Manager‐Union Bargaining Agenda Under Monopoly and with Network Effects

This paper investigates the bargaining agenda selection in a unionised monopoly with managerial delegation (MD). In contrast to the conventional wisdom, monopoly profits with MD under sequential Efficient Bargaining (SEB) exceed those under Right‐to‐Manage (RTM), while the union can prefer RTM to SEB: paradoxically, a conflict of interests between the parties may still exist but for reversed choices of the agenda. Consumption externalities change the picture. The monopolist still prefers SEB; however, provided that network effects are sufficiently strong, the union prefers SEB even for a relatively low bargaining power. Thus, the parties endogenously choose the SEB agenda which is also Pareto‐superior. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Comparing Alternative Predictors Based on Large‐Panel Factor Models

This article compares the predictive ability of the factor models of Stock and Watson (2002a) and Forni, Hallin, Lippi and Reichlin (2005) using a ‘large’ panel of macroeconomic variables of the United States. We propose a nesting procedure of comparison that clarifies and partially overturns the results of similar exercises in the literature. Our main conclusion is that with the dataset at hand the two methods have a similar performance and produce highly collinear forecasts.     

Investment, Pass-Through, and Exchange Rates: A Cross-Country Comparison

Using detailed data from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Japan, we examine the implications of exchange rates for time series of sectoral investment. Both theoretically and empirically, we show that investment responsiveness to exchange rates varies over time, positively in relation to sectoral reliance on export share and negatively with respect to the share of imported inputs in production. Important differences exist in investment endogeneity across high- and low-price-over-cost markup sectors, with investment in low-markup sectors often significantly more responsive to exchange rates. Cross-country differences in investment response are only partially explained by industrial organization arguments.     

Price stickiness and the contractionary effect of technology shocks

We derive a measure of technological change from a dynamic cost minimization model that controls for imperfect competition, increasing returns and unobserved factor utilization. We estimate this measure using highly detailed panel data of a representative sample of Italian manufacturing firms for the period 1984-1997. Our key finding is that technological improvements result in a contraction of labor input on impact. In principle, this result can be reconciled with the transmission mechanism of flexible-price models by resorting to reorganization and reallocation effects. On the other hand, however, it is consistent with the predictions of a sticky-price model. Using survey information on the frequency of price revisions, we corroborate the latter interpretation, by showing that the contractionary effect of technology shocks is much stronger for firms with stickier prices.     

Corrigendum to “The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda” [Int. J. Ind. Organ. 17 (1999) 1029-1040]

Assuming Cournot competition, Bughin (1999, 'The strategic choice of union-oligopoly bargaining agenda', International Journal of Industrial Organization) states that in a unionized oligopoly with firm specific negotiations, Efficient Bargaining (EB) is always the industry equilibrium both under blockaded and non-blockaded market structures. Extending Bughin's (1999) framework to a conjectural variation model, this note shows that EB emerges as equilibrium only for entry deterrence reasons. In all other cases, conflict of interests among the bargaining parties arise due todifference in dominant strategies, whatever is the degree of competitiveness of the industry.     

Equilibrium prices in the presence of delegated portfolio management

This paper analyzes the asset pricing implications of commonly used portfolio management contracts linking the compensation of fund managers to the excess return of the managed portfolio over a benchmark portfolio. The contract parameters, the extent of delegation, and equilibrium prices are all determined endogenously within the model we consider. Symmetric (fulcrum) performance fees distort the allocation of managed portfolios in a way that induces a significant and unambiguous positive effect on the prices of the assets included in the benchmark and a negative effect on the Sharpe ratios. Asymmetric performance fees have more complex effects on equilibrium prices and Sharpe ratios, with the signs of these effects fluctuating stochastically over time in response to variations in the funds' excess performance.     

Farming and tourism enterprise: Experiential authenticity in the diversification of independent small-scale family farming

This article examines the business choices made by independent farming families, when confronting the need to diversify away from traditional agricultural activities by starting farm-based tourism businesses. Based on interviews with farm family members who have set up tourism attractions on their farms, and drawing upon the concept of experiential authenticity, the article explores their self-conceptions of their family identities. In so doing, it addresses the choices and dilemmas facing farm families who attempt diversification through the tourism attraction route, and considers how this affects their attitudes towards more traditional farming activities. Using qualitative case study data, an empirically grounded framework is proposed that expresses the choices and challenges facing tourism entrepreneurial family farm members in the UK, through the conceptual lens of experiential authenticity.     

Markups and the Business Cycle: Evidence from Italian Manufacturing Branches

This paper investigates the markup of price over marginal cost in Italian manufacturing branches. The approach used is an extension of Hall's model that addresses some measurement shortcomings and theoretical limitations that may affect this class of model. The hypothesis of perfect competition is rejected in the majority of sectors over the period 1977–1995. The cyclical behavior of markups is found to vary significantly across branches, thereby helping to explain the contradictory evidence regarding the whole manufacturing sector reported in the literature. At branch level, industry concentration is found to be associated with countercyclical markups, providing scope for real effects of aggregate demand shocks. Finally, the size of the markup is negatively affected by both domestic and foreign competitive pressure.     

Business fluctuations and bankruptcy avalanches in an evolving network economy

We analyze the properties of a three-sector network economy characterized by credit relationships connecting downstream and upstream firms (inside credit) and credit relationships connecting firms and banks (outside credit). The network topology changes over time due to an endogenous process of partner selection (the preferred-partner choice rule). The output of simulations shows that a business cycle at the macroeconomic level can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction of the heterogeneous financial conditions of the agents involved. In this paper we focus on the emergence of bankruptcy crises: the bankruptcy of one agent can bring about the bankruptcy of one or more other agents in a snowball effect of more or less large size, depending on the network structure and the incidence of non-performing loans on balance sheets of agents involved.