Seung Huh  Dmitry A. Shapiro  Sung H. Ham 《The Journal of industrial economics》2023,71(3):770-813

We study how the inaccuracy of a costly certification technology affects a monopolistic seller's profitability. We compare three scenarios: no certification, a 100% accurate certification, and a 50% accurate certification that produces accurate evaluations half the time. The noisy certification environment is never the most profitable and, depending on the buyers' loss aversion, can be the least profitable. However, a noisy certification can be more profitable than an accurate one, as it discourages the over-certification that occurs in an accurate certification environment. Experimentally, the noisy certification is shown to be the least profitable treatment, whereas the accurate certification is shown to be the most profitable.  相似文献   

    

Dmitry Plotnikov 《International Journal of Economic Theory》2019,15(1):109-127

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A model for a large investor trading at market indifference prices. I: Single-period case     

Peter Bank  Dmitry Kramkov 《Finance and Stochastics》2015,19(2):449-472

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Dmitry Shapiro  Seung Huh 《Journal of Economics & Management Strategy》2021,30(1):81-99

The paper studies incentives of low‐quality sellers to disclose negative information about their products. We develop a model in which one's quality can be communicated via cheap‐talk messages only. This setting limits the ability of high‐quality sellers to separate, as any communication strategy they pursue can be costlessly imitated by low‐quality sellers. We study two factors that can incentivize low‐quality sellers to communicate their quality: buyers' loss aversion and competition. Quality disclosure reduces buyers' risk, thereby increasing their willingness to pay for the product. It also introduces product differentiation, softening the competition.  相似文献