A cluster-based strategy for Russia’s innovative development

This paper summarizes Russia’s experience in the use of the cluster approach to solving modernization and innovative development problems in the country’s economy. Our main attention is focused on analyzing the formed approaches, programs, and regulatory legal acts adopted on clustering at the federal and regional levels. We have also analyzed the positive experience accumulated by individual constituents of the Russian Federation. The paper shows the key role of infrastructural systems of intellectual and financial capital in supporting a cluster’s innovative orientation.     

Initiating Negotiations: The Role of Machiavellianism, Risk Propensity, and Bargaining Power

Initiation is an often-overlooked yet essential stage of the negotiation process. This study examined the effects of two measures of personality—Machiavellianism and risk propensity—and relative bargaining power (as based on multiple situational factors) on three phases of the initiation process—engaging a counterpart, making a request, and optimizing the request. Using a multi-scenario approach, one hundred fifteen participants indicated their initiation preferences for three distinct negotiations. The results of repeated measures ANOVAs indicate that bargaining power influences an individual’s decision to initiate negotiations. In addition, those high in Machiavellianism choose to initiate negotiations even when relative bargaining power is low, whereas those high in risk propensity tend to optimize their requests. The implications of these findings for practitioners and future research are discussed.     

The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes,Mechanics and Outcomes

We use insights from the literature on currency crises to offer an analytical treatment of the crisis in the market for Greek government bonds. We argue that the crisis itself and its escalating nature are very likely to be the result of: (i) steady deterioration of Greek macroeconomic fundamentals over 2001–09 to levels inconsistent with long‐term EMU participation; and (ii) a double shift in markets’ expectations, from a regime of credible commitment to future EMU participation under an implicit EMU/German guarantee of Greek fiscal liabilities, to a regime of non‐credible EMU commitment without fiscal guarantees, respectively occurring in November 2009 and February/March 2010. We argue that the risk of contagion to other periphery EMU countries is significant; and that without extensive structural reforms, the sustainability of the EMU is in question.