Logs or permits? Forestry land use decisions in an emissions trading scheme

Negative carbon emissions options are required to meet long-term climate goals in many countries. One way to incentivise these options is by paying farmers for carbon sequestered by forests through an emissions trading scheme (ETS). New Zealand has a comprehensive ETS, which includes incentives for farmers to plant permanent exotic forests. This research uses an economy-wide model, a forestry model and land use change functions to measure the expected proportion of farmers with trees at harvesting age that will change land use from production to permanent forests in New Zealand from 2014 to 2050. We also estimate the impacts on carbon sequestration, the carbon price, gross emissions, GDP and welfare. When there is forestry land use change, the results indicate that the responsiveness of land owners to the carbon price has a measured impact on carbon sequestration. For example, under the fastest land use change scenario, carbon sequestration reaches 29.93 Mt CO₂e by 2050 compared to 23.41 Mt CO₂e in the no land use change scenario (a 28% increase). Even under the slowest land use change scenario, carbon sequestration is 25.89 Mt CO₂e by 2050 (an 11% increase compared with no land use change). This is because, if foresters decide not to switch to permanent forests in 1 year, carbon prices and ultimately incentives to convert to permanent forests will be higher in future years.     

Financial Disclosure Management by Charitable Organisations: A Conceptual and Operational Framework

We present a conceptual and operational framework for analysing financial disclosure management by charitable organisations. We paint an overall picture of the issue and apply various theories to explain this management practice. The framework lists the many motivations and contextual factors that impel managers of charitable organisations to manage financial information and explains how they weight and prioritise items in light of considerations such as incentive bonuses, social performance, resource dependence and monitoring mechanisms. The framework also sums up the strategies and techniques that undergird financial disclosure management and describes the monitoring mechanisms that mitigate this opportunistic practice and its consequences. The paper concludes by presenting several research avenues.