer personality and suggests that retailer personality is an important concept that practitioners should consider when running their satisfaction and loyalty programs. 相似文献
66.
Mathieu Tahon Bart Lannoo Jan Van Ooteghem Koen Casier Sofie Verbrugge Didier Colle Mario Pickavet Piet Demeester 《Telecommunications Policy》2011,35(9-10):883-894
Next generation access networks are expected to bring ubiquitous broadband access and have attracted interest of municipal governments. This paper investigates the support by municipal authorities for the rollout of such a city-wide wireless broadband access network. Different business cases for 3G and WiFi operators are developed and it is indicated how to model the specificities for commercial versus public players. Furthermore, a game theoretic approach is used to investigate the investment options of the municipal player. It is shown that a partnership between a commercial and public player is the most likely investment strategy. However, bringing more players into the competitive environment reduces the intention of the commercial partner to engage in the public–private partnership (PPP). 相似文献
67.
Jorge Ferrando Jean J. Gabszewicz Didier Laussel Nathalie Sonnac 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2008,4(3):357-379
Intermarket network externalities occur when the utility of a good produced in a given industry varies with the size of the demand for a good produced in another. A particularly significant example of this phenomenon is provided by the interaction between the media and advertising industries. Media consumers vary according to their willingness to pay for a media good, which depends on the advertising volume. In the advertising market, advertisers vary according to their willingness to pay for an advertisement, which also depends positively on the audience reached. We model a situation of competition between two content providers who are rivals in both the media and advertising industries, choosing simultaneously the newspaper prices and the advertising rates. We characterize the equilibria of the game and explore how they depend on audience attitudes towards advertising. Our main finding is that two-sided interactions may induce exit by one of the media companies from either only the advertising market or both markets. 相似文献
68.
Previous research has extensively studied consumer's environmental and social concerns. However, measuring the value of the environmental or social dimension of a product remains a challenge. This paper proposes to partially fill this gap by measuring the double ‘Fair Trade and organic’ labels' value using an experimental method – the Becker‐DeGroot‐Marschak's mechanism. Two ‘organic and Fair Trade’ and two conventional chocolate products were tested on a sample of 102 consumers. Results show that organic and Fair Trade labels increase consumers' willingness to pay, and allow the identification of three consumers clusters. The first cluster represents people insensitive to the label. For the second cluster, the ‘organic and Fair Trade’ labels' influence on the improving image of the products is positive and important. And finally, for the third cluster, the valuation of the ‘organic and Fair Trade’ label is determined by the product's taste. Our research contributes to a better understanding of consumers' valuation of Fair Trade and organic labels, leading to our conclusions, which offer managerial implications with respect to this market (importance of taste and usefulness of double labels). 相似文献
69.
70.
Didier Cossin Estelle Metayer 《董事会》2014,(11):92-94
正如果董事会能够清晰地定义自己在公司内的战略功能,董事会内部、董事会与高管之间的争议将大大减少光怪陆离的世界,商业模式快速遭遇颠覆,新的竞争者层出不穷,为了生存发展,公司高层比任何时候都更加需要战略思维。不幸的是,董事会似乎仍然不知道应该如何在公司里发挥战略性作用。一种极端情况是,董事会就是CEO决策程序里一个橡皮图章; 相似文献